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Conversational implicature is (roughly) the practice of conveying one thing by 
saying another. Philosophical and linguistic work on the topic has been dominated 
by the approach proposed by Paul Grice — the Gricean framework, as I call it — 
according to which implicatures can be calculated from principles of cooperative 
behaviour. The framework faces numerous objections and counterexamples, 
however, and this thesis reassesses it in the light of recent work in the area. 
Chapters 1 and 2 introduce the topic, provide a detailed exposition of the Gricean 
framework, and highlight a problem concerning the role of speaker intentions in 
implicature. Chapter 3 sets out some problems for Grice’s approach and argues 
that we can address them by reinterpreting his framework as a normative one. It 
proposes some revisions to the framework to make it more compatible with this 
reading and shows how the tension in Grice’s view of speaker intentions can be 
resolved. Chapter 4 then argues that, despite its attractions, the revised theory has 
a serious flaw, being unable to establish norms of implicature that are speaker-
independent. The chapter proposes instead an intention-centred account, which 
abandons the requirement of calculability and allows a direct role for speaker 
intentions, while still preserving a normative element. Chapter 5 looks at neo-
Gricean theories, which use Gricean principles to explain a range of supposedly 
context-independent implicatures. It sets out some problems for neo-Griceanism, 
comparing it with rival approaches and surveying relevant experimental evidence. 
The chapter concludes that implicature is more context-sensitive than neo-
Griceanism allows and that general principles have at best a limited role in its 
explanation. Chapter 6 draws some conclusions, arguing that implicature is less 
rational than Grice supposed and more dependent on context and speaker intention. 
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A note on grammar 
 
In this thesis I use ‘they’, ‘them’, and ‘their’ as gender-neutral pronouns. This 
practice has a long history in English and, in the words of The Cambridge Guide 
to English Usage, ‘has become unremarkable — an element of common usage’ 
(Peters 2004, p.538). 
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Chapter 1  
Implicature: questions and theories 
 
1. The case of Mr Bronston 
On 10 June 1966, American movie producer Samuel Bronston was being 
questioned under oath at a bankruptcy hearing. His production company, Samuel 
Bronston Productions Inc, had failed two years earlier, and lawyers for its creditors 
wanted to know what overseas assets it held. (Bronston made films in European 
countries, where costs were lower, and his company held bank accounts in these 
countries.) In the course of this questioning, the following exchange took place 
between Bronston and one of the lawyers:  
 
Q. Do you have any bank accounts in Swiss banks, Mr. Bronston?  
A. No, sir.  
Q. Have you ever?  
A. The company had an account there for about six months, in Zurich.  
Q. Have you any nominees who have bank accounts in Swiss banks?  
A. No, sir.  
Q. Have you ever?  
A. No, sir. 
(Quoted in Bronston v. United States 1973) 
 
 Bronston’s answers were truthful, but the second of them was misleading. 
Bronston was asked whether he had ever had an account in a Swiss bank, but he 
replied by saying that his company had had such an account. The lawyer took this 
to indicate that Bronston himself had not had a Swiss bank account, and moved 
on. In fact, this was not true. Bronston had had a personal account with a bank in 
Geneva for nearly five years during the relevant period. He had made large 
deposits into the account and transferred money from it to his production company. 
When this was discovered, Bronston was charged with perjury. 
 At his trial, the prosecution argued that Bronston had deliberately chosen to 
give information about his company’s Swiss bank account in order to give the 
impression that he himself had not had such an account. The District Court 
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instructed the jury that perjury consists in ‘wilfully testifying to the truth of a fact 
which the defendant does not believe to be true’, but added that Bronston could be 
convicted of perjury if he had given an answer which was ‘not literally false but 
[which] when considered in the context in which it was given, nevertheless 
constitute[d] a false statement.’ The Court gave the following example: 
 
[I]f it is material to ascertain how many times a person has entered a store 
on a given day and that person responds to such a question by saying five 
times when in fact he knows that he entered the store 50 times that day, 
that person may be guilty of perjury even though it is technically true that 
he entered the store five times. (Quoted in Bronston v. United States 
1973) 
 
After over six hours of deliberation and a request for a repetition of the instructions 
given to them, the jury found Bronston guilty of perjury.  
 Bronston appealed, arguing that his answer had been truthful, even if 
unresponsive. The Court of Appeals ruled against him (although one judge 
disagreed), stating that:  
 
an answer containing half of the truth which also constitutes a lie by 
negative implication, when the answer is intentionally given in place of 
the responsive answer called for by a proper question, is perjury. (U.S. v. 
Bronston 1971) 
 
 Bronston appealed to the Supreme Court. The case was heard in November 
1972 and Chief Justice Burger gave the Court’s ruling in January 1973. Burger 
agreed that Bronston had implied that he had no personal Swiss bank account, and 
that in casual conversation this might be a reasonable interpretation of his 




the statute does not make it a criminal act for a witness to willfully state 
any material matter that implies any material matter that he does not 
believe to be true. (Bronston v. United States 1973) 
 
Provided they believe that the answers they give are literally true, Burger stated, 
witnesses should not be held responsible for any further intentions behind their 
testimony. 
 
A jury should not be permitted to engage in conjecture whether an 
unresponsive answer, true and complete on its face, was intended to 
mislead or divert the examiner; the state of mind of the witness is relevant 
only to the extent that it bears on whether ‘he does not believe (his 
answer) to be true.’ To hold otherwise would be to inject a new and 
confusing element into the adversary testimonial system we know. 
Witnesses would be unsure of the extent of their responsibility for the 
misunderstandings and inadequacies of examiners, and might well fear 
having that responsibility tested by a jury under the vague rubric of ‘intent 
to mislead’ or ‘perjury by implication.’ (ibid). 
 
Burger concluded that it was the questioner’s duty, not the courts’, to challenge 
unresponsive but literally true answers. The court reversed Bronston’s conviction.1 
 The Bronston case illustrates a familiar but puzzling phenomenon: our ability 
to convey one thing by saying another. By saying that his company had held a 
Swiss bank account, Bronston was somehow able to convey to his hearers the 
message that he himself had not had a Swiss bank account. This communicative 
                                                 
1  The Bronston case established a principle known as the ‘literal truth’ rule (for example, Anon. 
1999; Tiersma 1989–1990). It has been argued that this rule, together with similar legal practices, 
which seem to show a lack of regard for truth, have affected popular attitudes to truth telling, with 
the result that ‘society may have abandoned morality in favor of legality’ (Castleman 2004).  
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phenomenon, which philosophers and linguists call implicature, is the topic of this 
thesis.2 
 
2. Issues and questions 
Implicature raises many questions and connects with many wider issues, which 
will recur in different ways throughout this thesis. Here I shall briefly introduce 
some of the main ones. 
 
2.1 Implicature generation  
First, there are questions about how implicatures are determined, or, as it is often 
put, generated. By this, I mean how they come to exist, not how they are generated 
in the mind of the hearer. (I shall treat the question of how hearers detect 
implicatures separately.) What makes it the case that Mr Bronston’s utterance 
carried an implicature? The statement ‘My company had an account there’ does 
not entail ‘I did not have an account there’. The first statement could be true and 
the second false (indeed, that was so in Bronston’s case). Nor would the first 
statement always carry the implicature that the second was true. If Bronston had 
been asked whether his company had had an account in Switzerland, then no one 
would have thought that his answer conveyed anything more than its literal 
meaning. So it seems that Bronston’s implicature was due to some feature of the 
context. But which feature, or features, exactly? Was the implicature determined 
by Bronston’s intentions? Did it depend in any way on how his hearers interpreted 
his utterance? Or was the implicature generated by non-psychological features of 
the communicative exchange, and if so, which ones?  
 There are further questions about implicature generation. Are all implicatures 
generated in the same way? As we shall see in the next chapter, unlike Bronston’s 
answer, some sentences carry the same implicature in most contexts, unless words 
are added to cancel the implicature. (These are known as generalized implicatures, 
as opposed to context-dependent particularized ones.) For example, in most 
contexts the sentence ‘Some of the students passed the test’ carries the implicature 
                                                 
2  Strictly speaking, I shall be concerned with what is called conversational (as opposed to 
conventional) implicature. I shall explain these terms in Chapter 2. 
 15
that not all the students passed the test. Are these implicatures generated in a 
different way from ones that are more context-specific, or are the same factors 
involved? Is it always determinate whether or not an utterance carries an 
implicature, and if so, what is it? If hearers disagree about the existence of a 
particular implicature, will there always be (at least in principle) some way of 
settling the dispute? 
 These questions are, I take, it, broadly speaking, philosophical questions. The 
implicated meanings of utterances, like their literal ones, depend on us. They are 
not intrinsic properties of the sounds involved but properties that depend in some 
way on how we use and react to those sounds — on our communicative practices 
and conventions, and our expectations, intentions, and beliefs. So in order to 
explain how they arise, we need to think about our everyday communicative 
practices and attitudes, and to analyse the conditions under which we ascribe 
implicatures to utterances, drawing on our intuitions about different cases and 
making use of thought experiments and counterexamples.  
 
2.2 Implicature recovery 
The second set of questions are questions about how implicatures are processed or 
recovered — that is, about the processes by which a hearer comes to interpret an 
utterance as carrying a particular implicature.3 Does implicature recovery involve 
inference, and if so, what kind of inference is it and what data does it draw on? 
Are there general principles of implicature recovery or is implicature derivation 
context-driven? Implicature recovery is a part of pragmatic processing, the 
recovery of contextual aspects of meaning, as opposed to purely semantic 
processing, which is concerned with the recovery of literal, non-contextual 
meaning. How is implicature recovery related to other aspects of pragmatic 
processing and to the processing of semantic meaning? Are semantic and 
pragmatic processing really distinct?  
                                                 
3  I use the term ‘recovery’ (or, alternatively, ‘derivation’) to contrast with ‘generation’, but I 
shall use it in such a way that there can be recovery without generation. That is, I allow the 
possibility that a hearer may interpret an utterance as carrying an implicature that it does not in fact 
carry, according to our preferred theory of implicature generation. 
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 Unlike questions about implicature generation, these are questions about the 
mental processes involved in utterance interpretation. Theories of implicature 
recovery are thus broadly psychological ones, though most of them aim to describe 
the interpretation process at an abstract level, rather than specifying detailed 
cognitive mechanisms. Theories of this kind have been developed primarily by 
linguists and cognitive scientists, drawing on linguistic intuitions, evolutionary 
considerations, and, increasingly, experimental data.4 
 This distinction between implicature generation and implicature recovery is 
not always drawn, and some theories of implicature tend to run the two sets of 
questions together. (Jennifer Saul suggests that some ‘relevance’ theorists do this, 
taking the hearer’s interpretation of an utterance to determine what the utterance 
implicates; Saul 2002b.) It is not hard to see why this happens. Questions of 
generation and recovery are closely related, and the answers to one set may be 
relevant to the other. Implicatures are typically recoverable by competent human 
hearers, and any theory of implicature generation that would make their recovery 
impossible or extremely hard for humans can be ruled out. Thus considerations of 
recoverability constrain theories of implicature generation. Moreover, implicature 
recovery must be sensitive to whatever factors make it the case that implicatures 
exist, so a theory of implicature generation sets the target for a theory of 
implicature recovery. This probably accounts for why questions about generation 
and recovery are often run together in a ‘theory of implicature’. (I shall expand on 
these points later, in Chapter 4.) Indeed, implicature generation might be, in a 
sense, dependent on the recovery process. It might be that an utterance carries an 
implicature just because hearers are typically disposed to interpret it as doing so, 
and speakers can rely on this. (The ‘neo-Gricean’ theories discussed in Chapter 5 
can be interpreted in this way.)  
 Thus, theories of implicature generation and implicature recovery are not as 
independent as they seem at first sight. However, they are conceptually distinct 
                                                 
4  Of course, theories about implicature generation may also be in a sense psychological. It may 
be that implicatures exist in virtue of certain psychological states of the speaker or hearer, or both. 
That is to say, an answer to the philosophical question of what implicatures are may mention 
psychological states. However, that does not make the question itself a psychological one. 
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and involve different methods of investigation, and it is important not to confuse 
them or to judge a theory of one by the standards appropriate to the other.  
 
2.3 Normative issues 
We can also ask normative questions about implicature. In the case of literal 
meaning we can make a distinction between what a speaker means and what their 
words mean. Suppose Mr Bronston had said explicitly, ‘I did not have a bank 
account in Switzerland.’ Then if he had later been presented with evidence that he 
had had such an account, he would have had difficulty defending himself against 
a perjury charge by saying that he had really meant that he had not had a bank 
account in Swaziland. There are established norms of literal meaning, and 
witnesses are expected to respect them. Even if a witness accidentally misspeaks, 
they may still be held responsible for their carelessness.  
 Are there similar norms for implicature, which would determine what, if 
anything, Mr Bronston’s utterance implicated? We use implicature widely, and it 
can be used to convey important messages, such as invitations and consent. (Think, 
for example, of how a question such as, ‘Shall we go upstairs?’ might, in certain 
circumstances, be used to convey an invitation to sexual intercourse.) Implicit 
communication of this kind is open to abuse (as, arguably, in Mr Bronston’s case), 
and may lead to serious misunderstanding and confusion. Having clear norms 
governing its use would, therefore, be very useful.  
 Questions about norms of implicature are obviously closely linked to questions 
about implicature generation. In asking how implicatures are generated we are in 
effect asking when it is correct to attribute implicatures to utterances. When the 
conditions for a certain utterance to generate a certain implicature are met, then it 
will be correct to say that the utterance carries that implicature. However, whether 
this yields socially useful norms will depend on what the generation conditions 
are. If the condition for an utterance to implicate a proposition p is simply that the 
speaker intends it to implicate p, then this would not give us speaker-independent 
norms of implicature, like those of literal meaning. Speakers would, potentially, 
be able to make their utterances implicate anything they liked. (We might call this 
the Humpty Dumpty view of implicature, after Lewis Carrol’s Humpty Dumpty, 
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who claimed he could make his words mean anything he liked.)5 Such norms 
would be of little use in regulating communication, and speakers could always 
plead that any supposed implicatures of their utterances were unintended and 
hence non-existent.  
 On the other hand, if the conditions for implicature generation are independent 
of, or at least not wholly determined by, the speaker’s intentions, then this might 
(depending on the details) support a substantive normative theory of implicature. 
Speakers might be held responsible for implicatures generated by their utterances, 
even if they had not intended them or been aware of them. If the generation 
conditions are also independent of the hearer’s mental states, then an utterance 
might generate an implicature that neither speaker nor hearer notice (just as a 
sentence might carry a conventional meaning that neither speaker nor hearer 
recognize).  
 
2.4 Ethical questions 
Another set of questions concerns the ethics of implicature. What responsibility do 
speakers have for the implicatures their utterances carry? Was the Supreme Court 
right to reverse Mr Bronston’s conviction for perjury? Even if it was as a matter 
of law, what about speakers in ordinary conversational contexts? Do speakers have 
a moral responsibility for beliefs their hearers form as a result of implicatures 
carried by their utterances? Does it matter how obvious the implicatures are? What 
if a speaker does not notice that their words carry an implicature? (If that is 
possible; if implicatures depend on the speaker’s intentions, it might not be.) Are 
they still morally responsible for any effects the implicature has on their hearers? 
What about hearers? If a hearer misses an implicature, have they been negligent? 
Can it be negligent to trust an implicature (as the lawyer questioning Mr Bronston 
did)? What if different hearers disagree about what implicature, if any, an utterance 
carries? 
 Although these ethical questions can be considered on their own, we cannot 
deal with them fully until we have good theories of how implicatures are generated 
and recovered. In order to properly assess speakers’ responsibility in this area, we 
                                                 
5  Carroll, 2009, p.190 (originally published in 1880). 
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need to know when and how implicatures come to exist, and what control speakers 
have over the factors involved. For example, if implicatures depend on the 
speaker’s intentions, then speakers have a greater degree of control over (and thus, 
arguably, greater responsibility for) what their words implicate than if implicatures 
depend on conventions or other aspects of the situation that are not under the 
speaker’s control. Similarly, understanding how implicatures are recovered will 
help us to assess the extent of hearers’ duties with regard to the detection of 
implicatures and to decide when they have been negligent in missing them.  
 I shall return briefly to questions about the ethics of implicature in the final 
chapter, but for the most part I shall focus on the preliminary questions about 
generation and recovery. In this respect the current thesis prepares the ground for 
further work on the ethics of implicature.  
  
3. Theories  
3.1 Grice’s account and some alternatives 
More than any other person it was the philosopher Paul Grice (1913–1988) who 
brought implicature to the attention of philosophers and linguists, and Grice’s own 
account of the nature of implicature generation (first presented in a 1967 lecture 
series and published in 1975) has provided a hugely influential framework for 
thinking about implicature (Grice 1975). The core idea of the account is that the 
link between utterances and the implicatures they carry is not arbitrary or 
contingent, based on the speaker’s intentions or general conventions, but a rational 
one, grounded in general principles of cooperative behaviour. Grice argues that an 
implicature arises when an utterance would be uncooperative if taken literally, 
violating one or more maxims about how a cooperative speaker should convey 
information. Since a presumption of cooperation is essential to communication, 
Grice argues, in such cases the speaker must be understood to be conveying 
something other than the literal meaning of their utterance, and this is the 
implicated meaning. On this view, implicatures can be calculated from general 
communicative principles, although Grice does not claim that hearers must 
actually go through this calculation process in order to recover them. This 
approach aims to provide a unified account of both generalized, context-
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independent implicatures and particularized, context-specific ones, and it has been 
the dominant approach to implicature in the philosophical literature. 
 Grice’s work has also inspired psycho-linguistic theories that approach 
implicature through the recovery process (for example, Levinson 2000). These so-
called ‘neo-Gricean’ theories hold that when hearers interpret utterances they 
automatically apply certain heuristics, related to the maxims Grice proposes, 
which transform and enrich the literal meanings of the utterances in various ways, 
creating a new level of meaning which speakers can exploit and which makes 
communication more efficient. According to neo-Griceans, implicatures of the 
generalized kind belong to this level of meaning. This account does not, however, 
extend to particularized implicatures, and requires us to make a sharp division 
between generalized and particularized implicatures. 
 A radically different approach to implicature generation, advocated by Wayne 
Davis, completely rejects the Gricean view that implicature depends on general 
principles of communication (Davis 1998). By contrast, Davis argues that 
particularized implicatures depend on the speaker’s intentions, and that 
generalized implicatures depend on linguistic conventions. On this view, then, the 
link between an utterance and the implicature it carries may be to a large extent 
arbitrary, and implicature detection may require specific knowledge of the speaker 
or relevant linguistic conventions.  
 The chief alternative to neo-Gricean theories of implicature recovery is 
relevance theory (for example, Carston 2002; Sperber and Wilson 1995). This 
‘post-Gricean’ approach agrees that interpretation involves the application of 
general communicative principles, but it posits only one of these: that speakers 
aim to be maximally relevant (in a certain technical sense). Since the literal 
meaning of a sentence may not be the most relevant one in the context, this often 
dictates non-literal interpretations, and implicatures are cases of these. This view 
does not make a sharp distinction between generalized and particularized 
implicatures, but treats them all as context-dependent, particularized ones.  
 
3.2 The present thesis  
Grice’s approach to implicature (the Gricean framework, as I shall call it) is 
elegant and powerful, and (as we shall see) it promises to establish norms of 
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implicature of the kind I suggested it would be useful to have. Despite these and 
many other attractions, however, the framework faces problems. Some important 
interpretative questions remain unsettled, including questions about the role of 
speaker intentions in implicature and about the aims of Grice’s theory. Moreover, 
attacks on the Gricean framework have been mounting in recent years. Wayne 
Davis, in particular, has presented many powerful counterexamples to the view 
that implicatures can be calculated in the way Grice proposes. And post-Gricean 
pragmatists have attacked neo-Gricean accounts of implicature recovery, drawing 
support from a growing body of experimental work on implicature processing. 
Perhaps, for all its elegance, Grice’s approach was too ambitious, and implicature 
is a messier, more context-dependent, and less rational phenomenon than Grice 
supposed?  
 This is, then, a good time at which to reassess the Gricean framework. This 
thesis attempts such a reassessment. It is structured as follows. Chapter 2 provides 
a detailed exposition of Grice’s theory of implicature. It discusses key distinctions, 
claims, and applications, and introduces Grice’s well-known three-part definition 
of implicature, according to which what is implicated by an utterance is (roughly) 
whatever supposition is required to make sense of it as a cooperative contribution 
to the conversation. In addition, the chapter explores a tension in Grice’s views 
concerning the role of speaker intentions in implicature. I argue that the issue is 
not resolved in Grice’s work and that we should for the moment distinguish two 
possible versions of Grice’s account. Later chapters will return to this issue. 
 Chapter 3 turns to the detailed assessment of the Gricean framework. Drawing 
in part on Davis’s work, it sets out a number of problems for each of the three 
clauses of Grice’s definition, showing how Gricean theory conflicts with our 
intuitions about what implicatures various utterances carry. The chapter then goes 
on to look at a possible response to these problems based on a proposal by Jennifer 
Saul (Saul 2002a). Saul argues that Grice’s notion of implicature is a normative 
one, parallel to Grice’s notion of sentence meaning, and that additional descriptive 
notions (of utter-implicature and audience-implicature) are needed in order to 
account for our intuitions about implicature. This reinterpretation, I point out, 
gives Griceans a line of reply to the problem cases discussed earlier: They can hold 
that our intuitions in these cases are simply wrong, and that they refer to utter-
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implicatures or audience-implicatures rather implicatures proper. This is an 
attractive option, but the normative reading is not wholly in line with Grice’s 
definition of implicature and some problem cases remain. In response, I go on to 
propose a revised two-clause version of Grice’s definition that is fully in line with 
the normative reading and which avoids many of the remaining problems. The 
final section of the chapter then returns to the issue of the role of speaker intentions 
in implicature. Drawing on Saul’s parallel between implicature and sentence 
meaning, I argue that the tension in Grice views can be resolved by making a 
distinction between what a speaker implicates and what their utterance implicates, 
where the former, but not the latter, depends on the speaker’s intentions. The 
chapter concludes that the reinterpreted and revised version proposed is the most 
charitable and consistent form of the Gricean framework. 
 Having identified the most promising version of the Gricean framework, I go 
on in Chapter 4 to argue that even this version has a serious flaw. As a normative 
theory, its aim should be to provide a speaker-independent notion of implicature. 
Although implicatures may depend on features of the context of utterance, they 
should not depend on the intentions, beliefs, and values of the individual speaker. 
Otherwise, the theory would threaten to collapse into a Humpty Dumpty one. Yet, 
I shall argue, the Gricean framework does not provide such an account. It holds 
that implicatures can be calculated from information about utterances and their 
context, together with general principles of communication. Yet — I shall argue 
— there is no way to specify the appropriate premises for such calculations without 
appealing to the speaker’s beliefs, intentions, and values. Thus, although a 
speaker’s mental states do not directly determine what is implicated, they 
indirectly determine it by establishing the background assumptions relative to 
which implicatures are calculated. The chapter goes on to examine the 
consequences of this conclusion, arguing that it seriously undermines the Gricean 
framework and proposing instead an intention-centred account of implicature, 
which abandons the requirement of calculability and allows a direct role for 
speaker intentions. I argue that this account need not collapse into a Humpty 
Dumpy view, since a normative element can be preserved by requiring that an 
appropriate audience can work out what is being implicated. Moreover, by 
employing the notion of a meaning being made available to an audience, I argue, 
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we can draw a distinction between what a speaker implicates and what an utterance 
does, thus allowing for the possibility of unmeant implicatures. The third section 
of the chapter supplements the case against the revised Gricean framework by 
examining the notions of utterer-implicature and audience-implicature proposed 
by Saul and arguing that they cannot play the role required of them. The last section 
looks briefly at some of the implications of Grice’s theory of implicature 
generation for the process of implicature recovery, arguing that here too the theory 
has some unattractive consequences.  
 Chapter 5 turns to implicature recovery and neo-Gricean theories. Such 
theories hold that hearers derive generalized implicatures by applying 
interpretative principles similar to those proposed by Grice, but (I shall argue), 
they can also be seen as offering an account of how generalized implicatures are 
generated. Thus, if the neo-Gricean approach is sound, then the Gricean 
framework will be at least partially vindicated. The chapter focuses on Stephen 
Levinson’s influential version of neo-Griceanism (Levinson 2000), comparing and 
contrasting it with rival approaches, including relevance theory, a cognitive 
version of convention theory, and a weakened form of neo-Griceanism. Levinson 
identifies three core interpretative principles from which generalized implicatures 
can be derived, and the chapter examines each of these in turn. In each case I 
highlight numerous problem cases, arguing that they indicate that implicature 
recovery is more context-sensitive than Levinson supposes and that a rival 
approach may offer a more attractive explanation. This chapter also surveys recent 
work in experimental pragmatics and shows that its results do not fit well with the 
predictions of neo-Griceanism. The chapter concludes that the prospects for neo-
Griceanism are not bright, although Gricean principles may have a limited role to 
play in implicature recovery. It does not attempt to adjudicate between alternative 
non-Gricean theories, however, and suggests that a pluralistic approach to 
implicature recovery may be called for. 
 A short final chapter reviews the previous chapters, pulling threads together 
and drawing some tentative conclusions concerning the various questions raised 
earlier. The chapter and the thesis concludes with some speculations about the 
social function of implicature and related ethical issues.  
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3.3 Methodological remarks 
I shall add some brief remarks on methodology. First, I shall assume that 
propositional attitudes and reasoning involving them can be, and often are, 
nonconscious. So when I describe a speaker as having certain beliefs or intentions, 
or a hearer as making certain inferences, I should not be understood to be claiming 
that the attitudes and processes in question are conscious (though I should not be 
understood to be claiming that they are not conscious either). There are interesting 
questions about the relative roles of conscious and non-conscious processing in 
implicature recovery, but for the most part I shall not address them here (for some 
discussion of the topic within the context of ‘dual-process’ theories of reasoning, 
see Frankish and Kasmirli 2010).  
 Second, I shall assume that implicatures are psychologically real for us — that 
we typically intend them, notice them, and act on them. Thus, as suggested earlier, 
theories of implicature generation cannot ignore psychological questions about 
how utterances are interpreted and implicatures recovered. This is not to deny that 
claims about implicatures may have a normative aspect and that speakers and 
hearers can make mistakes about what implicature an utterance carries, or even 
fail to notice an implicature altogether. But I assume that most of us are good at 
detecting implicatures and that our careful judgements about them are usually 
sound. Thus, our intuitions about particular cases can provide evidence for our 
theories of implicature. 
 Third, and relatedly, in arguing for my position, I shall employ a mixture of 
philosophical analysis (drawing on our intuitions as data) and psychological 
theorizing. The former is primarily relevant to questions of implicature generation 
and the latter to questions of implicature recovery, but since the answers to one set 
of questions bear on those to the other, the two methodologies overlap. I do not 
think this mixture of methods is objectionable. It is common nowadays for 
philosophers of mind and psychology to adopt an eclectic approach, combining 
conceptual analysis with reflections on experimental results and broad 




With this introduction, I turn now to exposition of Grice’s theory of implicature, 





The Gricean framework 
 
The term ‘implicature’ was coined by Paul Grice, who was one of the first to 
identify and analyse the phenomenon. Grice proposed a theory of how implicatures 
are generated, according to which they arise from general principles of rational 
communication. This account forms the background to all subsequent work on the 
topic, and in this chapter I shall set it out and discuss a problem concerning its 
interpretation.  
 
1. Saying and implicating 
Grice’s first detailed presentation of his views on implicature was in his 1967 
William James lectures, given at Harvard. The ideas appeared in print in his 1975 
paper ‘Logic and Conversation’ (Grice 1975), which was later reprinted, together 
with the rest of the William James lectures, in his 1989 collection Studies in the 
Way of Words (Grice 1989).1 An earlier 1961 paper ‘The Causal Theory of 
Perception’ (Grice 1961/1989) also contains some discussion of implicature. Grice 
expressed his views tentatively, so it is not always easy to pin hard-and-fast 
commitments on him.2 I shall discuss an important interpretative issue later in this 
chapter (see section 5), but for the most part I shall be concerned with the view of 
implicature that is proposed in Grice’s writing and that he is commonly taken to 
endorse, without worrying whether Grice himself would in fact have endorsed it 
without qualification. I shall refer to this view as the Gricean framework.  
 Grice introduces the notion of implicature by contrasting it with that of saying. 
According to Grice, what a person says by an utterance is ‘closely related to the 
conventional meaning of the words (the sentence) he has uttered’ (Grice 
                                                 
1  Where a paper is reprinted in the 1989 collection, I shall cite it 19XX/1989, where 19XX is 
the original publication date. Where page numbers follow, they refer to the 1989 reprint edition. 
2  For examples of Grice’s caution in expressing his views about implicature, see Turner 2001. 
Grice himself humorously notes the suggestion that his remarks employ a new form of speech act, 
to be represented by an operator called quessertion, read as ‘It is perhaps possible that someone 
might assert that ...’. (Grice 1982, reprinted in Grice 1989, p.297). 
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1978/1989, p.25), and for a hearer to grasp what is said, he or she will need to 
know these conventional meanings (and resolve any ambiguities), together with 
any relevant references (of proper names, indexicals, and so on). For many 
purposes, what a speaker says by an utterance can be identified with the 
proposition they express. Strictly speaking, however, in order to say something, in 
Grice’s terms, it is not sufficient to produce an utterance with an appropriate 
conventional meaning. As Stephen Neale stresses (Neale 1992, p.523), for Grice 
an utterer counts as saying that p only if they mean that p — which for Grice 
involves having a self-referring intention of the sort described in Grice’s theory of 
meaning (Grice 1957, 1968, 1969, all reprinted in Grice 1989). Omitting many 
complications, a speaker S means that p by utterance x, if S intends to get their 
hearer H to believe that p (or to believe that S believes that p), and to achieve this 
in part via the hearer’s recognition of this very intention. If an utterer does not have 
an appropriate intention of this kind (for example, because they are being ironic), 
then they merely make as if to say p, rather than saying p (Grice 1978/1989, p.41, 
p.53). In short, the speaker must both have meant what they say and have found 
words with the correct conventional meaning to convey it. The utterer’s meaning 
(or speaker’s meaning) fixed by their communicative intention must coincide with 
the sentence meaning conventionally associated with the words used (Grice 
1969/1989, pp.87–8, 1968/1989, pp.120–1). I shall return to the distinction 
between saying and making as if to say later in this chapter.  
 On the one hand, then, we have what a speaker literally said (or made as if to 
say) by an utterance. However, this may not exhaust what is communicated by the 
utterance. In the exchange discussed in the previous chapter, Mr Bronston said that 
his company had an account in Zurich, but additionally implied that he himself had 
not had an account there. Thus, on the other hand, we have what (if anything) the 
speaker additionally implied by it. Grice notes that various everyday words might 
be used in this context, including ‘imply’, ‘suggest’, ‘indicate’, and ‘mean’ (1989, 
p.86, also 1975/1989, p.24, 1968/1989, p.118). To avoid choosing between these 
terms, he introduces the semi-technical term ‘implicate’ and the nouns 
‘implicature’ (the act of implicating) and ‘implicatum’ (what is implicated). 
 For Grice, what a speaker says (or makes as if to say) is the vehicle of 
implicature. From the speaker’s point of view, what is said is, in part, the means 
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to successfully implicating something, and from the hearer’s point of view 
grasping what is said is, in part, the means to recovering the secondary meaning 
that is implicated. (‘In part’ since it will not be possible to infer what is implicated 
solely from what is said; other factors too will play a role, such as knowledge of 
conversational principles, context, background knowledge, and so on.) Speakers 
implicate one thing by saying another, and hearers recover what is implicated by 
understanding what is said. Although the implicata of our utterances are often 
essential to our communicative exchanges, they do not affect the truth conditions 
of the utterances, which are determined only by what we say. In this respect 
implicatures differ from the presuppositions of an utterance (that is, propositions 
which must be true in order for the utterance to have a truth value), and from 
entailments of utterances (propositions whose falsity entails the falsity of the 
utterance). (Of course, implicata have truth values; but their truth values are 
independent of those of the utterances that generate them.)  
 In ‘Logic and Conversation’ Grice introduces two broad categories of 
implicature, which he calls conventional and conversational. These are similar in 
that neither affects the truth-conditions of the utterance that is used to convey them, 
but in other respects they are very different. Consider the following example, 
which is Grice’s own: 
 
 (1)  He is an Englishman; he is, therefore, brave. (Grice 1975/1989, p.25) 
 
This conveys (a) that the person referred to is both an Englishman and brave, and 
(b) that the person’s bravery follows from his being an Englishman. But, Grice 
claims, what is said is simply (a). From a truth-functional perspective, ‘therefore’ 
functions simply as a conjunction, and, strictly speaking, an utterance of (1) would 
not be false if it turned out that the person’s bravery was not a consequence of his 
being an Englishman (Grice 1975/1989, pp.25–6). Hence, (b) is implicated rather 
than said. However, this implicature is different from ones such as Mr Bronston’s, 
since it is determined by the conventional meaning of the words used. It is part of 
the meaning of the word ‘therefore’ that it carries the implicature that the second 
thing followed from the first. This implicature would be recognized by any 
competent hearer, no matter what the context, and it cannot be stripped away or 
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cancelled. This is what Grice calls a conventional implicature. Thus, knowledge 
of the conventional meaning of an uttered sentence (together with knowledge of 
relevant references) suffices to fix both what is said and what (if anything) is 
conventionally implicated by the utterance. As Stephen Levinson puts it, 
commenting on Grice’s programme, ‘what is coded by the linguistic system is the 
sum of what is said (roughly the truth-conditional content) and what is 
conventionally implicated’ (Levinson 2000, p.14).  
 Now contrast (1) with an utterance of: 
 
 (2)  Some Englishmen are brave.  
 
Taken literally, this says that there exist brave Englishmen, which is compatible 
with all Englishmen being brave. However, (2) would normally be taken to imply 
that not all Englishmen are brave. Unlike the implicature in (1), however, this 
implicature is not part of the conventional meaning of the words used, and it could 
be cancelled — for example, by adding ‘In fact, all Englishmen are’. 
 Or take the following sentences:  
 
 (3)  You obviously think tenacity pays.  
 
 (4)  Jones has beautiful handwriting.  
 
Taken out of context, (3) makes a claim about the hearer’s attitudes. But if uttered 
in response to a curious and persistent colleague, it will convey something about 
the speaker’s attitude — namely, that the speaker finds the hearer tiresome and 
won’t cooperate. Similarly, in many contexts (4) would simply express praise for 
a talent Jones possesses. However, if it were uttered by a professor of philosophy 
in response to a request for an opinion of a student’s academic ability, it would 
convey the message that Jones is a poor philosopher. (This now famous example 
was first used by Grice in his 1961, p.130.)  
 Examples (2) to (4) are cases of what Grice calls conversational implicatures. 
These are nonconventional, pragmatic implicatures, which are not part of the 
conventional meaning of the words used. Unlike conventional implicatures, 
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conversational implicatures are at least to some degree context dependent, and they 
can be cancelled by a subsequent utterance. (I shall say more about cancellability 
below.) Grice allows that there may be other types of nonconventional implicature, 
in addition to conversational ones, but says little about them.  
 My focus in this thesis is on conversational implicatures, which are defeasible 
and not determined by the conventional meaning of the words used. (I shall, 
however, consider the suggestion that some of these implicatures are themselves 
conventional in another sense; see Chapter 5.) When I use the word ‘implicature’ 
without qualification, it should be understood to refer to conversational 
implicature.  
 
2. Implicature generation 
How is ‘going beyond what is said’ supposed to work in the case of conversational 
implicature? Grice claims that hearers can arrive at the implicated meaning by a 
process of inference, guided by the assumption that the speaker is trying to be 
cooperative. He points out that conversational exchanges are typically cooperative:  
 
Our talk exchanges do not normally consist of a succession of 
disconnected remarks, and would not be rational if they did. They are 
characteristically, to some degree at least, cooperative efforts; and each 
participant recognizes in them, to some extent, a common purpose or set 
of purposes, or at least a mutually accepted direction. (Grice 1975/1989, 
p.26) 
 
He proposes a ‘rough general principle’ which speakers are expected to observe:  
 
Make your conversational contribution such as is required, at the stage at 
which it occurs, by the accepted purpose or direction of the talk exchange 
in which you are engaged. (ibid.)  
 
Grice calls this the Cooperative Principle (henceforth CP), and he claims that 
adhering to it involves respecting various maxims, which he assigns to four broad 
categories: Quantity, Quality, Relation, and Manner (1975/1989, pp.26–7). 
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Quantity concerns the amount of information provided and includes the 
submaxims: ‘Make your contribution as informative as is required (for the current 
purposes of the exchange)’, and ‘Do not make your contribution more informative 
than is required’. Quality includes the supermaxim: ‘Try to make your contribution 
one that is true’ and the submaxims ‘Do not say what you believe to be false’ and 
‘Do not say that for which you lack adequate evidence’. Relation comprises the 
general maxim ‘Be relevant’, the application of which may be very complex. 
Finally, Manner includes the supermaxim ‘Be perspicuous’ and the submaxims 
‘Avoid obscurity of expression’, ‘Avoid ambiguity’, ‘Be brief (avoid unnecessary 
prolixity)’ and ‘Be orderly’.  
  Grice suggests that these conversational maxims are instances of more general 
maxims which govern other kinds of purposive behaviour, such as helping to fix a 
car or bake a cake. In such cases, too, the parties involved are expected to be 
cooperative and to make contributions that are appropriate in quality, quantity, 
relevance, and manner. Grice also speculates that it is not a contingent fact that we 
observe the CP and its maxims, but that anyone engaging in communication is 
rationally required to observe them (Grice 1975/1989, pp.29–30). 
 Grice allows, of course, that on occasions a speaker may fail to follow these 
maxims. He mentions four cases (1975/1989, p.30). First, the speaker may covertly 
violate a maxim, usually in order to mislead their hearer. Second, a speaker may 
explicitly opt out of a maxim, for example by indicating that they are unwilling to 
tell all they know. Third, a speaker may find that two maxims clash, forcing them 
to choose between them. For example, if a speaker has information that is 
important but of doubtful reliability then they will not be able to simultaneously 
respect the maxims of Quantity and Quality. Finally, a speaker may openly flout a 
maxim in a way that is obvious to their hearer. Cases of the last type, Grice 
proposes, are the ones that typically generate conversational implicatures. By 
openly flouting the CP in what they say, yet without ceasing to observe the CP by 
opting out, a speaker signals to their hearer that they wish to convey some further 
message that is consistent with the CP. Thus, even though the speaker seems to be 
flouting the maxims, they are in fact following them at another level. As Grice puts 
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it, they are exploiting the conversational maxims for the purposes of generating a 
conversational implicature (1975/1989, p.36).3 
 Take the following example: 
 
 (5)  Ada: Do you like my new outfit? 
   Bea: You shouldn’t be allowed to buy clothes. 
 
Bea’s utterance appears to violate the CP — specifically the maxims of Quantity 
and Relation (and probably Quality too). Bea must know that more, and more 
relevant, information, is required, and she ought to be able to provide it, since the 
question was about her personal opinion. But Ada has no reason to think that Bea 
has opted out of the conversational exchange; Bea is her friend and knows that 
choices of outfit are important to her. Ada can reconcile these facts only by 
supposing that Bea is seeking to convey something else — that Ada’s outfit is 
horrible — which is informative and relevant but which for some reason Bea does 
not wish to say explicitly. Ada assumes that Bea thought Ada could work this out, 
and concludes that Bea is implicating that her outfit is horrible.4  
 In the case just described a maxim is actually flouted (exploited), but actual 
flouting is not necessary in order to generate a conversational implicature, in 
                                                 
3  Grice also allows that implicatures can also be generated by other maxims, such as aesthetic, 
social, and moral ones. Such implicatures form the class of nonconversational, nonconventional 
implicatures mentioned earlier. However, he holds that the conversational maxims and implicatures 
are the most important ones as far human communication is concerned (Grice 1975/1989, p.28).  
4  It might be objected that, taken literally, some of the maxims do not allow for indirect 
adherence of this kind, at the level of what is implicated rather than what is said. For example, the 
maxim of Quality tells us not to say something that we believe to be untrue, so a speaker cannot 
follow it by saying something they believe to be false, even if they thereby implicate something 
they believe to be true. Neale responds on Grice’s behalf that this probably reflects a looseness of 
phrasing, and that adherence to the maxim at the level of what is implicated should be allowed to 
compensate for a violation of it at the level of what is said. Thus ‘blatantly violating a maxim at 
the level of what is said but adhering to it at the level of what is implicated would not necessarily 
involve a violation of the Cooperative Principle’ (Neale 1992, p.526).  
  33
Grice’s view. In some cases, a conversational implicature is generated in order to 
avoid flouting. To borrow an example from Grice, suppose someone asks me 
where they can get petrol, and I reply ‘There is a garage round the corner’ 
(1975/1989, p.32). Here, what I say would flout the maxim of Relation (‘Be 
relevant’) if I didn’t believe that the garage round the corner has petrol and is 
currently open. Thus, my hearer must assume that I believe those things in order 
to preserve the assumption that I am following the CP, and I thereby implicate 
those propositions. However, what I said didn’t actually flout the maxim of 
Relation, since it is relevant that the station is round the corner. This contrasts with 
the case where Ada says that Bea should not be allowed to buy clothes, which is 
neither true nor relevant. In the latter case the implicature serves to repair a 
flouting by supplying a relevant meaning where one was lacking, whereas in the 
petrol station case it serves to prevent a flouting, by supplying additional 
information which makes the literal meaning relevant. Both cases, however, fit the 
same broad pattern, in that the implicated meaning must be presupposed in order 
to maintain the assumption that the speaker is being cooperative, and this is the 
heart of Grice’s account.  
 More formally, Grice offers the following three-part definition of the 
conditions that must be satisfied for a conversational implicature to occur: 
 
A man who, by (in, when) saying (or making as if to say) that p has 
implicated that q, may be said to have conversationally implicated that q, 
provided that (1) he is to be presumed to be observing the conversational 
maxims, or at least the Cooperative Principle; (2) the supposition that he 
is aware that, or thinks that, q is required in order to make his saying or 
making as if to say p (or doing so in those terms) consistent with this 
presumption; and (3) the speaker thinks (and would expect the hearer to 
think that the speaker thinks) that it is within the competence of the hearer 
to work out, or grasp intuitively, that the supposition mentioned in (2) is 
required. (Grice 1975/1989, p.30–1) 
 
Simplifying slightly, for a speaker to implicate q by saying p, it must be the case 
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that (1) the speaker is presumed to be being cooperative;5 (2) this presumption 
requires the supposition that the speaker thinks that q, and (3) the speaker thinks 
that their hearer can work this out. I shall follow Wayne Davis in referring to these 
three conditions as, respectively the cooperative presumption, determinacy (since 
it is the condition that q specifically is required), and mutual knowledge (Davis 
1998, p.13). Grice’s definition does not explicitly state who does the presuming in 
(1), but the natural interpretation is that it is the hearer.  
 Note that Grice says that the speaker need only make as if to say that p. Though 
they utter a sentence that conventionally means p, they themselves need not mean 
that p — the sentence meaning does not need to be backed by a speaker meaning 
(which for Grice would be constituted by an intention to get their audience to 
believe that p by recognizing this intention). Thus, for example, when Bea utters 
the sentence ‘You shouldn’t be allowed to buy clothes’, she does not really mean 
that Ada should not be allowed to buy clothes, and so (in Grice’s terminology) 
does not say it, but merely makes as if to say it. What Bea makes as if to say is 
merely the means to implicating that Ada’s outfit is horrible, which is Bea’s real 
communicative aim. The same will go in many cases where a speaker actually 
flouts a maxim as a way of generating an implicature, and it will almost always be 
the case where they flout the maxim of Quality.  
 
3. Calculability 
Grice claims that, in the process of working out what a speaker is conversationally 
implicating (that is, determining what is required to maintain the cooperative 
presumption), a speaker will draw on the following pieces of information:  
 
(1) the conventional meaning of the words used, together with the identity 
of any references that may be involved; (2) the Cooperative Principle and 
its maxims; (3) the context, linguistic or otherwise, of the utterance; (4) 
other items of background knowledge; and (5) the fact (or supposed fact) 
                                                 
5  This is how Grice’s first condition is often stated (and even misquoted), though he actually 
says that the speaker is ‘to be presumed’ to be being cooperative. I will say more about this issue 
in the next chapter. 
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that all relevant items falling under the previous headings are available to 
both participants and both participants know or assume this to be the case 
(Grice 1975/1989, p.31). 
 
And he suggests that the process will involve a calculation of the following general 
kind: 
 
[The speaker] has said that p; there is no reason to suppose that he is not 
observing the maxims, or at least the Cooperative Principle; he could not 
be doing this unless he thought that q; he knows (and knows that I know 
that he knows) that I can see that the supposition that he thinks that q is 
required; he has done nothing to stop me thinking that q; he intends me 
to think, or is at least willing to allow me to think, that q; and so he has 
implicated that q. (Grice 1975/1989, p.31) 
 
An argument which derives an implicated meaning in this way is sometimes 
referred to as a Gricean calculation.  
 It is not clear what kind of argument a Gricean calculation is supposed to be. 
The way Grice sets out the calculation and the fact that he uses the word ‘required’ 
in clause (2) of the preceding definition of implicature (‘the supposition that he is 
aware that, or thinks that, q is required in order to make his saying or making as if 
to say p … consistent with this presumption’) suggest that the argument is meant 
to be deductive — that the cooperative presumption and the other items of 
information mentioned entail that the speaker is implicating that q. But, as Wilson 
and Sperber note, the third stage in the Gricean calculation (‘he could not be doing 
this unless he thought that q’) does not follow from the claims before it, and Grice 
does not explain how it is derived (Wilson and Sperber 1991, p.378). Moreover, it 
is doubtful that we could construct a deductive argument for it — at least without 
giving a complete list of the speaker’s background beliefs. (Given suitably strange 
background beliefs, a speaker could regard any utterance as cooperative under its 
literal meaning.) Accordingly, many writers hold that the process of deriving an 
implicature is not one of deductive, demonstrative inference, but of abductive 
inference — inference to the best explanation of the data (Bach and Harnish 1979, 
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pp.92–3; Brown and Yule 1983, p.34; Leech 1983, pp.30–1; Levinson 1983, 
pp.115–6). On this view the conclusion that the speaker has implicated q is not 
logically required by what they have said (or made as if to say), given the context, 
the assumption that they are following the CP, and so on; rather, it is the most 
likely hypothesis given that information. It is not clear whether Grice would accept 
this, but for interpretative purposes I shall adopt a pluralistic position on which a 
Gricean calculation can be either deductive or non-deductive (or include both 
deductive and non-deductive elements), and I shall treat ‘required’ in this context 
as meaning ‘required or highly probable’. (I shall say more about implicature 
recovery in Chapter 5.) 
 Grice adds that the hearer need not actually go through a process of inference 
of this type in order to see that a particular conversational implicature is present. 
They may just ‘grasp intuitively’ that it is (Grice 1975/1989, p.31). However, he 
insists that the implicature must be ‘capable of being worked out’ — the intuition 
must be replaceable by an argument. Otherwise, it will count as a conventional 
implicature, not a conversational one (1975/1989, p.31; 1978/1989, p.43).6 The 
thought seems to be that if an implicature could not be calculated in the way 
described, then it could only arise from the conventional meaning of the words 
used (assuming, that is, that it is not some other kind of nonconventional 
implicature, derivable from maxims of a different sort).  
 The claim that the intuition must be replaceable by an argument accords with 
Grice’s wider views about reasoning, as set out in his posthumously published 
Aspects of Reason (Grice 2001). Here Grice distinguishes a laborious ‘hard’ way 
of reasoning, in which every step is spelled out, and an easier ‘quick’ way, which 
leaves gaps. The quick form still counts as reasoning, Grice argues, provided that 
                                                 
6  Compare the following passage from a 1981 paper, in which Grice makes the same point:  
[T]the final test for the presence of a conversational implicature had to be, as far 
as I could see, a derivation of it. One has to produce an account of how it could 
have arisen and why it is there. And I am very much opposed to any kind of 
sloppy use of this philosophical tool, in which one does not fulfill this condition. 
(Grice 1981, p.187, quoted in Cummings 2009, p.137)  
  37
the agent intends that each step could be filled out in such a way as to create a valid 
argument and has the ability to do this filling out:  
 
we could say (for example) that x reasons (informally) from A to B just 
in case x thinks that A and intends that, in thinking B, he should be 
thinking something which would be the conclusion of a formally valid 
argument the premisses of which are a supplementation of A. … The 
possibility of making a good inferential step (there being one to be made), 
together with such items as a particular inferer’s reputation for inferential 
ability, may determine whether on a particular occasion we suppose a 
particular transition to be inferential (and so to be a case of reasoning) or 
not. (Grice 2001, p.16) 
 
 As Richard Warner notes in his introduction to the volume, this offers an 
attractive view of the nature of the reasoning Grice attributes to speakers and 
hearers in his theory of speaker meaning (reasoning about the speaker intentions, 
the hearer’s recognition of these intentions, and so on). People do not go through 
this reasoning in the hard way, but they can be regarded as doing so in the quick 
way, provided they intend their interpretations of each other’s utterances to be 
rational and have the ability to produce reasoning of the relevant kind. The 
arguments Grice sets out can be thought of as the ones they would construct if they 
were to fill in the steps (Warner in Grice 2001, pp.xxxii-v). (It might be objected 
that most people do not have the ability to construct these arguments, and that it 
took a highly trained philosopher of Grice’s talents to produce them. Grice might 
reply that it is sufficient that people would recognize and endorse the arguments 
when presented with them.) We can take a similar view of the reasoning involved 
in deriving implicatures. Hearers may not actually go through a Gricean 
calculation when they interpret an utterance as carrying an implicature, but they 
intend their interpretation to be a rational one and the calculation sets out the sort 
of argument they would produce if they were to rationalize their interpretation. 
 To sum up, according to the Gricean framework, if an utterance U carries a 
conversational implicature q, then it must be possible to construct an argument 
(deductive or nondeductive) that derives the claim that the speaker is implicating 
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q from the conventional meaning of U, the CP, the context, background 
knowledge, and the fact that all this information is openly available. Following 
Davis, I shall refer to this claim as the Calculability Assumption (Davis 1998, 
p.14). The assumption serves as a supplement to the definition of conversational 
implicature, expanding on clause (2). To say that a proposition is required in order 
to make a speaker’s utterance consistent with the cooperative presumption is to 
say that it is the one that would be uniquely identified by a Gricean calculation. 
 
4. Particularized and generalized implicatures 
Grice introduces a further distinction among conversational implicatures, between 
two sub-categories: particularized and generalized. Particularized implicatures are 
one-offs — cases where a person implicates a particular message by saying that p, 
but there is, as Grice puts it, ‘no room for the idea that an implicature of this sort 
is normally carried by saying that p’ (1975/1989, p.37). For example, take:  
 
 (6)   It’s chilly here. 
 
Uttered by a person stepping off an aeroplane into the suffocating heat of a tropical 
country, this might carry the implicature ‘It is extremely hot here’. Given the 
conditions, the speaker cannot really believe that it is chilly, so their utterance 
would flout the maxim of Quality if taken literally. To preserve the assumption 
that the speaker is observing the CP, the hearer must suppose that they are speaking 
ironically and expressing the thought that it is the very opposite of chilly. However, 
the reasoning depends on particular facts about the context of the utterance (that it 
is suffocatingly hot) and in other contexts the same sentence would generate a 
different implicature, or none at all. For example, if uttered in response to the 
question ‘Do you want to go home?’ it might generate the implicature that the 
speaker does want to go home. The implicatures generated by uttering this 
sentence are particularized, context-dependent ones.  
 Generalized conversational implicatures, on the other hand, are not context-
dependent in this way; the words used ‘would normally (in the absence of special 
circumstances) carry such-and-such an implicature or type of implicature’ (Grice 
1975/1989 p.37). For example, sentences of the form ‘Some F are G’ will normally 
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generate an implicature of the form ‘Not all F are G’. If the speaker believed that 
all F were G, they would have flouted the maxim of Quantity by not saying that 
they all were. Given the presumption that the speaker is observing the CP, the 
hearer therefore infers that the speaker does not believe that all F are G. Here the 
inference does not depend on facts about the particular context of utterance and 
will go through by default in all contexts.  
 Levinson helpfully provides a more explicit formulation of the difference 
between the two types of implicature:  
 
a. An implicature i from utterance U is particularized iff U implicates i 
only in virtue of specific contextual assumptions that would not 
invariably or even normally obtain  
b. An implicature i is generalized iff U implicates i unless there are 
unusual specific contextual assumptions that defeat it.  
(Levinson 2000, p.16) 
 
 Grice acknowledges that it may not be easy to distinguish generalized 
conversational implicatures from conventional implicatures (Grice 1975/1989, 
p.37), but as a noncontroversial example of the former he offers expressions with 
the form ‘an X’, which, he notes, normally generate the implicature that the X in 
question ‘does not belong to, or is not otherwise closely connected with, some 
identifiable person’. For example, an utterance of ‘John is meeting a woman this 
evening’ would normally carry the implicature that the woman in question was not 
John’s wife, relative, or close friend. However, this is not a conventional 
implicature of the phrase ‘an X’, since there are some contexts in which the phrase 
does not generate the implicature, and ones in which it generates the opposite one. 
(Grice cites ‘I broke a finger yesterday’, which implies that the finger does belong 
to the speaker.) It is better, Grice argues, to see this as a case of generalized 
conversational implicature, generated by the mechanisms described above:  
 
When someone, by using the form of expression an X, implicates that the 
X does not belong to or is not otherwise closely connected with some 
identifiable person, the implicature is present because the speaker has 
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failed to be specific in a way in which he might have been expected to be 
specific, with the consequence that it is likely to be assumed that he is not 
in position to be specific. (Grice 1975/1989, p.38)  
 
That is, by not being more specific about the identity of the X referred to, the 
speaker has seemingly violated the maxim of Quantity, and the assumption that he 
or she is being cooperative can be preserved only on the supposition that he was 
not in a position to be specific — that is, did not think that the X belonged to or 
was closely connected with some identifiable person. (I shall discuss this example 
further in Chapter 5.)  
 Grice identifies some other properties that are distinctive of conversational 
implicatures as opposed to conventional ones. The two most important of these (in 
addition to calculability and nonconventionality, discussed above) are 
cancellability and nondetachability (Grice 1975/1989, pp.39–40, 1978/1989, 
pp.43–4). Grice sometimes refers to these as tests for the presence of a 
conversational implicature (1981/1989, pp.270–1), though he says they are more 
like prima facie indications than knock-down tests (1978/1989, p.43). I shall 
consider them in turn. 
 First, cancellability. Because conversational implicatures depend on the 
assumption that the speaker is observing the CP, and because a speaker can 
explicitly opt out of doing this, it follows that a conversational implicature can be 
cancelled. This can be done either explicitly, by adding a further statement which 
indicates that one is opting out, or implicitly, by the context. For example, using 
‘somebody’, rather than a more specific expression, normally generates the 
implicature that the speaker cannot identify the person referred to (following a 
similar line of reasoning to that for ‘an X’), but this implicature can be cancelled, 
as the following examples illustrate (the examples are my own):  
 
 (7)  Explicit cancellation. I heard somebody robbed you yesterday. In fact, 
it was your brother.  
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 (8)  Implicit cancellation. Somebody forgot to turn the headlights off. 
(Uttered in a context and with a tone of voice that makes it obvious that 
the speaker is referring to the hearer.) 
 
Here the second sentence in (7) and the context in (8) make it clear that the 
speaker’s use of ‘somebody’ was genuinely uncooperative (the speaker could have 
used a more specific term but didn’t, presumably for stylistic reasons), and the 
usual implicature is cancelled. 
 The second indicative feature of implicature is nondetachability. Since 
conversational implicatures are generated by general inferential principles applied 
to the conventional meanings of the sentences uttered (together with context and 
background information), utterances with equivalent conventional meanings will 
generate the same implicature in the same context. Thus in most cases ‘it will not 
be possible to find another way of saying the same thing, which simply lacks the 
implicature in question’ (Grice 1975/1989, p.39). That is, conversational 
implicatures are typically not detachable from the content of the utterance. An 
exception is where the implicature is generated by flouting the maxim of Manner, 
in which case how a content is expressed will be crucial. Grice gives the following 
example: ‘Miss X produced a series of sounds that corresponded closely to the 
score of “Home Sweet Home”’ (1975/1989, p.37). Because of the roundabout way 
it is expressed, avoiding use of the word ‘sing’, this implicates that Miss X’s 
singing was very bad. Saying the same thing in a simpler way would not generate 
this implicature.  
 A final feature of conversational implicature mentioned by Grice is 
indeterminacy. What is implicated by an utterance is, according to Grice, what 
must be supposed in order to preserve the assumption that the speaker is being 
cooperative. But in any given case there may be many different suppositions that 
could play this role. For example, Bea’s utterance of ‘You shouldn’t be allowed to 
buy clothes’ might be taken to implicate that the outfit Ada has chosen is dull, or 
that it is extravagant, or that it is too young for Ada, or that it is too old for Ada, 
or that it possesses some other negative feature. More generally, it might implicate 
that Ada’s taste in clothes is poor, or that Ada should listen to Bea’s advice, or 
some other, related claim. Grice accepts this point. In such cases, he claims, the 
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implicatum will be the disjunction of the various possible suppositions, and if this 
disjunction is open-ended, the implicatum will be simply indeterminate 
(1975/1989, p.40).  
 
5. Implicature and speaker meaning 
We saw earlier that a speaker S counts as saying that p, by uttering an appropriate 
sentence, only if they also mean that p — that is, only if they have an appropriate 
communicative intention. Otherwise, they merely make as if to say that p. This 
naturally raises the question of whether implicatures, too, must be backed by 
speaker meanings. For a speaker to implicate that q, must they also mean that q¸ 
on Grice’s view? (And if they go through the motions of implicating q without 
actually meaning q, do they just make as if to implicate q?) Although this is a basic 
and important question, Grice himself does not address it directly, and says nothing 
about speaker meaning in his account of implicature in ‘Logic and conversation’. 
In fact, there is a dispute over the correct interpretation of Grice here (Davis 2007; 
Neale 1992; Saul 2001, 2002a), and a case can be made for both positive and 
negative answers to the question, as I shall now explain.  
 There are several reasons for holding that Grice thought that speakers must 
mean what they implicate. When a person implicates something, it is natural to say 
that the implicated content is what they really meant, in contrast with what they 
literally said. Indeed, ‘mean’ is one of the everyday words (along with ‘imply’, 
‘suggest’, and ‘indicate’) for which Grice introduces ‘implicate’ as a technical 
replacement (1975/1989, p.24, 1989, p.86). It is notable, too, that in Grice’s 
general schema for working out an implicature, quoted earlier, the hearer’s train 
of thought concludes with ‘he [the speaker] intends me to think, or is at least 
willing to allow me to think, that q; and so he has implicated that q’ (Grice 
1975/1989, p.31) — which suggests that the speaker’s intentions (or at least their 
wishes) are relevant in deciding whether or not an implicature is present (for more 
discussion of this passage, see Davis 2007, p.1659). Moreover, in ‘The Causal 
Theory of Perception’ (Grice 1961) Grice specifically says that an implicature 
must be backed by a communicative intention. Discussing an imaginary case 
where he has reported on the abilities of a student, Jones, by saying simply ‘Jones 
has beautiful handwriting and his English is grammatical’, Grice comments: 
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I (the speaker) could certainly be said to have implied that Jones is 
hopeless (provided that this is what I intended to get across) ... (Grice 
1961, p.130) 
 
(It is true that the section in which this passage appears was not included when this 
paper was reprinted in Studies in the Way of Words, but there is no reason to think 
this was because Grice had changed his mind. In the reprint Grice says that the 
section was omitted because the material it contained was ‘substantially the same’ 
as that in ‘Logic and Conversation’ (Grice 1989, p.229)).  
 Another reason for thinking that conversational implicatures must be meant 
comes from Grice’s views about the role of the presumption of cooperation in 
generating them. Hearers posit implicatures in order to preserve the assumption 
that speakers are being cooperative. But if speakers need not mean what they 
implicate, how does what they implicate support the presumption that they are 
being cooperative? How can behaviour that is unmeant and unintended be 
genuinely cooperative? 
 Finally, on the basis of a reading of Grice’s other work, Stephen Neale argues 
that Grice held that what a speaker implicates is a part of what they mean overall 
(Neale 1992, pp.523–4). Neale points out that in ‘Utterer’s Meaning, Sentence-
Meaning and Word-Meaning’, Grice introduces the notion of what a speaker 
conventionally means, which breaks down into what they say and what (if 
anything) they conventionally implicate, and which is part of what they mean 
overall (Grice 1968/1989, p.121). Neale suggests that Grice would also have 
recognized the parallel notion of what a speaker nonconventionally means, which 
breaks down into what (if anything) they conversationally implicate and what (if 
anything) they nonconversationally nonconventionally implicate. 
(Nonconversational nonconventional implicatures are ones that are dependent on 
nonconversational maxims, such as aesthetic or moral ones.) Neale concludes that 
it is reasonable to think that Grice would have accepted the breakdown of what an 




Figure 1: The breakdown of what a speaker means, according to Stephen Neale’s 
interpretation of Grice. (Adapted from Neale 1992, p.523.) 
 
  On Neale’s view, then, Grice’s theory of conversational implicature is part of 
his wider project of explaining the conventional and nonconventional components 
of what a speaker means, and the reason there is no mention of speaker meaning 
in ‘Logic and Conversation’ is simply that Grice’s theory of speaker meaning is 
assumed as part of the background.  
 There is a strong case, then, for thinking that Grice held that implicatures must 
be backed by speaker meanings. However, there are also objections to this view. 
The main objection is that there is no mention of speaker meaning in Grice’s three-
part definition of conversational implicature in ‘Logic and Conversation’ 
(discussed above), which, as Jennifer Saul stresses, focuses on the attitudes of the 
hearer, not the speaker (Saul 2001, pp.632–3, 2002a, p.241). According to the 
definition, the hearer must presume that the speaker is observing the 
conversational maxims (clause 1), and be able to work out that the supposition that 
the speaker has a certain belief is required in order for his utterance to be consistent 
with that presumption (clause 2). The only attitude of the speaker that is mentioned 
is the belief that the hearer can work out that the supposition mentioned in clause 
2 is required (Grice 1975/1989, p.30–1). There is no mention of the speaker’s 
intentions at all.  
 It may be replied that Grice does not offer this definition as a complete account 
of the conditions necessary for conversational implicature, but only of those 
conditions necessary for an implicature to count as a conversational implicature, 
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as opposed to a conventional or nonconversational nonconventional one. (The 
definition begins ‘A man who, by (in, when) saying (or making as if to say) that p 
has implicated that q, may be said to have conversationally implicated that q, 
provided that...’; ibid). On this interpretation, other conditions will have to be met 
in order for an implicature to be present at all, and it may be that Grice took these 
to include the presence of a corresponding speaker meaning. This reading of Grice 
is adopted by Wayne Davis (Davis 2007, p.1660). It is true, however (as Davis 
acknowledges), that Grice elsewhere speaks of conversational implicatures being 
generated by, or present because of, or arising from the conditions mentioned in 
the definition, which suggests that those conditions are sufficient for the presence 
of a conversational implicature, rather than merely necessary for an implicature to 
count as conversational (for example, Grice 1975/1989, p.28, p.38, 1989, p.370). 
This reading, on which the conditions are sufficient, is often adopted in the 
subsequent literature (for example, Harnish 1991, p.330; Levinson 1983, p.100, 
p.103; Sadock 1991, p.366).  
 There is another reason for doubting that Grice would have accepted that 
implicatures must be backed by speaker intentions. Suppose that speakers must 
mean what they implicate — that is, they must have an appropriate communicative 
intention. But then why couldn’t implicatures be recovered simply by recognizing 
these intentions, rather than going through Gricean calculations? Indeed, on 
Grice’s view, for a speaker to mean q, they must intend to get their hearer to believe 
that q in part by recognizing this very intention. So, it seems, if implicatures must 
be meant, then a speaker who implicates q intends their hearer to come to believe 
q at least in part by recognizing their intention to communicate q, and not by going 
through a Gricean calculation. Thus, the speaker’s conception of how the 
implicated message is to be recovered seems to be different from the one suggested 
by Grice. Finally, if a speaker intends their hearer to recover the implicated 
message by recognizing their intention to communicate it, why is it necessary for 
them also to believe that the hearer can work out that the implicated message is 
required to uphold the presumption that they are being cooperative (clause 3)? 
 It may be replied that Grice claims only that implicatures must be calculable, 
not that they must actually be calculated. Perhaps they can also be recovered by 
recognizing the speaker’s intentions straight off, without any actual calculation 
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(though Grice himself does not mention this possibility). Moreover, the belief that 
the implicated message will be recovered by detecting the intention to 
communicate it is not incompatible with the belief that the message can be 
recovered by a Gricean calculation. The Gricean calculation could be the means to 
recognizing the intention; the speaker might (a) intend to get the hearer to believe 
that q in part by recognizing this very intention and (b) believe that the hearer can 
recognize this intention by going through a Gricean calculation. Indeed, in his 
informal description of the process of working out an implicature Grice makes it 
clear that he expects the hearer to move from the supposition that the speaker 
thinks that q to the belief that the speaker intends him (the hearer) to think that q: 
 
he knows (and knows that I know that he knows) that I can see that the 
supposition that he thinks that q is required; he has done nothing to stop 
me thinking that q; he intends me to think, or is at least willing to allow 
me to think, that q; and so he has implicated that q. (Grice 1975/1989, 
p.31) 
 
We might compare the role of sentence meaning in saying. Understanding what 
someone says involves recognizing the speaker’s communicative intentions, but it 
also involves recognizing the meaning of the sentence the speaker utters, and 
recognizing the latter is typically the means to recognizing the former.  
 This is a possible position, but, as it stands, it is still rather puzzling. Why 
should it be necessary for the speaker to believe that their communicative intention 
can be recognized by a Gricean calculation if it is not necessary for them to believe 
that it can be recognized only by that means (as Grice must allow, given that he 
denies that the hearer must actually go through the calculation process)? It is 
plausible that the speaker must believe that the hearer has some means of 
recognizing their intention, but it is unclear why they must believe that the hearer 
can do so specifically by a Gricean calculation.  
 What should we conclude from this discussion? There are cases for both 
positive and negative answers to the question about Grice’s view of the role of 
speaker meaning in implicature, and I do not think we are justified in attributing 
to him a settled view on the matter. (Here, perhaps, we should take notice of what 
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he says about the tentative nature of his proposals.) However, lack of an answer 
constitutes a serious gap in the Gricean framework, and I shall return to the 
question in the next chapter, where I shall suggest a way of reconciling this tension 
in Grice’s theory of implicature. 
 
6. Applications 
Grice’s theory is primarily an account of what we might call commonsense 
implicatures — cases where it is intuitively obvious that an utterance conveys 
something beyond its literal meaning, as in the examples we have considered. 
However, the theory also has applications to more technical issues in philosophy 
of language and linguistics. In particular, it can offer an economical account of the 
conventional meanings of particular words. By making a distinction between what 
is said and what is further implicated, it is possible to hold that a word has a single 
conventional meaning while at the same time explaining how it typically conveys 
a further meaning. Grice uses ‘or’ as an example (1978/1989, pp.44–7). Sometimes 
‘or’ is used in a ‘weak’ way equivalent to logical disjunction. In this sense, to say 
that p or q is simply to rule out the claim that both p and q are false, and a person 
could legitimately assert ‘p or q’ because they knew that p was true or that q was 
true or that both were true. Thus if one knows that p, then one can assert that p or 
q for any q at all. However, we typically use ‘or’ in a stronger sense, to indicate 
that we have a reason for thinking that p or q other than the fact that we think one 
or both of p and q are true, such as evidence that p and q are the only possible 
alternatives. In this sense, a person could not legitimately assert ‘p or q’ just 
because they knew that p was true or that q was true or that both were, and they 
could legitimately assert it without knowing any of those things. Faced with these 
different uses, we could say that ‘or’ is ambiguous, with two different conventional 
meanings, but Grice points out that we could instead explain the stronger meaning 
as a generalized implicature. If a speaker knows that p (or that q, or that p and q), 
then in most communicative contexts it will be more informative to assert it, rather 
than asserting that p or q. Thus if a speaker says that p or q, the hearer can uphold 
the presumption that they are observing the CP (and thus the maxim of Quantity) 
only by supposing that they do not believe that p (or that q, or both), and thus that 
they have some reason for asserting the disjunction other than the fact that they 
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believe one or both of the disjuncts to be true — which corresponds to the stronger 
sense of ‘or’. Thus in normal circumstances this meaning is generated 
automatically by conversational implicature. 
 Grice suggests that we should prefer such explanations to ones that posit 
further conventional meanings, and he proposes a principle he calls ‘Modified 
Occam’s Razor’ (and which has subsequently become known as ‘Grice’s Razor’): 
Senses are not to be multiplied beyond necessity (1978/1989, p.47). That is, we 
should not treat a word as having multiple conventional meanings unless there is 
no other way of explaining the different ways in which it is used. In particular, if 
we can explain one of a word’s meanings as due to a generalized conversational 
implicature arising from the word’s conventional meaning, then we should prefer 
that explanation to treating the meaning as a second conventional meaning. As 
François Recanati notes, because the implicature explanation derives from general 
assumptions and principles that are independently motivated, it is more 
economical than positing an extra sense, which would be an ad hoc move (Recanati 
1989, p.296). Applying Grice’s Razor in a particular case involves showing how 
the mechanisms of implicature could generate the secondary meaning in question, 
and also applying the various ‘tests’ for implicature, in particular, non-
detachability and cancellability. In Stephen Levinson’s words, this approach 
 
allows one to claim that natural language expressions do tend to have 
simple, stable and unitary senses (in many cases anyway), but that this 
stable semantic core often has an unstable, context-specific pragmatic 
overlay — namely a set of implicatures. (Levinson 1983, p.99) 
 
 Grice argues that this approach can be applied to deal with objections to some 
philosophical theories that use terms in a way that seems to clash with everyday 
usage. For example (a case that played a role in prompting Grice to develop his 
theory of implicature), some theories of perception characterize the sort of 
experience one has when seeing (say) a red object as the experience of seeming to 
see something red, and it may be objected that this conflicts with ordinary usage. 
One can have the experience in question when one is sure that one is seeing 
something red, but we would not normally say that we seem to see something red 
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unless we had some doubt about whether we really were seeing something red. In 
response, Grice argues that we can treat the indication of doubt, not as part of the 
conventional meaning of ‘seems to see’, but as a generalized conversational 
implicature, like the strong sense of ‘or’, which is generated by apparent violation 
of the maxim of Quantity. If one is sure one is seeing something red, one would 
normally say that one is seeing something red, not that that one seems to see 
something red. Thus in saying the latter, one implicates that one is not sure that 
one is seeing something red (Grice 1961/1989, ch.15). In this way, the objection 
is removed. Since implicatures do not affect the truth conditions of the utterances 
to which they attach, the existence of this implicature does not affect the truth of 
the statement that one seems to see something red, or of the theory to which it 
belongs.  
 Grice suggests there are many other contexts in which this approach might be 
applied to reconcile philosophical theories with the existence of layers or shades 
of meaning not accounted for by the theory. As examples he mentions claims 
involving the terms ‘see’, ‘know’, ‘cause’, responsible’, ‘actual’ (1961/1989, 
p.237). He also sketches an application to the word ‘true’ (1978/1989, p.55–7) and 
considers (without fully endorsing) the suggestion that the existence claims 
implicit in utterances such as ‘The present king of France is bald’ are 
conversational implicatures, rather than presuppositions (1981/1989, ch.17). Later 
theorists have followed these hints, applying the Gricean framework (or an 
extended, revised version of it) to various other problems in philosophy of 
language (for example, Neale 1990; Recanati 1993; Salmon 1989).   
 These applications of the Gricean framework differ from the earlier uses of the 
framework to explain commonsense cases of conversational implicature, such as 
(5) and (6) above. First, the implicatures in the application cases are all generalized 
ones and arise from the use of particular words or concepts. Second, as Recanati 
notes, the applications extend the scope of the phenomenon of implicature 
(Recanati 1989, p.327). In the commonsense cases, it is intuitively obvious that 
something is implied beyond what is actually said, whereas in the application cases 
this is not so, and argument is required to establish that an implicature is present. 
The fact that the Gricean framework can be extended and applied in this way 
suggests that it is a fruitful research programme, and thus offers further support for 
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it. However, the applications depend on the soundness of Grice’s basic account of 
how conversational implicatures are generated, in both particularized and 
generalized cases, and I shall focus primarily on that.  
 
Conclusion 
This completes my introduction of the Gricean framework. The framework has 
been, and continues to be, hugely influential in theorizing about the nature of 
implicature and (as we shall see in Chapter 5) about how implicatures are 
recovered. There are attractions to the idea that implicatures can be derived from 
general principles of communication, as opposed to being, on the one hand, one-
off psychological interpretations or, on the other hand, conventions of language or 
of language use. The Gricean framework suggests that implicature is a rational 
phenomenon, which can be universally understood, and it thus holds out hope for 
an ethics of implicature based on general principles.  
 The framework faces many problems, however. In particular, there are some 
basic issues with Grice’s definition of conversational implicature and the 
supplementary Calculability Assumption. The next chapter will look at these. 
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Chapter 3 
Problems, reinterpretation, and revision 
 
This chapter will examine some fundamental issues concerning Grice’s account of 
implicature generation. I shall begin by setting out some problems for Grice’s 
definition of conversational implicature and the Calculability Assumption, and 
arguing that they are serious ones. I shall then consider a proposal by Jennifer Saul, 
who argues that Grice’s notion of conversational implicature is a normative one, 
and that additional notions are needed in order to capture all the psychological 
aspects of implicature. I shall argue that this is an attractive reading of Grice, and 
that the resulting enriched Gricean framework avoids many of the problems 
discussed. I shall then go on to propose some further modifications to the Gricean 
definition in order to bring it still more closely in line with the normative reading 
and to avoid some remaining problems. The aim will be to set out the most 
plausible version of the Gricean framework, revised as necessary.  
 
1. Problems for Grice’s definition 
This part of the chapter will consider some problems arising from Grice’s account 
of the way implicatures are generated. Recall Grice’s three-part definition of 
conversational implicature (with Davis’s terminology added in brackets):  
 
A man who, by (in, when) saying (or making as if to say) that p has 
implicated that q, may be said to have conversationally implicated that q, 
provided that (1) he is to be presumed to be observing the conversational 
maxims, or at least the Cooperative Principle [‘the cooperative 
presumption’]; (2) the supposition that he is aware that, or thinks that, q 
is required in order to make his saying or making as if to say p (or doing 
so in those terms) consistent with this presumption [‘determinacy’]; and 
(3) the speaker thinks (and would expect the hearer to think that the 
speaker thinks) that it is within the competence of the hearer to work out, 
or grasp intuitively, that the supposition mentioned in (2) is required 
[‘mutual knowledge’]. (Grice 1975/1989, pp.30–1) 
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This definition is supplemented with the Calculability Assumption, which says 
that q can, in principle, be identified by a Gricean calculation, as described in the 
previous chapter. I shall treat this assumption as a supplement to the determinacy 
clause. 
 As we saw, there is debate about whether these conditions are sufficient for the 
existence of a conversational implicature (perhaps speaker intentions are needed 
as well), but it is clear that Grice thinks they are necessary, and this in itself creates 
problems. (Again, in what follows I shall often drop the qualification 
‘conversational’; unless otherwise indicated, ‘implicature’ always means 
‘conversational implicature’.) 
 
1.1 Problems with the cooperative presumption.  
The first of the three conditions for the presence of an implicature is the 
cooperative presumption: the speaker is presumed to be being cooperative 
(observing the CP).  
 Before going on, I want to mention an interpretative issue. The cooperative 
presumption is standardly quoted or paraphrased in the way I have just done, as 
the descriptive claim that the speaker is presumed to be being cooperative 
(following the maxims or at least the CP).1 However, Grice actually says that the 
speaker is to be presumed to be cooperative (see the quotation above). This 
phrasing is not easy to interpret, but it seems to indicate a normative claim: the 
hearer ought to presume the speaker to be being cooperative. The standard version, 
by contrast, makes a descriptive claim: the hearer does presume the speaker to be 
being cooperative. Whether this interpretation is right and exactly how much 
importance should be placed on the wording is not clear (for some discussion, see 
Davis 2007; Green 2002; Saul 2010). Since my aim here is to evaluate the Gricean 
framework as it is commonly understood, I shall focus primarily on the descriptive 
version, but I shall also indicate how things might differ if the normative reading 
were adopted (though, given the uncertainty surrounding the interpretation of 
                                                 
1  Writers who use this wording in quoting or summarizing Grice’s definition include, among 
many others, Davis (1998, p.13, 2014), Levinson (2000, p.15, 171), Saul (2002a, p.231), and 
Soames (2009, p.26, p.299).  
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Grice’s words, these remarks should be taken as tentative). With this preliminary 
point made, I shall now argue that the cooperative presumption has several 
counterintuitive consequences. 
 The first problem is that, assuming it is the hearer who is supposed to do the 
presuming (and it is unclear who else it could be), then this means that implicatures 
are dependent for their existence on something hearers do. This is counterintuitive. 
Usually, we do not think that the meaning of an utterance depends on the particular 
person hearing it, and this seems to go for non-conventional meaning as much as 
conventional. In trying to work out whether a speaker is implicating something, 
our sense as a hearer is that we are trying to ascertain a fact that is independent of 
us, not one that is dependent on what we ourselves do. This assumes the standard 
descriptive reading of the condition, of course, but a similar problem threatens to 
arise on the normative reading of it. For it is no more plausible to think that 
implicatures depend on what the hearers ought to do than on what they actually 
do. (Note that the normative claim is not that speakers are to be cooperative, but 
that they are to be presumed to be cooperative, where the presuming is to be done 
by (I assume) the hearer.)2 Whether or not a hearer ought to presume that a speaker 
is being cooperative plausibly depends on what the hearer believes about the 
speaker. If they believe that the speaker is trying to mislead them, then they ought 
not to presume that they are being cooperative. But this means that whether or not 
the cooperative presumption holds in any given case, and thus whether or not there 
is an implicature, depends on facts about the hearer.  
 A second problem is that the cooperative presumption has the consequence that 
if the speaker is not presumed to be cooperative (or ought not to be) — say, if 
because the hearer has reason to think they are lying — then the speaker cannot be 
implicating something. And this seems wrong. Davis gives the following examples 
(Davis 1998, p.116): 
 
 (1)  Karen:  Were you out with Jennifer last night? 
   George:  I was out drinking with the boys. 
                                                 
2  Compare ‘The prisoner is to be watched closely’, which is the passive form of the statement 
that someone should watch the prisoner closely.  
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 (2)  Alice: Do you like my new dress? 
   Brett: I like all your dresses. 
 
Karen may suspect, or even know, that George is trying to deceive her, and 
therefore not presume that he is observing the CP. Nevertheless, she will still 
interpret his words as carrying an implicature to the effect that he was not out with 
Jennifer. Similarly, Alice may believe that Brett is merely being polite, and thus 
not cooperative (in the sense that involves being truthful); yet she will still interpret 
him as implicating that he likes her new dress. Indeed, a speaker can openly refuse 
to cooperate, yet still implicate something (Sterelny 1982, p.189). Rather than 
answering Alice’s question, Brett might try to change the subject by saying ‘Is that 
the time?’. Though this utterance is clearly not cooperative, it still carries an 
implicature: namely, that it is late and that Brett must leave (and perhaps that he 
does not wish to talk about Alice’s dress). 
 This problem with the cooperative presumption can be stated in a more general 
way. People often use implicature in order to mislead. They say something that is 
strictly true but that implicates a falsehood, hoping to get their hearer to believe 
the falsehood without having actually said anything untrue. (This, of course, is 
what Mr Bronston was accused of doing in the case discussed in Chapter 1.) Now 
in itself this is not incompatible with Grice’s definition. The cooperative 
presumption does not say that speakers are cooperative, only that they are 
presumed to be (or ought to be presumed to be). However, there is still a difficulty 
for Grice. For it is common knowledge that people often implicate falsehoods, and 
when we detect an implicature we may wonder whether we can trust it. If I ask my 
son, ‘Did you eat all the chocolates?’ and get the reply, ‘I ate some of them’, I 
might wonder whether I can trust the implication that he did not eat them all. Yet 
on Grice’s view, questions of this sort should not arise. Given the cooperative 
presumption, if one ceases to regard a speaker as being cooperative (or has good 
reason to think one ought not to regard to them as being cooperative), then one 
should cease to regard them as implicating anything. In interpreting an utterance, 
the only options should be that it carries no implicature or that it carries a sincere 
implicature, which the speaker believes to be true (though it might, of course, 
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actually be false). But in fact we can, and often do, interpret utterances in a third 
way, as carrying insincere implicatures.  
 It might be suggested that we could avoid this problem by weakening the CP. 
For example, we might say that an utterance is cooperative if it is informative, 
relevant, and suitably expressed, regardless of whether or not the speaker believes 
it to be true or has evidence for it. (That is, we might drop the commitment to the 
maxim of Quality.) The problem with this, however, is that it would threaten to 
undermine the second condition of Grice’s definition, determinacy, which is that 
there should be a unique proposition required to preserve the cooperative 
presumption. For if all that cooperativeness requires is informativeness, relevance, 
and appropriate expression, then this condition will be met in few cases, if any. In 
general, if ‘p’ is an informative, relevant, well-expressed contribution to a 
conversation, then ‘It is not the case that p’ would be an equally informative, 
relevant, and well-expressed contribution. So the supposition that the speaker 
believes the latter would preserve the presumption of cooperation just as well as 
the supposition that they believe the former, and thus neither of them could be 
singled out as required to preserve the presumption.  
 It is likely that any other attempted weakening of the CP cooperation would 
suffer from similar problems. As we shall see in the next sub-section, there are 
problems with the determinacy clause as it stands, and weakening the notion of 
cooperation would only make these worse. Besides, even if a weaker notion of 
cooperation were adopted, the cooperative presumption would still fail for cases 
where the speaker blatantly fails to cooperate by changing the subject. 
 Another problem case for the cooperative presumption is monologue, in which 
there is no audience at all and hence no one to make the presumption (or to be 
under an obligation to make it). Grice’s definition implies that in such cases 
speakers cannot implicate at all, and Grice explicitly endorses this conclusion:  
 
I take it as being obvious that insofar as the presence of implicature rests 
on the character of one or another kind of conversational enterprise, it 
will rest on the character of concerted rather than solitary talk production. 




 However, this is counter-intuitive. Suppose Inspector Clouseau is talking to 
himself, trying to reason out the chauffeur’s motives. ‘The chauffeur is clearly not 
the murderer’, he says, ‘But some of his statements were lies... Perhaps he is 
covering up for the real murderer.’ Intuitively, his second sentence carries the 
implicature that not all of the chauffeur’s statements were lies. Similarly, in his 
reasoning Clouseau might employ figures of speech which depend on implicature, 
such as metaphor or irony. He might say to himself, ‘Maria Gambrelli cannot be 
the murderer; she is a saint!’ — meaning that she is virtuous, not that she has been 
canonized. Grice might reply that Clouseau’s reasoning does not constitute a 
genuine monologue; perhaps in this case Clouseau is his own hearer, or there is an 
imagined hearer. But if this is not a genuine monologue, then it is not clear what 
would count as one.  
 It might be suggested that Grice could accept the possibility of implicature in 
monologue if he were to allow that the presumption of cooperation can be made 
by speakers themselves. However, this would threaten to make the first clause of 
his definition of implicature redundant. For speakers will always (and probably 
should always) presume that they are being cooperative with themselves.  
 A final problem with the cooperative presumption is that in making implicature 
hearer-dependent, it also seems to make it hearer-relative. Suppose speaker S has 
two hearers, A and B. S says that p, aiming to implicate that q and thinking that A 
and B will realize this. A has no reason to distrust S, and therefore presumes (and 
ought to presume) that S is being cooperative. B, however, has been told (on 
seemingly good authority, that S is untrustworthy, and therefore does not presume 
(and ought not to presume) that S is cooperative. Has S implicated that q? 
Assuming the other conditions are met, it seems that they have done so as far as A 
is concerned but not as far as B is concerned. But this would mean that implicature 
is hearer-relative — something which Grice’s definition does not acknowledge or 
allow for.  
 
1.2 Problems with determinacy and calculability. 
Grice’s second condition for the existence of an implicature with content q is that 
the supposition that the speaker believes q is required to preserve the cooperative 
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presumption. This condition is supplemented by the Calculability Assumption, 
according to which a hearer can work out that this supposition is required from 
general principles and background knowledge. 
 The first thing to say here is that this further extends the hearer-dependency of 
implicature. If the supposition that the speaker thinks that q is required in order to 
make their utterance consistent with the presumption that they are following the 
CP, then if the hearer has not identified q, they cannot consistently continue to 
presume the speaker to be observing the CP (and surely ought not to either). But 
according to (1), that presumption is necessary for the existence of the implicature. 
Thus, it seems, the identification of an implicature by the hearer is necessary for 
the existence of the implicature itself. This again is counterintuitive. Common 
sense tells us that a hearer may fail to spot an implicature. A third party, listening 
to our account of an earlier conversation, may alert us to an implicature we had 
missed. (‘How could you be so silly?’, we might say to a friend, ‘He was implying 
that he wanted to ask you out!’) Likewise, common sense tells us that a hearer 
might believe that a speaker is implicating something without being able to work 
out exactly what. (I shall give an example shortly.) It may be objected that this is 
an uncharitable reading of Grice’s definition, but it follows from the wording as it 
stands, and it is in line with the hearer-dependency of implicature indicated by 
condition (1).  
 Another problem with the determinacy condition is the role it gives to the 
demands of consistency. The condition says that a speaker S implicates q in saying 
p only if one must suppose that S thinks that q in order to make the claim that S 
said p consistent with the claim that S is observing the CP. The problem is that 
such a supposition, attributing a specific belief to S, will never be required; a hearer 
can always reconcile the two claims simply by supposing that S believes (and is 
trying to communicate) some, unidentified, proposition that would be a 
cooperative contribution to the conversation.3 The demand for consistency would 
never push us to go beyond this general supposition — with the consequence that 
no one ever implicates anything specific! Obviously, this is not what Grice 
intended — though, again, it follows from his wording. To get the intended result, 
                                                 
3  Thanks to Keith Frankish, who pointed this out to me. 
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the required supposition should be one that does not merely make S’s saying that 
p consistent with their being cooperative, but one that explains how it manifests 
their cooperativeness — what cooperative contribution it makes. That is, (2) 
should be something like the following: 
 
(2’) the supposition that he is aware that, or thinks that, q is required to 
explain how his saying or making as if to say p (or doing so in those 
terms) reflects his presumed observance of the CP. 
 
Having noted this, for convenience I shall continue to use Grice’s original wording 
in what follows; none of the points I make will be affected by this.  
 Further problems arise from the Calculability Assumption. As we saw in the 
previous chapter, this states that for an utterance U to carry an implicature, q, it 
must be possible to arrive at the supposition that the speaker believes that q by a 
process of inference from information mutually available to speaker and hearer, 
including the CP and its maxims, the conventional meanings of the words used 
and the identity of any references involved, the context of the utterance, and 
appropriate background knowledge. This assumption has been the subject of much 
discussion, and a large number of problem cases have been described, in which a 
Gricean calculation appears to produce the wrong result — either predicting an 
implicature that intuitively isn’t there (a false positive, as Davis calls it; 1998, 
p.63), or failing to predict one that intuitively is there (a false negative). The latter 
cases are the more problematic ones for Grice, since Grice does not hold that 
calculability is sufficient for implicature (condition 3, mutual knowledge, must be 
met too), but only that it is necessary. The hard cases for Grice are ones where a 
hearer believes that an implicature is present (and may even be able to identify it) 
but cannot calculate it by Gricean means. Grice must deny that there is any 
implicature in such cases, but, as we shall see, this is often highly counterintuitive. 
I shall not summarize this literature here (for a careful presentation of many 
problem cases, see Davis 1998, Chapters 2–3). Rather, I shall focus on certain core 
cases that highlight fundamental problems with the Calculability Assumption. (In 
addition, some problems concerning the calculability of generalized implicatures 
will be considered in Chapter 5.) 
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 One problem lies with the starting point of the calculation process. According 
to Grice, the process begins when a hearer detects an apparent violation of the CP 
— when a speaker says something that, taken literally, flouts one or more of the 
conversational maxims. The problem is that in some cases it may not be clear 
whether or not a speaker is doing this. Some utterances can be taken either literally 
or figuratively, and yet be equally cooperative either way. (Davis calls this ‘the 
rhetorical figure problem’; Davis 1998, pp.65–70.) For example, suppose Danny 
has taken Candy to the cinema to see Quentin Tarantino’s latest violent action 
movie. Throughout the movie Candy sits silent and emotionless. When it is over, 
the following exchange takes place:  
 
 (3)   Danny: What did you think of the movie? 
   Candy:  It was sublime and beautiful.  
 
 How should Danny interpret Candy’s reply, given the assumption that she is 
observing the CP? Intuitively, there are two options: Candy might be speaking 
literally, or she might be being ironic — saying the opposite of what she believes 
(flouting the maxim of Quality) in order to implicate that the movie was brutal and 
ugly. Either message would be an informative and relevant reply to Danny’s 
question, so the assumption that Candy is observing the CP does not distinguish 
between the two interpretations. Given Candy’s lack of response during the movie, 
the context of the conversation does not help to decide between them either. It 
might be argued that further contextual information or background knowledge 
could settle the matter. For example, if Danny knows that Candy dislikes violent 
action movies and was reluctant to see this one, then he might suspect she is being 
ironic. But even so, Candy might still be speaking literally. She might have been 
so impressed by Tarantino’s film that she had changed her mind about action 
movies. And if Danny himself thinks that the film really was sublime and beautiful, 
then he might regard this as an equally plausible reading of Candy’s remark.  
 It is true that there might be further items of information that would settle the 
matter. Suppose that Candy did in fact intend her words to be taken ironically (and 
believed that Danny could work this out). And suppose Danny, who knows Candy 
well, senses this, and concludes that she thinks the movie was brutal and ugly. 
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Still, this does not mean that the implicature is calculable in Grice’s sense. For 
Danny can work out what Candy thinks from the literal meaning of her words 
together with the fact that she meant them ironically, without appealing to the CP 
at all. Since the calculation does not depend on the assumption that Candy is 
observing the CP, it does not show that the supposition that Candy thinks the movie 
was brutal and ugly is required in order to preserve the assumption that she is 
observing the CP.4 This is not surprising. Since her utterance would be cooperative 
under both literal and figurative readings, the assumption that she is being 
cooperative cannot help Danny decide which interpretation to prefer — which 
means that a Gricean calculation is not possible.  
 Since Grice holds that calculability is necessary for implicature, he must deny 
that there is an implicature in this case; the ironic reading is not required, so there 
is no irony. This clashes with our intuition that there might be an implicature, with 
Candy’s intentions that there should be one, and with Danny’s conclusion that 
there was one. The example here involves irony, but similar examples could be 
generated for other figures of speech — understatement, overstatement, metaphor, 
and so on.  
 A second type of problem case is one where a Gricean calculation can at best 
show that something is being implicated without being able to identify what. 
Consider the following example (based on an actual exchange between the author 
and a former colleague). Jill enters her workplace and greets a colleague Finn, 
whom she hasn’t seen for several days:  
 
 (4)   Jill:  How are you feeling?  
   Finn:  I need to find Suleiman again. 
 
Jill knows that Suleiman is someone Finn met on a recent holiday in Turkey. Finn 
has mentioned him several times and shown her a photo of him. So she knows the 
                                                 
4  Davis makes the same point: if facts about the figures of speech speakers are using are treated 
as part of the context of their utterances, then implicatures can be calculated directly from this 
context and what is said, without establishing that they are required to maintain the cooperative 
presumption (Davis 1998, p.70). 
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reference of ‘Suleiman’. But she thinks it is unlikely that Finn literally means that 
he needs to find this person again, and, even if he does, the information is not 
relevant to her question. Now Jill knows that Finn has a liking for non-literal uses 
of speech, so she suspects that he is implicating something. And she can confirm 
this by Gricean reflections. Finn’s utterance appears uncooperative, violating the 
maxims of Relation and Quantity. However, Jill thinks it is unlikely that Finn is 
being uncooperative or that he has produced an uncooperative utterance by 
mistake, so she infers that Finn means to convey some relevant information, and 
that he thought she could and would work out what this was. However, Jill cannot 
do this. She can infer that the relevant information must concern Finn’s state of 
physical or mental well-being, and perhaps further that he is lacking something 
that Suleiman could provide. But she cannot move beyond this, since she has no 
idea what Suleiman could provide. She cannot identify the relevant attribute of 
Suleiman.5  
 It may be objected that Jill lacks some crucial background knowledge. If she 
knew more about Suleiman and Finn’s relationship with him, then she could make 
the calculation. But even if Jill did have more background knowledge, she still 
might not be able to make the calculation. Suppose she knows that Suleiman is an 
amusing conversationalist, a skilled masseur, a good cook, and that he makes 
herbal teas to treat headaches. Then, perhaps, she can narrow down what Finn is 
implicating. It may be that Finn is bored and wants to be diverted, or that his back 
is hurting, or that he is hungry, or that he has a headache. But, even so, Jill cannot 
work out which; she doesn’t know which of Suleiman’s attributes is the relevant 
one. 
                                                 
5  In the actual conservation on which this example is based, my colleague said ‘I need to find 
myself a Suleiman’, and in previous presentations of this material I used this form of words. I have 
changed the wording in the present version in order to avoid the objection that in the phrase ‘a 
Suleiman’, ‘Suleiman’ serves, in the speaker’s idiolect, as a common noun (meaning, say, ‘an 
interesting conversational partner’) and thus that if the hearer knew its literal meaning they would 
be able to work out the implicature. The objection does not apply to the present version, where 
‘Suleiman’ is a singular term. (Thanks to André Gallois for drawing my attention to this point.) 
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 Of course, there is information that would allow Jill to work out what Finn is 
implicating. She could simply ask Finn why Suleiman would help. If he mentions 
Suleiman’s conversational talents, then Jill will conclude that Finn is implicating 
that he is bored. But this would still not establish the sort of rational connection 
between literal meaning and implicature that Grice requires. Even if Jill could now 
work out that Finn was expressing the belief that he is bored, she still wouldn’t be 
in a position to establish that he must have been doing this (or even that it is 
probable that he was), in order to preserve the assumption that he was observing 
the CP. For, given the range of Suleiman’s talents, Finn’s utterance would have 
been equally cooperative if it had expressed the belief that his back hurt, or the 
belief that he was hungry, or the belief that he had a headache.  
 Again, then, it seems that Grice must deny that there is an implicature here. If 
a Gricean calculation cannot identify a unique belief that must be attributed to Finn 
to make sense of his utterance, then the determinacy condition fails to hold and 
there is no implicature, despite the fact that Gricean considerations would lead a 
hearer to believe that he is implicating something.  
 It might be objected that Grice allows that implicatures can be indeterminate. 
He writes:  
 
Since, to calculate a conversational implicature is to calculate what has to 
be supposed in order to preserve the supposition that the Cooperative 
Principle is being observed, and since there may be various possible 
specific explanations, a list of which may be open, the conversational 
implicatum in such cases will be a disjunction of such specific 
explanations; and if the list of these is open, the implicatum will have just 
the same kind of indeterminacy that many actual implicata do in fact seem 
to possess. (Grice 1975/1989, pp.39–40) 
 
Thus, since there are various equally plausible explanations for Finn’s utterance 
(that Finn is bored, that his back is hurting, that he is hungry, that he has a 
headache), perhaps his utterance should be interpreted as the disjunction of these 
claims: that Finn is bored or has a sore back or is hungry or has a headache.  
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 There are problems with this suggestion, however, which illustrate a general 
difficulty for the determinacy condition. It is true, as Grice notes, that many 
implicata are indeterminate; many metaphors, for example, are effective precisely 
because they express an open-ended range of related thoughts (Martinich 1991). 
However, as Davis points out, a metaphor is not equivalent to a disjunction of the 
thoughts it expresses. We would not regard a metaphor as appropriate if only one 
of the many thoughts it expressed were true, even though that would be enough to 
make the disjunction true. ‘My love is like a red rose’ would not be an apt metaphor 
if its subject possessed only one of the many properties which a human might share 
with a rose — say, being sweet-smelling — while being utterly unlike a rose in 
every other respect (Davis 1998, pp.71–2). Moreover, it is very unlikely that a 
speaker who uses a metaphor believes that their hearer will construct a disjunction 
of all the ideas their words express and attribute a belief in it to them. Yet if they 
do not, then the determinacy clause will not hold and there will be no implicature. 
For example, in Finn’s case it is very unlikely that he is seeking to convey a 
complex disjunctive proposition to the effect that he has at least one of a series of 
needs, and thinks Jill can work this out. And even if he were, it would be hard to 
reconcile the supposition that he is doing so with the presumption that he is being 
cooperative. Since Finn must know which of the disjuncts is true (all the claims 
are about his own feelings), it would be uncooperative of Finn not to indicate 
which of them it is (violating the maxim of Quantity). And if more than one of the 
disjuncts is true, then it would be uncooperative not to indicate that their 
conjunction was true (again violating the maxim of Quantity).  
 Another problem with Grice’s approach is that it makes some implicatures 
dependent on the hearer’s state of knowledge. Suppose Finn wants to implicate 
that he is bored. He thinks that all Jill knows about Suleiman is that he is a good 
conversationalist, and so believes she will work out what he means. And if that 
were all Jill knew about Suleiman, then the implicature would succeed. Jill 
presumes that Finn is observing the CP, and, given what she knows about 
Suleiman, the only way to make sense of his utterance is to suppose that he is 
indicating that he is bored. And Finn believes that she can work this out. So the 
three conditions are met, and Finn successfully implicates that he is bored. Now 
consider another case. Everything is the same except that Jill knows more about 
  64
Suleiman: that he is a skilled masseur, a good cook, and so on. Now there are other 
equally plausible suppositions available to Jill, and the disjunctive reading is 
required. But since Finn does not know that Jill has this additional knowledge, he 
still believes she will suppose that he is indicating that he is bored, and he doesn’t 
even consider the disjunctive reading. So the determinacy condition does not hold, 
and nothing is implicated at all. This is counterintuitive, and it leaves us with a 
puzzle as to what to say about cases where a speaker has multiple hearers. What if 
Finn’s remark had been addressed to a group of people, each of whom had a 
different level of knowledge about Suleiman? For Finn to successfully implicate 
that he was bored, would it be sufficient that one of his hearers was required to 
attribute that belief to him (given their particular background knowledge) or must 
all of them be required to do so (given their different levels of background 
knowledge)? Neither option seems plausible. It seems too weak to allow that one 
hearer is sufficient (especially as that hearer might be the one with the least 
background knowledge), but too strong to require that all are necessary, since then 
the addition of one new poorly informed or over-informed hearer could undermine 
an implicature that everyone else agreed existed.  
 
1.3 Problems with mutual knowledge 
The third of Grice’s conditions for the existence of an implicature with content q 
is that the speaker should think (and expect the hearer to think that they think) that 
the hearer can work out, or grasp intuitively, that the supposition that the speaker 
believes q is required to make their utterance consistent with the presumption that 
they are observing the CP. (For simplicity I shall omit the parenthesis in what 
follows; nothing will turn on it.) Again, there are problems with this condition. 
 One problem is that the condition requires speakers to possess a sophisticated 
understanding of the role that (according to Grice) cooperation plays in the 
generation of implicatures. Yet, it seems, young children can implicate things 
without having this understanding. When my five-year old son says he ate some 
of the chocolates or asks me if I can find his shoes, he implicates things, though I 
doubt if he believes I can work out what these things are from the presumption that 
he is observing the CP (despite his having overheard me talk about this at great 
length!). Likewise, a person can doubt that hearers can derive implicatures from 
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the CP without thereby becoming unable to implicate. Wayne Davis notes that his 
rejection of Gricean theory has not reduced his power to implicate things (Davis 
1998, p.121).  
 Moreover, even if speakers do sometimes form the beliefs Grice mentions, it 
seems possible to implicate without them. I implicate things to my five-year old 
(for example, in saying that he can have some of the sweets), without believing 
that he can work out that the supposition that I believe that he may not have all the 
sweets is required in order to preserve the assumption that I am being cooperative. 
And though I do believe that he can grasp my meaning intuitively, I do not believe 
that he can do this in the ‘quick’ way Grice describes, which involves having the 
ability to construct, or at least recognize, the full Gricean calculation (see the 
discussion in Chapter 2, section 3).  
 There are many other cases where a speaker implicates something without 
believing that their hearer can calculate or intuitively grasp the implicatum. A 
speaker might say something with the intention that it should carry an implicature 
that they do not expect their hearer to recognize. Talking to a particularly annoying 
acquaintance, I might say something that carries a subtle and insulting implicature 
just for my own satisfaction and with the intention that it should go over my 
acquaintance’s head. Or a speaker might say something with the hope that their 
hearer will get the implicature but without being confident that they will or even 
believing that they won’t. (Think of a relative talking to a coma patient in the hope 
of triggering a response.) Or a person might say something without realizing that 
it carries an implicature until it is pointed out to them later — an embarrassing 
situation with which most of us are familiar. Or, finally, as noted earlier, one might 
use implicatures in a monologue, where there is no hearer involved at all.  
 It might be objected that the beliefs Grice mentions need not be conscious ones, 
and that in the cases mentioned the speakers have nonconscious beliefs of the 
required kind, which in some cases conflict with their conscious beliefs (for the 
view that we have separate conscious and nonconscious systems of belief, whose 
contents may conflict, see, for example, Frankish 2004). However, without 
independent evidence for the existence of implicit beliefs with the contents in 
question, this looks like an ad hoc move designed to save the theory. Moreover, it 
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is hard to see how the suggestion could be extended to cases of unintended or 
solitary implicature.  
 
2. A normative reading 
Many of the problem cases considered above are ones in which Grice’s theory of 
conversational implicature seems to conflict with our intuitions as to whether an 
implicature is present or what its content is. But it may be that the conflict is only 
apparent. Perhaps the theory and the intuitions concern different things. In 
particular, it may be that our intuitions concern what speakers intend to implicate 
by their utterances or what hearers take utterances to implicate, whereas Grice’s 
theory concerns what utterances actually do implicate, in a normative sense. If so, 
then many of the supposed problems for Grice will disappear. This approach has 
been proposed by Saul (Saul 2002a), and I shall look at it in this section of the 
chapter. 
 
2.1 Speaker meaning, implicature, and an extended taxonomy 
Saul proposes that Grice’s notion of conversational implicature is intended to 
capture a normative aspect of language use, parallel to his notion of sentence 
meaning. Grice holds that for a speaker to succeed in saying p by uttering sentence 
S, it is not enough for the speaker to mean that p (to have the right communicative 
intentions); it must also be the case that the sentence S means that p — which, for 
Grice, is, roughly, to say that people typically use it to mean p. The sentence’s 
meaning must match the speaker’s meaning. Similarly, Saul proposes, for a 
speaker to implicate that q it is not enough for them to mean q; they must also 
produce an utterance that implicates q, where this is not determined by the 
speaker’s intentions. The idea is that as speakers we do not have complete control 
over what we implicate, any more than we have complete control over what we 
say. We cannot implicate whatever we like by a given utterance, any more than we 
can say whatever we like by it. (I cannot say that I am dyslexic by uttering the 
words ‘I am dialectic’, even if that is what I mean to say, and even if I think that 
that is what the sentence means.) To implicate that q by uttering S, an objective, 
normative condition must be met as well as a subjective, psychological one. 
However, this normative condition cannot be that S is typically used to implicate 
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q (as the parallel with sentence meaning would suggest), since many implicatures 
are context dependent. So, Saul suggests, Grice identifies it instead with the 
meaning that the hearer is required to attribute to the speaker in order to preserve 
the assumption that the speaker is being cooperative. This may vary from context 
to context, but it is not controlled by the speaker’s intentions, and so gives the 
required objective condition (Saul 2002a, p.241).  
 On this reading, implicature is not a form of speaker meaning, and we must 
reject the view (which Saul suggests is close to being an orthodoxy) that for Grice 
what a speaker means divides into what they say and what they implicate. (This is 
the view by defended Stephen Neale, discussed in Chapter 2.) Saul argues that this 
is an implausible reading of Grice, given that his definition of speaker meaning is 
framed wholly in terms of the speaker’s intentions, whereas his definition of 
implicature focuses on what the hearer presumes and supposes. It follows that a 
hearer’s attitudes cannot constrain what a speaker means but can constrain what 
they implicate, which suggests that the two can diverge. Saul argues that one can 
mean things that one does not implicate (and does not say either), and she suggests 
that it may be possible to implicate things one does not mean.  
 Saul illustrates the former case (meanings that are not implicated) with variants 
of an example used by Grice, in which a philosophy professor is writing a reference 
letter for a student who is applying for an academic job (Grice 1975/1989, p.33). 
In the first variant, the professor is writing a reference for Fred, who is a poor 
philosopher and a thief. She doesn’t wish to say this explicitly, however, so she 
devotes her reference letter to praising Fred’s genuine typing skills, intending to 
implicate that Fred is a poor philosopher. However, her audience does not interpret 
her letter in the way she expects. Fred is in fact applying for a typing job, and the 
employer takes the letter literally. In the second variant, the professor writes a 
similar letter for Cedric. Again she focuses on irrelevant matters, such as Cedric’s 
typing skills, intending to implicate that Cedric is a poor philosopher. Again, she 
fails, however. For the appointing committee have been told that she disapproves 
of writing reference letters, and they therefore assume that she is simply being 
uncooperative, and do not search for an implicated meaning. In both cases, then, 
the speaker means something that is not successfully implicated (and not said 
either) (Saul 2002a, p.230, pp.234–5). 
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 As a possible case of unmeant implicature, Saul uses another variant of the 
same example. This time, although the student, Roland, is a poor philosopher, the 
professor likes him and wants him to get the job. So she writes a long and detailed 
letter containing lots of information about Roland’s academic career but no 
judgements on his ability. Since the letter lacks important information, it can be 
read as cooperative only on the supposition that the professor thinks that Roland 
is a poor philosopher, and the professor believes that the audience can work this 
out. So the letter implicates that Roland is a poor philosopher (in the example it is 
the letter that implicates rather than any particular sentence in it). However, the 
professor does not intend the audience to form this belief; in fact, she hopes that 
they will read the letter superficially and form a positive impression of Roland. So 
she does not intend the audience to form the belief that Roland is a poor student 
and so does not mean that, though her letter implicates it (Saul 2002a, p.237–8). If 
this is right, then speakers can mean things that they do not implicate (or say either) 




Figure 2: The relation between speaker meaning, sentence meaning, and 
conversational implicature, on Saul’s reading of Grice. A given proposition may 
fall in any of the circles or their defined overlaps. (The Roland case would fall in 
the unshaded area on the far right.) 
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 Saul notes that if there are aspects of meaning that are neither said nor 
implicated, then Grice’s taxonomy is incomplete. To rectify this, Saul introduces 
the notion of utterer-implicature. The definition of utterer-implicature is the same 
as that of conversational implicature, except that it is not necessary for conditions 
(1) (the cooperative presumption) and (2) (determinacy) to hold, but only for the 
speaker to think they hold.6 That is (1) and (2) are replaced by: 
 
(1*) The speaker thinks that he is presumed to be following the 
conversational maxims, or at least the Cooperative Principle. 
(2*) The speaker thinks that the supposition that he [the speaker] is aware 
that, or thinks that, q, is required to make his saying or making as if to say 
p (or doing so in those terms) consistent with this presumption. 
(From Saul 2002a, p.235) 
 
In the Fred and Cedric cases, the professor utterer-implicates that their student is 
a poor philosopher, without conversationally implicating it. 
 Saul also proposes a corresponding notion of audience-implicature, which 
replaces clauses (2) and (3) in the definition of conversational implicature with the 
following:  
 
(2A) The audience believes that the supposition that he [the speaker] is 
aware that, or thinks that, q, is required to make his saying or making as 
if to say p (or doing so in those terms) consistent with this presumption. 
(3A) The audience takes the speaker to think that it is within the 
audience’s competence to work out that the supposition mentioned in (2) 
is required. 7 
(From Saul 2002a, p.242) 
                                                 
6  Saul adopts the usual descriptive phrasing of the cooperative presumption, rather than Grice’s 
own normative one, and I shall follow her in this in what follows. 
7  Saul says ‘the supposition mentioned in (2)’ but to make the definition more self-contained we 
could change this to ‘the supposition mentioned in (2A)’. 
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As an example of an audience-implicature, Saul uses another reference-letter case. 
This time the professor is writing a letter for a student, Felix, who she thinks is 
applying for a job as a typist. Although Felix is an excellent philosopher, the 
professor says nothing about his philosophical abilities and writes about his typing 
skills and punctuality. However, Felix is in fact applying for a philosophy post, 
and the audience interpret the letter as implicating that Felix is a poor philosopher. 
This is not a genuine conversational implicature, since, although conditions (1) 
and (arguably) (2) are met, condition (3) is not.8 However, it is an audience-
implicature, since (2A) and (3A) hold (Saul 2002a, p.242).  
 As Saul notes, an utterer-implicature is (roughly) what the speaker is trying to 
implicate, and an audience-implicature is what the audience takes the speaker to 
be implicating (Saul 2002a, p.243). Thus, if a claim q is both utterer-implicated 
and audience-implicated, then it will have been successfully communicated. This 
might suggest that a conversational implicature is simply a combination of the two: 
q is conversationally implicated if it is both utterer-implicated and audience-
implicated. Saul rejects this suggestion, however, arguing that something can be 
conversationally implicated without being audience-implicated. She illustrates this 
with two final examples, in which a professor writes reference letters for two 
students, Trigby and Wesley. In both cases, the professor seeks to implicate that 
the student is a poor philosopher by writing about irrelevant matters, such as their 
rock-climbing skills or wide knowledge of illegal drugs. The letters can be read as 
cooperative only on the assumption that the professor thinks that the students are 
poor philosophers and believes the audience will realize this, so the conditions for 
conversational implicature are met. However, the audiences fail to interpret the 
letters as intended. In Trigby’s case, they see that the supposition that Trigby is a 
                                                 
8  (2) is met if it is assumed that the writer understood who they were addressing and why. 
Although this assumption may be false (as in the Felix case), it seems reasonable for hearers to 
make it when deciding how to interpret an utterance. If it is not made, then a non-literal reading of 
an utterance will be required only if there is no conceivable misunderstanding on the speaker’s part 
which would make the utterance cooperative on a literal reading — with the consequence that non-
literal readings are required far less often than we think.  
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poor philosopher is needed, but don’t realize that the professor intended them to 
work this out. (They think she was trying to trick them into forming a positive 
opinion of Trigby.) Hence (3A) is not met. In Wesley’s case, the audience read the 
letter quickly, notice some positive words, and think that the professor is 
recommending Wesley. Here (2A) is not met. Thus in these cases the claim that 
the student is poor is conversationally implicated but not audience-implicated 
(Saul 2002a, p.244).  
 Saul uses the Wesley case to illustrate what the role of conversational 
implicature actually is, on the interpretation she proposes. Suppose the audience 
(the hiring committee) complain that the professor misled them about Wesley. It 
would not be sufficient, Saul argues, for the professor (who in the examples is Saul 
herself) to reply that she utterer-implicated that Wesley was a poor student — that 
she believed that the supposition that she thought he was a poor student was 
required in order to make sense of her letter. For if her belief was not justified, 
then she could still be blamed for the miscommunication.  
 
Saying that I utterer-implicated that Wesley is a poor philosopher is not 
much of a defense: I could have utterer-implicated that Wesley was Elvis 
if I was crazy enough to suppose that attributing this belief to me was 
required to make sense of my utterance, and that the audience could work 
this out. (Saul 2002a, p.244) 
 
But (Saul continues) it would be a good defence to claim that she conversationally 
implicated that Wesley was a poor student:  
 
What I can do, however, is maintain that I conversationally implicated it: 
It was required in order to understand me as cooperative, and my audience 
was capable of working it out. (ibid.) 
 
By conversationally implicating something, Saul argues, one has made it available 
to one’s audience, and thereby fulfilled one’s communicative responsibilities in 
the matter — whether or not one’s audience actually grasps it. Grice’s notion of 
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conversational implicature, Saul concludes, is designed precisely to play this 
normative role. 
 
2.2 An enriched Gricean framework 
By treating (conversational) implicature as a normative notion, and by introducing 
the additional concepts of utterer-implicature and audience implicature, Saul 
enriches the Gricean framework and enables it to avoid some of the problems 
discussed earlier. In particular, the enriched framework provides at least partial 
solutions to the problems concerning determinacy and calculability. If we 
understand implicature as normative, then it becomes easier to accept that there is 
no implicature present in cases like those of Candy and Finn, where calculability 
fails. We can agree that the utterer has not done enough to make the information 
available. Our intuitions that there is an implicature in place in these cases (or that 
there is a more determinate one than we can calculate) can be vindicated by the 
existence of appropriate utterer-implicatures. Thus, Candy utterer-implicated that 
Tarantino’s movie was ugly and brutal, and Finn utterer-implicated that he was 
bored, since they believed that those interpretations were required to make sense 
of their utterances as cooperative and they thought their hearers could work that 
out. However, they were wrong about this, since in neither case was the intended 
meaning required in the Gricean sense. Candy’s utterance did not require a non-
literal reading at all, and although Finn’s did require such a reading, he did not do 
enough to narrow down the possible non-literal meanings to the one he had in 
mind. Thus, neither conversationally implicated the things they utterer-implicated.  
 However, Saul’s account doesn’t resolve all of the problems for Grice. First, it 
does not address the problems that arise from condition (1) (the cooperative 
presumption). As noted earlier, it is plausible to think that an utterance can carry 
an implicature even if the hearer does not (or should not) presume the speaker to 
be being cooperative (for example, where the hearer thinks the speaker is trying to 
mislead them, or where the speaker is changing the subject or engaging in 
monologue). We might respond by saying that in such cases there is only an 
utterer-implicature, not a conversational one. That is, though (1) does not hold, 
(1*) does: the speaker thinks that he or she is presumed to be being cooperative. 
However, this is not adequate. For in many of the cases discussed earlier, even 
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(1*) will not hold: typically, speakers who openly change the subject or engage in 
monologue will not even think that their hearers presume them to be being 
cooperative.  
 Second, the enriched framework still faces the problems created by condition 
(3), mutual knowledge, which says (simplifying somewhat) that a speaker thinks 
that the hearer can work out the implicated message in the Gricean way. As we 
saw, intuitively it is possible for an utterance to carry an implicature even where 
this condition is not met (for example, where the speaker is a child, or where an 
implicature is intended to go over a hearer’s head, or where the speaker is engaged 
in monologue or talking to a coma patient). And the enriched framework still 
cannot explain this. There cannot be an utterer-implicature in these cases any more 
than there can be a conversational one, since the definition of utterer-implicature 
includes condition (3) unchanged. Nor is it plausible to think that there is an 
audience-implicature. For an audience-implicature exists only if the audience 
thinks that condition (3) holds (that is, if they take the speaker to think that they 
can work out the implicated content in Gricean fashion) and in the problem cases 
discussed (where the speaker is a child, or the hearer uncomprehending or 
comatose or non-existent) this is no more likely than it is that condition (3) will 
actually hold. 
 
3. Some modifications 
Despite its attractions, there are also some difficulties for Saul’s reading of Grice, 
and in this section I shall highlight these and propose some modifications to the 
definition of conversational implicature in order to bring it more in line with the 
normative view proposed by Saul. Although this means departing from the letter 
of Grice’s account, the modified version will remain broadly faithful to his 
approach, and, as we shall see, the modifications will also remove some of the 
remaining problems for the Gricean framework mentioned in the first section. 
 
3.1 The cooperative presumption revised  
The first difficulty concerns condition (1), which runs against the spirit of the 
normative reading. If implicating something involves making it available to one’s 
hearer, then it should not depend on the hearer’s doing something. A content might 
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be made available to a hearer even if they did nothing to pick it up — not even 
presuming that the speaker was being cooperative. From a normative perspective, 
it doesn’t matter whether anyone actually makes the presumption that the utterer 
is being cooperative.9 What matters is what is rationally required to make their 
utterance consistent with that presumption, and this is captured by (2) on its own, 
with slight rephrasing as follows: 
 
(I) (= 1 & 2 revised) The supposition that the speaker is aware that, or 
thinks that, q, is required to make his saying or making as if to say p (or 
doing so in those terms) consistent with the presumption that he is 
observing the CP. 
 This suggests that if implicating involves making a content available, then we 
should revise its definition, dropping (1) altogether and replacing (2) with (I) 
above. This would be more consistent with the idea that the notion of implicature 
is a normative one. Moreover, it has the additional advantage that it removes all 
the problems for the Gricean framework arising from clause (1). On the modified 
view, a speaker can conversationally implicate something (make it available) no 
matter what attitude their audience takes towards them and even if there is no 
audience at all. (In the latter case, the content will be made available to merely 
potential hearers.)  
 
3.2 Mutual knowledge revised 
The second difficulty concerns condition (3), which also does not fit in well with 
the normative approach. If implicating something involves making it available 
according to an objective standard (fulfilling one’s communicative responsibilities 
with regard to it), then there ought to be more to it than the speaker merely 
believing that certain conditions are met. Thus, when discussing clauses (2) and 
(2A), Saul points out that if a speaker is accused of not properly communicating a 
                                                 
9  A similar point holds on the ‘to be presumed’ reading of the cooperative presumption. Whether 
or not a speaker makes a piece of information available should not depend on the hearer’s 
obligations. 
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piece of information, p, it would not be enough for them to reply that they had 
believed that attributing the belief that p to them was required in order to make 
sense of their utterance (Saul 2002a, p.244). If attributing that belief to them was 
not in fact required, then they had not made p available. Similarly, I suggest, it 
would not be enough for a speaker to say that they believed their audience could 
work out that attribution of the belief that p was required: their belief about their 
audience's abilities must be a reasonable one. To see this, consider another 
reference letter example. Again, the professor wants to implicate that one of her 
students, Dido, is a poor philosopher. This time, however, she tries a different 
tactic. She writes a glowing letter full of relevant details, but closes the letter with 
the sentence ‘In closing, it is of the utmost importance to stress that I am a biscuit’. 
She believes that the only way to make sense of this surreal comment is as 
conveying the belief that all she has just written about Dido is unreliable, and she 
believes that her audience are able to work this out. It is not implausible to think 
she is right about the first point (how else could one make sense of the comment?), 
so the conditions for implicature are met (the message that Dido is a poor 
philosopher is required to make sense of the speaker’s utterance and the speaker 
believes the audience can work this out). As it turns out, however, the professor 
has overestimated her audience’s inferential abilities. Her tactic is too subtle for 
the hiring committee, who are simply baffled by the closing sentence. So although 
the conditions for implicature are met, the professor has not made the relevant 
information available, since she had a mistaken view about her audience’s ability 
to work out what is required to make sense of her utterance. (This resembles Saul’s 
Wesley case, where the audience read the professor’s letter quickly and failed to 
work out that the intended meaning was required in order to make sense of it. 
However, in that case the professor was right to think that the audience could work 
out the intended meaning (they could have worked it out if they had read the letter 
more carefully), and responsibility for the failure of communication lay with the 
audience. In the Dido case, by contrast, the professor is wrong to think that the 
audience can work out that the intended meaning is required, and responsibility 
for the failure of communication lies with her. Thus, in the Wesley case the 
professor made her meaning available, whereas in the Dido case she did not.) 
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 Since (3) is the cause of the problem here, this suggests that we should revise 
it so that it becomes a claim about what the audience can do, rather than about 
what the speaker believes they can do: 
 
(3’) It is within the audience’s competence to work out, or grasp 
intuitively, that the supposition mentioned in (I) is required. 
 
 Together with the previous modification, this change has the effect of making 
the notions of utterer-implicature, audience-implicature, and conversational 
implicature more clearly parallel to each other: the first concerns what the utterer 
thinks is the case, the second concerns what the audience thinks is the case, and 
the third concerns what is in fact the case. Thus, an utterance U carries the 
utterance implicature q if the utterer thinks that the supposition that they think q is 
required to make sense of U and that the audience can work this out. U carries the 
audience-implicature that q if the audience thinks that the supposition that the 
utterer thinks that q is required to make sense of U and that the utterer thinks they 
can work this out. And U carries the conversational implicature q if the supposition 
that the utterer thinks that q is in fact required to make sense of U and the audience 
can in fact work this out. Or, more concisely, q is utterer-implicated if the utterer 
thinks U makes q available; q is audience-implicated if the audience thinks U 
makes q available, and q is conversationally implicated if U does make q available.  
 There are problems with this suggestion, however. If (3) was not demanding 
enough on speakers, the revised version, (3’), seems too demanding. For it would 
mean that an implicature could fail for reasons outside the speaker’s control. A 
speaker might produce an utterance which is designed to implicate that q and 
which most hearers would interpret as implicating that q, yet fail to implicate that 
q because their actual hearer is unable to work out that q is implicated — say, 
because they are confused, ill, or suffering from some mental disability. A 
normative standard which requires speakers to take account of the specific abilities 
of individual hearers seems too strict. After all, on the normative reading, 
implicature is supposed to have a similar role to that of sentence meaning, and that 
is not relativized to individual hearers. Moreover, many of the original problems 
for condition (3) would still remain on the revised version. For example, it would 
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still be impossible to implicate something when talking to a coma patient or in 
monologue, or to implicate something that went over the hearer’s head.  
 One option here would be to drop condition (3) altogether, and say that an 
utterance implicates a proposition q if the supposition that the speaker thinks that 
q is required to make sense of the utterance, regardless of whether the speaker 
thinks the audience can work this out or whether the audience can in fact work it 
out. This would of course solve all the problems arising from condition (3), and it 
seems to get at the core of Grice’s account, as reflected in his briefer presentations 
of it.10  
 However, dropping (3) would again give us a rather loose normative standard, 
as the unrevised version of (3) did. There could be cases where a certain 
supposition is required to make sense of an utterance, but where it is beyond the 
scope of a typical audience to work this out, and in such cases the speaker would 
not have done enough to convey the supposition. The Dido reference letter serves 
again as an example. Perhaps the best option, then, would be to revise (3) further, 
so that it becomes a claim about what a typical, or normal, audience would be 
capable of: 
 
                                                 
10  For example: 
[W]hat is implicated is what it is required that one assume a speaker to think in 
order to preserve the assumption that he is observing the Cooperative Principle 
(and perhaps some conversational maxims as well), if not at the level of what is 
said, at least at the level of what is implicated. (Grice 1989, p.86) 
and  
Implicatures are thought of as arising in the following way; an implicatum … is 
the content of that psychological state or attitude which needs to be attributed to 
a speaker in order to secure one or another of the following results; (a) that a 
violation on his part of a conversational maxim is in the circumstances justifiable, 
at least in his eyes, or (b) that what appears to be a violation by him of a 
conversational maxim is only a seeming, not a real violation … (Grice 1989, 
p.370) 
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(II) (= 3 revised) It would be within the competence of a typical audience 
to work out, or grasp intuitively, that the supposition mentioned in (I) is 
required. 
 
(I call the revised claim (II) to match (I), which is our revised version of (1) and 
(2)). Here ‘typical’ means something like ‘alert, averagely informed, competent 
adult speaker of the relevant language’. (This definition will do for the present, but 
in the next chapter I shall argue that we must define the typical hearer more 
narrowly, to take account of the background assumptions and other information on 
which the hearer is expected to draw.) This also has the advantage of avoiding the 
other problems for (3). A speaker can implicate things even if their hearer cannot 
calculate the implicatum or even if there is no hearer at all, provided a typical 
hearer could make the calculation. Thus, one can implicate something in 
monologue or while talking to a coma patient.  
 
3.3 Unmeant implicatures 
Another consequence of this revision of clause (3) is that there will be clear cases 
of unmeant implicatures. Although Saul suggests that there may be unmeant 
implicatures, she does not commit herself and says that the issues are ‘incredibly 
tricky’ (2002a, p.247 n.28). This is true so long as we stick with Grice’s definition, 
with the original clause (3). On the one hand, if conversational implicature is the 
pragmatic parallel of sentence meaning, then it should be possible to produce 
utterances with implicatures one does not intend, just as it is possible to utter 
sentences with meanings one does not intend. On the other hand, it is not easy to 
think of cases where a speaker believes that their audience can work out that the 
supposition that they (the speaker) believe that q is required to make sense of their 
utterance and yet does not intend to express the belief that q. This is not to say that 
implicature conceptually requires intention. As we saw in the previous chapter, 
Grice’s views on that are not clear. The point is that it is not easy to find 
psychologically plausible cases where a person fulfils the conditions for 
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implicating that q without also intending to communicate p. (Saul offers the 
Roland case as a possible example, but does so only tentatively.)11 
 The revised version of Grice’s definition, with (II) instead of (3), avoids this 
problem. Since (II) does not make reference to what the speaker believes, there is 
no obstacle to a speaker’s producing an utterance that carries an unmeant 
implicature. If a certain reading is required to make sense of a given utterance as 
cooperative, and if a typical audience would work out this meaning, then it is 
implicated, regardless of whether or not the speaker intended it.  
 This is, I suggest, an intuitively desirable result. The following example may 
help to illustrate this. A professor, Donald, phones a colleague, Rita, to ask her 
opinion of one of her former students, Omar, who has just applied to Donald’s 
institution. As it happens, Rita thinks that Omar is an excellent philosopher. 
However, she also knows that he is an exceptionally kind, caring, and inspiring 
human being, who spends all his spare time on voluntary work and charitable 
activities, and on the spur of the moment she is so eager to say what a wonderful 
person Omar is that she forgets to say anything at all about his philosophical 
abilities. Donald interprets this failure to mention Omar’s philosophical work as 
implicating that Omar is a poor philosopher, and decides to reject his application. 
Here I think we would intuitively say that Rita (or perhaps her utterance — see 
below) had implicated that Omar is a poor philosopher, and if she were later to 
reflect on what she had said, she might well come to that conclusion herself and 
feel guilty for misrepresenting Omar, albeit unintentionally. But Grice’s definition 
does not support this intuitive conclusion, since clause (3) would not be met. Rita 
would not count as having implicated that Omar was a poor student, since she did 
not believe that Donald was able to work out that that belief must be attributed to 
her to preserve the supposition that she was being cooperative. (If she had believed 
that, she would have spoken very differently.) However, the revised definition, 
with (II) instead of (3), does support the intuitive conclusion, since it does not 
                                                 
11  To recap: The professor writes a reference letter that clearly implicates that Roland is a poor 
philosopher, yet she does not intend the hiring committee to form the belief that he is a poor 
philosopher, and hopes they will not notice the implicature (Saul 2002a).  
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mention Rita’s beliefs at all. Since (plausibly) attributing to Rita the belief that 
Omar was a poor philosopher was required to uphold the presumption that she was 
observing the CP and following the maxims, and since it was within the power of 
a typical hearer to work that out, Rita (or her utterance) implicated that message.  
 Although implicatures like Rita’s are unintended, the speaker may still be held 
responsible for them, since they neglected to consider the way in which their 
utterance would be understood. The recognition of the possibility of unmeant 
implicatures may have consequences for questions about the ethics of implicature.  
 
4. Implicature and speaker meaning again  
I now want to return to the role of speaker meaning in implicature. As we saw in 
the previous chapter, Grice does not clearly commit himself as to whether 
implicatures must also be meant, and we left the question open. However, Saul’s 
normative reading, revised as proposed, suggests a way to resolve this issue, as I 
shall now explain.  
 
4.1 Normative and psychological conditions for implicature 
Saul proposes that Grice’s notion of implicature is intended to play a normative 
role, similar to that of sentence meaning. Now, for Grice, uttering a sentence which 
means that p (sentence meaning) is only one of two necessary and sufficient 
conditions for saying that p. The other condition is that the speaker must mean that 
p (speaker or utterer’s meaning) — where this is a matter of the speaker being in 
a certain psychological state (having certain communicative intentions, as 
previously discussed). If the notion of implicature plays the same role as that of 
sentence meaning, then this suggests that for a speaker to implicate that q it is not 
enough for them to produce an utterance that implicates that q; in addition, the 
speaker must meet some psychological condition, parallel to having an appropriate 
speaker meaning (see Table 1). 
 But what is this psychological condition? One option would be to say that it is 
the existence of an utterer-implicature (in Saul’s sense) with content q. Utterer-
implicature is defined in terms of speaker’s beliefs, so this is a psychological 
condition. However, it does not seem to be the right psychological condition. 
Roughly speaking, to say that a speaker S utterer-implicates q is to say that S thinks 
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that their utterance implicates q — that is, S thinks that the normative condition 
holds. But in the case of saying the two conditions are not related in this way. To 
say that a speaker S means that p is not to say that S believes that the sentence they 
utter means that p. Speaker meaning is a matter of having certain communicative 
intentions, and it is more basic than sentence meaning and independent of it.  
 A better view, I propose, is that the psychological condition is simply that S 
means that q in Grice’s standard sense — that is (roughly), S intends to get their 
hearer H to believe that q (or to believe that S believes that q) and to achieve this 
in part by getting H to recognize this very intention. As we saw in the previous 
chapter, there are several reasons to think that Grice held that implicatures need to 
be backed by speaker meanings, and these reasons all support the present proposal. 
Thus, I propose that the conditions for the performance of speech acts with, 
respectively, conventional and nonconventional meaning are as in Table 1. (For 
simplicity, I have assumed that conventional meaning is limited to what is said, 
and nonconventional meaning to what is conversationally implicated; the table 
could easily be extended to accommodate conventional implicature and 
nonconversational nonconventional implicature.)  
 






S says that p 
 
S means that p  
(speaker meaning) 
S uses a sentence 




S implicates that q S means that q S produces an 





Table 1: Saying and implicating. A psychological condition and a normative 
condition are individually necessary and jointly sufficient for each act. 
 
Of course, as we also saw in the previous chapter, there are also reasons to think 
that Grice held that implicatures do not need to be backed by speaker meanings. 
However, from our present position we can explain this, as I shall now show. 
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4.2 Speaker implicature and utterance implicature 
If what has been said in the previous section is correct, then a speaker might meet 
the normative condition for implicating that q without meeting the psychological 
one. In the case of conventional meaning, Grice holds that a speaker says that p 
only if both conditions are met, so by parallel, we should say that a speaker 
implicates that q only if both relevant conditions are met. In the case where only 
the normative condition is met, we might say that the utterance, but not the 
speaker, implicates that q. (The parallel with conventional meaning would suggest 
that we should say it is the sentence that implicates. But although this might be 
appropriate for generalized implicatures, where the same sentence generates the 
same implicature in most contexts, it does not allow for particularized 
implicatures, which are context-dependent. To accommodate both kinds, we need 
to consider sentences as uttered in particular contexts — that is, utterances.) Thus, 
we need to distinguish between an utterance implicating something and a speaker 
implicating something. An utterance U implicates that q when the normative 
condition holds (that is, on the proposed revised account, when (I) and (II) hold), 
whether or not the speaker means that q. A speaker S implicates q when both the 
normative and psychological conditions hold (that is, when (I) and (II) hold, and, 
in addition, S means that q).12 I shall refer to these as utterance implicature and 
speaker implicature respectively. (The latter should not be confused with utterer-
implicature as defined by Saul. A person utterer-implicates that q in Saul's sense 
if they think that their utterance meets the Gricean conditions for implicating q. A 
person speaker implicates that q in my sense if (a) their utterance meets the Gricean 
conditions for implicating that q (or my revised versions, (I) and (II)), and (b) they 
                                                 
12  As a reminder, conditions (I) and (II) are: 
(I) The supposition that the speaker is aware that, or thinks that, q, is required to 
make his saying or making as if to say p (or doing so in those terms) consistent 
with the presumption that he is observing the CP. 
(II) It would be within the competence of a typical audience to work out, or grasp 
intuitively, that the supposition mentioned in (I) is required. 
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mean that q.) Cases of unmeant implicature, like Rita’s, are ones of utterance 
implicature but not speaker implicature. The relation between utterance 
implicature and speaker implicature, and the parallel relation between sentence 
meaning and what is said, are set out in diagram form in Figure 3. 
 
 
Figure 3: The relation between sentence meaning and what is said, and between 
utterance implicature and speaker implicature, on the view proposed here. The 
Roland and Rita cases fall in the unshaded crescent on the far right. 
 
 The cases of unmeant sentence meaning (those in the crescent on the far left) 
will include both ones where the speaker misspeaks, choosing the wrong words 
for their meaning, and ones where they deliberately say something they do not 
mean in order to convey something else (where they make as if to say it, as Grice 
puts it). Similarly, the cases of unmeant utterance implicature (in the crescent on 
the far right) will include both unwitting ones, in which the speaker is unaware 
that their utterance carries an implicature (as in Rita’s case) and ones where the 
speaker deliberately creates an implicature they do not mean, as in Saul’s Roland 
case (in which the professor deliberately writes an irrelevant reference letter but 
hopes no one will spot the implicature). In cases of the latter kind, we might say 
that the speaker makes as if to implicate.  
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4.3 The role of intention 
This distinction between utterance implicature and speaker implicature enables us 
to resolve the apparent conflict in Grice’s views about the role of speaker meaning 
in implicature. As we saw in the previous chapter, a case can be made for thinking 
both that Grice did and did not hold that implicatures must be backed by speaker 
meanings. Now, on the view proposed here, an utterance can implicate something 
without the speaker meaning it, as in Rita’s case, but a speaker cannot implicate 
something without meaning it (though that is not all there is to implicating it; 
meaning that q is necessary but not sufficient for implicating that q). Thus, the 
apparent tension in Grice’s views can be resolved. The two contrasting positions 
on the role of speaker meaning can be thought of as corresponding to two different 
questions: what is required for an utterance to implicate something and what is 
required for a speaker to implicate something. Since the requirements for a speaker 
to implicate that q differ from those for saying that q only in that they involve 
producing an utterance which implicates that q, it is natural that Grice’s discussion 
of implicature focuses almost exclusively on the conditions for utterance 
implicature and makes little or no mention of intentions. However, when we set 
Grice’s theory of implicature in the wider context of his theory of meaning, we 
need to bring in the further psychological conditions for a person to communicate 
something, and thus to focus on the broader notion of speaker implicature. Thus, 
the distinction between utterance and speaker implicature makes sense of what is 
otherwise a mysterious conflict in Grice’s views.  
 I am not claiming that Grice would have endorsed this explanation. For one 
thing, he does not distinguish between speaker implicature and utterance 
implicature, and indeed it is difficult to make that distinction while working with 
the unrevised Gricean definition, which does not easily accommodate unmeant 
implicatures. Moreover, Grice’s definition of implicature is framed in terms of the 
conditions for a person (indeed, a man) to implicate something (‘A man who, by 
(in, when) saying (or making as if to say) that p has implicated that q [etc.]’ 
(1975/1989, p.30). This is not, however, strictly incompatible with the proposal 
made here. Grice’s definition might give only necessary conditions for speaker 
implicature, while at the same time giving sufficient conditions for utterance 
implicature. At any rate, I suggest that the interpretation I have proposed makes 
  85
the best sense of Grice’s comments on the topic, which, as noted in the previous 
chapter, are often tentative and exploratory.  
 A final comment on the role of intention in implicature. The view just outlined 
is similar to the hybrid one suggested in the previous chapter, which tried to link 
Grice’s accounts of implicature and speaker meaning by proposing that when a 
speaker S implicates that q, S must both (a) intend to get their audience to believe 
that q in part by recognizing this very intention and (b) believe that the audience 
can do this by going through a Gricean calculation. (These conditions were not 
supposed to be sufficient for implicature; the other Gricean conditions for 
implicature were also required.) I noted, however, that the suggestion created a 
puzzle as to why it should be necessary for condition (b) to hold, given that it is 
not necessary for S to believe that their intention can be recognized only by means 
of a Gricean calculation. The proposal set out in the present chapter is similar to 
this, but also significantly different. For if the revisions to the Gricean definition 
in section 3 above are accepted, it is no longer necessary for (b) to hold. Condition 
(b) followed from clause (3) of Grice’s definition, but we have revised this so that 
it no longer requires the speaker to believe that the implicated message can be 
recovered by a Gricean calculation. It is sufficient that the message can be 
recovered (by a typical audience) by a Gricean calculation (condition (II)), and the 
reason for including this condition is simply that (together with condition (I)) it 
provides the normative element highlighted by Saul. 
 
Conclusion 
In this chapter I have considered some fundamental problems for Grice’s definition 
of (conversational) implicature and set out a response which involves adopting a 
normative reading of Grice and introducing new psychological notions of utter-
implicature and audience-implicature. I showed how this enriched Gricean 
framework avoided many, but not all, of the problems raised. In the spirit of the 
normative reading, I then went on to propose further modifications and extensions, 
replacing Grice’s three-part definition with a shorter two-part one, and introducing 
a distinction between speaker implicature and utterance implicature. I argued that 
these revisions removed many of the remaining problems for Grice and also 
resolved a persistent problem concerning the role of intention in implicature. I 
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suggest that the resulting account is the most charitable and consistent formulation 
of the Gricean framework, and that it affords the best line of reply to the problems 
raised in section 1 of this chapter. Finally, construed in this way as a normative 
theory, the framework promises to provide us with norms of implicature, of the 
sort discussed in Chapter 1, which may help us to avoid misunderstandings and 
resolve disputes. So far, the Gricean framework is standing up well, then. 




Where the Gricean framework fails 
 
The previous chapter argued that, if interpreted as a normative theory and enriched 
and revised in certain ways, the Gricean framework can avoid many of the 
objections raised against it. However, some problems remain, and in this chapter I 
shall set them out and argue that they seriously undermine the framework.  
 The first section of the chapter deals with the issue of speaker-dependency. On 
the normative reading of Grice we have been considering, what is conversationally 
implicated should be independent of the intentions and attitudes of the particular 
speaker involved. I shall argue, however, that conversational implicature, as 
defined by Grice, is not speaker-independent in this way. Although speaker 
intentions do not directly determine what is implicated, they indirectly determine 
it via their role in fixing relevant background knowledge, cooperative standards, 
and other inputs to the interpretative process. The next section of the chapter looks 
at the implications of this argument for the Gricean framework. It argues that they 
are serious and that the appropriate response is to adopt a different approach to 
implicature, which drops the requirement of calculability and gives a greater role 
to speaker intentions. This intention-centred account, I argue, can still retain a 
normative element, at least of a weak kind. Section 3 of the chapter looks at the 
concepts of utterer-implicature and audience-implicature, introduced by Saul as 
part of her revision of Grice’s account. I noted that these notions might be 
employed to prop up the Gricean framework, but I shall argue that they cannot do 
the work required of them. The final section of the chapter looks at the implications 
of Grice’s theory of implicature generation for the process of implicature recovery, 
arguing that here, too, it faces problems.  
 Although I proposed some (sympathetic) modifications to the Gricean 
definition of implicature in the previous chapter, the problems I shall highlight in 
this chapter will not depend on these modifications being accepted and would 
remain even if they were rejected. Where it is important, I shall indicate how the 
problems apply to both the original and revised versions. 
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1. The argument for speaker-dependency 
1.1 Normativity and speaker dependency 
As we saw in the previous chapter, it is plausible to interpret Grice’s notion of 
conversational implicature as a normative one. On this view, speakers cannot make 
their utterances implicate whatever they want, any more than they can make them 
carry whatever conventional meaning they want. There is a standard of correctness 
for implicature that is independent of the speaker. What is implicated by an 
utterance is what is required to make sense of it as cooperative, where this is 
determined by general communicative principles, not by what the speaker intends 
to implicate, and it may differ from what the speaker and hearer think is required 
— notions for which Saul introduces the terms utterer-implicature and audience-
implicature, respectively.  
 This is supposed to apply to particularized, context-dependent, implicatures as 
much as to generalized ones — if not to a greater degree. In the case of generalized 
implicatures, a normative, speaker-independent notion could be defined by 
generalizing across speakers. We could say that ‘Some F are G’ conversationally 
implicates ‘Not all F are G’ if speakers typically use it to implicate that (as they 
do). But this tactic cannot be used with particularized implicatures, since these 
depend heavily on context, and, Saul argues, Grice included audience-related 
criteria in his definition of implicature precisely in order to provide a speaker-
independent element in such cases.1 What is implicated by an utterance is what the 
audience is rationally required to believe in order to make sense of it as cooperative 
                                                 
1  Saul writes:  
Despite his focus on speaker intentions, [Grice] wanted what is said not to be 
entirely subject of the whims of individual speakers. Instead, he defined ‘saying’ 
in terms of both speaker meaning and sentence meaning, and defined sentence 
meaning by generalising across speakers. … Grice’s inclusion of the audience in 
his definition of ‘conversational implicature’ serves a similar purpose. ... With 
conversational implicature, generalising across speakers would be inappropriate 
given the importance of context. Instead, he looked to the other participant in the 
conversation — the audience. (Saul 2002a, p.241) 
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in the context — where again this may not be the same as what the speaker or 
hearer actually think is required. Thus, if a sentence carries a certain implicature 
in a certain context X (where X includes the language used as well as other factors) 
when uttered by speaker A in the presence of speaker B, then it should carry the 
same implicature if uttered in X by speaker C in the presence of speaker D, and so 
on. What is conversationally implicated should not be dependent on beliefs and 
intentions specific to the individual speaker or hearer. This is not to say that none 
of the speaker’s or hearer’s beliefs are relevant. In its original form at least, Grice’s 
conditions for the presence of a conversational implicature include that the speaker 
believes that the hearer can work out that the implicated message is required and 
that the hearer believes that the speaker is being cooperative. In the previous 
chapter I argued that, in the spirit of Saul’s normative reading, we should remove 
or revise these conditions (Chapter 3, section 3). But even if we do not, they are 
general conditions for the existence of an implicature; the content of the 
implicature does not depend on further beliefs and intentions specific to the 
speaker and hearer in question. 
 In this part of the chapter I shall argue that conversational implicature is not in 
fact independent of the speaker’s beliefs and intentions in this way, and thus that 
the concept of conversational implicature cannot play the proposed normative role. 
The overall argument is as follows. According to Grice, what is required to make 
sense of an utterance as cooperative can be inferred from the following items of 
information: 
 
(1) the conventional meaning of the words used, together with the identity 
of any references that may be involved; (2) the Cooperative Principle and 
its maxims; (3) the context, linguistic or otherwise, of the utterance; (4) 
other items of background knowledge; and (5) the fact (or supposed fact) 
that all relevant items falling under the previous headings are available to 
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both participants and both participants know or assume this to be the case 
(Grice 1975/1989, p.31).2 
 
That is, what an utterance implicates is what is required to make sense of it as 
cooperative, given premises concerning (1) conventional meaning and references, 
(2) cooperativeness, (3) context, (4) background knowledge, and (5) mutual 
knowledge. Davis refers to these premises as the ‘background constraints’ relative 
to which an implicated meaning is required (1998, p.63). Assuming that only one 
conclusion can be derived from the premises, this would give a speaker-
independent standard of what is required and hence implicated. However, this 
assumes that the relevant premises grouped under (1) to (5) can themselves be 
identified without reference to the speaker’s beliefs, desires, and intentions, and 
this, I shall argue, is not so. I shall begin with item (4), background knowledge, 
which presents the biggest difficulty for Grice, and then look more briefly at items 
(1), (2), and (3).  
 The points that follow apply especially to particularized implicatures, which 
are more dependent on background information and contextual detail, though they 
apply in principle to all implicatures. (Some problems specific to generalized 
implicatures will be discussed in the next chapter.)  
 
1.2 Background knowledge 
I take it that the background knowledge employed in a Gricean calculation 
includes any information that is not specific to the utterance or its context but that 
is still necessary for interpreting the utterance. For instance, take the familiar 
example in which a philosophy professor devotes a reference letter to praising their 
student’s handwriting skills. This implicates that the student is a poor philosopher, 
but this conclusion cannot be derived simply from the premise that the professor 
is being cooperative, together with the conventional meaning of the words and the 
context. We need to add the background knowledge that handwriting is irrelevant 
                                                 
2  I assume that Grice says ‘supposed fact’ under (5) because he requires only that the speaker 
should believe that the hearer can work out the implicature on the basis of the information listed, 
not that they can actually work it out. This was a point on which my revised version differed. 
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to philosophical ability. If good handwriting were in fact a highly reliable sign of 
philosophical ability, then the utterance would implicate that the student was a 
good philosopher, not a bad one. The same holds in many other cases. In general, 
inferences about contingent matters depend on a large number of background 
assumptions that are not made explicit in our reasoning. But since different sets of 
background assumptions will generate different inferences, this raises an important 
question: what is the relevant set of background assumptions for the generation of 
conversational implicatures? More precisely, since we are adopting a normative 
perspective, what is the correct set of background assumptions to use in working 
out what, if anything, an utterance conversationally implicates? The implicated 
content is the one that is required to make sense of the utterance as cooperative, 
but what are the background assumptions relative to which it is required? Given 
different background assumptions, different implicata will be required. (I speak of 
assumptions rather than knowledge, in order to avoid begging the question of 
whether these attitudes must be true.) 
 One suggestion is that the appropriate background is simply the truth — the 
set of all relevant true propositions. This would fit with the idea that what is 
conversationally implicated is speaker-independent. There is a problem with this 
suggestion, however. Consider the following exchange: 
 
 (1)  Al: Do you think Cally will realize she’s been tricked? 
   Bea: She’s not Einstein. 
 
We would naturally interpret Bea as implicating that Cally is stupid and will not 
realize that she has been tricked (and let us assume that this is the interpretation 
that Bea intends). Einstein was a genius, and in saying that Cally is not like him 
Bea implicates, by understatement, that Cally is stupid. But now suppose that, 
unknown to everyone, the real Einstein was in fact of very low intelligence, and 
that all the mathematical and scientific work for which he is known was actually 
produced by someone else and was falsely presented as Einstein’s. Then if Bea’s 
utterance is to be interpreted in the light of what is in fact true, a very different 
interpretation would be required. If the relevant background assumption is that 
Einstein was of very low intelligence, then Bea’s utterance requires us to suppose 
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that she thinks Cally is actually very smart and will realize that she has been 
tricked. Here is another example: 
 
 (2)  Raj: Do you think the king will win the battle? 
   Sal: Is the earth flat? 
 
Here Sal answers by asking a rhetorical question, implying that the answer to Raj’s 
question is the same as — and as obvious as — the answer to it. But of course what 
answer is implicated will depend on what we think is the answer to the rhetorical 
question. If Raj and Sal are living in a prescientific society where everyone thinks 
that the earth is flat, then Raj will naturally interpret Sal as implicating that it is 
obvious that the king will win. (Again, let us assume that this is what Sal intended.) 
However, if the relevant background is the truth, then this interpretation would be 
wrong, and Sal ought to be interpreted as implicating that it is obvious that the 
king will not win. 
 Now in these cases the speaker would not actually count as implicating the 
unintended reading (that Cally is smart, that the king will lose), since clause (3) of 
Grice’s definition ((II) of the revised version) would not be met.3 The speaker 
would not believe that the audience can work out that that reading was required, 
nor (on the revised version) would a typical hearer (contemporary to the speaker) 
be able to work out that it was required. So in these cases Grice would have to say 
that nothing is conversationally implicated, although the intended meaning is both 
utterer-implicated and audience-implicated. This is implausible, however. It would 
be inappropriate to base a pragmatic interpretation of an utterance on information 
unknown, not only to the speaker and the hearer, but to anyone in their society. 
                                                 
3  As a reminder, Grice’s clause (3) and my revised version (II) run as follows: 
(3) The speaker thinks (and would expect the hearer to think that the speaker 
thinks) that it is within the competence of the hearer to work out, or grasp 
intuitively, that the supposition mentioned in (2) is required. 
(II) It would be within the competence of a typical audience to work out that the 
supposition mentioned in (I) [= Grice’s (2)] is required. 
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Such a normative standard would be far too strict. Indeed, if the normatively 
correct interpretation is the one that is made available to the hearer, then it should 
be the other reading (the intended one) that is the normative one. Bea’s utterance 
makes available the information that Cally will not realize that she has been 
tricked, and Sal’s utterance makes available the information that the king will win 
— and these utterances would make these pieces of information available to any 
other typical hearer in Bea’s or Sal’s societies.  
 (Note that the previous paragraph assumes that being able to work out that a 
certain reading is required involves being able to identify the appropriate 
background assumptions to use as well as being able to make the appropriate 
calculation from them. However, if working out the implicature simply involves 
being able to make the calculation itself, then Al and Raj (or any other typical 
hearer of Bea or Sal) could work out that the truth-based, unintended meaning is 
required, since they would be able to make the calculation if they were provided 
with the appropriate background information. In this case, clause (3)/(II) would be 
met and the utterances would carry the unintended implicatures. However, this 
would not make it any more plausible to think that truth is the relevant background 
for interpretation. If anything, it is even less plausible to claim that these utterances 
do in fact carry the unintended implicatures than to claim that they carry no 
implicature at all.) 
 These examples suggest that the appropriate background assumptions to use 
for interpretation are not those that are true but those that are believed to be true in 
one’s community. This would mean that in the case of Bea and Sal the speakers’ 
intended interpretations would be the normatively correct ones, since they are the 
ones that would be derived from the background beliefs current in their 
communities. However, there are further problem cases. For on many matters, 
different and conflicting background beliefs exist within a community, and these 
differences will affect the interpretation of utterances. Here is an example (suppose 
that Don and Ellie are both American citizens): 
 
 (3)  Don: Do you think Senator Bloggs took the bribe? 
   Ellie: Well, he’s a Republican. 
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Here, how one interprets Ellie’s utterance depends on what background 
assumptions one makes about Republicans. If one assumes that Republicans are 
corrupt, then Ellie’s remark would seem to implicate that Bloggs did take the bribe. 
If one assumes that Republicans are honest, then it would seem to implicate that 
Bloggs did not take the bribe. (I say seem to implicate, since, again, we have to 
allow for the effect of clause (3)/(II) of the definition. Even if we agree on what 
meaning is required to make sense of the utterance, that meaning will not actually 
be implicated unless the speaker believes that the hearer can work out that it is 
required, or (on the revised version) unless a typical hearer could work out that it 
is required.) Given that both views are widespread in Don and Ellie’s community 
(assuming that to be the community of American citizens), which is the correct 
view to use in interpreting Ellie’s utterances?4  
 One option would be to say that since there is a diversity of relevant 
background views in Ellie’s community, there is no unique proposition required 
to make sense of the utterance as cooperative, and hence no conversational 
implicature is present at all. Instead, there are just an utterer-implicature and an 
audience-implicature, corresponding to what the speaker and hearer think is 
required, and reflecting their personal background beliefs. But again, this seems 
too strict. Suppose that Ellie is well known to her friends (including Don) for her 
strong dislike and distrust of Republicans. Then Don will naturally interpret her as 
implicating that the Senator took the bribe. This interpretation would be 
particularly natural if Don shares Ellie’s views about Republicans, but even if he 
does not, it would be the obvious one to adopt. If Don knows Ellie’s views about 
Republicans, then he will assume a negative view of Republicans for the purposes 
of interpreting her comment, even if he is himself a Republican supporter. 
Moreover, this seems to be the correct interpretation, given Ellie’s beliefs and 
Don’s knowledge of them. Ellie has successfully made her opinion available to 
Don, and there has been no confusion or lack of attention on either side. Her 
                                                 
4  Keith Frankish has suggested another example to me, as follows. Writing a reference for a 
former student, a philosophy professor includes the comment ‘Her impact on professional 
philosophy may be similar to that of Ludwig Wittgenstein.’ Depending on what we think of 
Wittgenstein, this might be taken as either the highest praise or an accusation of charlatanism. 
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opinion is not only utterer-implicated and audience-implicated, but 
conversationally implicated. There will be many cases like this, where different 
people within a community have different background beliefs or make different 
value judgements, each of which would generate a different implicature.  
 Note that Grice’s condition (3) may also be met in this case. We may suppose 
that Ellie believes, correctly, that Don knows her background beliefs and can work 
out that the anti-Republican reading is required. The revised version of this 
condition, (II), might also be met. This says that a typical hearer could work out 
that the anti-Republican reading is required. Whether or not this is the case 
depends on what we mean by ‘typical’. But since the aim of the revised condition 
was to capture our intuitions about implicature, the fact that we have an intuition 
that there is a conversational implicature in Ellie’s case indicates that we should 
read ‘typical’ in a way that is compatible with this. For example, we might say that 
a typical hearer is one that has (among other things) the sort of familiarity with the 
speaker’s attitudes that the speaker expects them to have — in other words, one 
that is a member of the community to whom Ellie might address this remark. Thus, 
we might say that a typical hearer for an utterance is one that is (a) alert, averagely 
informed, linguistically competent, and (b) a member of the community to whom 
the speaker might address the utterance (with the particular communicative 
intentions they have on this occasion). In short, a typical hearer is a competent 
potential addressee. In some cases, where the interpretation of an utterance 
depends on specific assumptions shared by few people, the pool of potential 
addressees might be very small — perhaps including only the person actually 
addressed. In such cases, an implicature might serve the function of a private code. 
 The Ellie example suggests, then, that the appropriate background beliefs for 
derivation of a conversational implicature are those of the speaker. It might be 
objected that this is covered by the suggestion made earlier in response to the Al 
and Raj examples — namely, that the appropriate background beliefs are those 
that dominate in the speaker’s community. In this case (the objector may say), the 
relevant community is that of people who think that Republicans are corrupt. 
However, this does not remove the speaker-dependency, since the relevant 
community has to be identified by reference to the attitudes of the speaker. The 
reason we pick out the people who believe Republicans are corrupt as the relevant 
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community is that that belief is the relevant background assumption made by the 
speaker. This is speaker-independency in name only, since it holds only between 
people who share the same (relevant) beliefs as the speaker.  
 I think this is nearly right, but I want to make a modification, which gives 
priority to the speaker’s intentions rather than their beliefs. Suppose Don is the 
father of Ellie’s boyfriend, and that Ellie is meeting him for the first time. She 
knows that Don is a committed Republican, and, although she herself deeply 
distrusts Republicans, she is anxious to make a good impression and not to offend 
Don. So she conceals her real views, goes along with Don’s comments on political 
matters, and intends her answer to his question about Bloggs to be understood in 
the light on Don’s beliefs, not her own, and thus to implicate that the Senator did 
not take the bribe. Intuitively, this would seem the correct way to interpret Ellie’s 
utterance. If she purposely conceals her own background beliefs about 
Republicans, then she has not made available her belief that Bloggs took the bribe. 
(This would remain true even if Don realizes that Ellie is concealing her real views. 
We know that what a person makes available to us may not be what they really 
believe.) This suggests, then, that the relevant background assumptions to use in 
calculating an implicature are those that the speaker intends to be used — where 
these will often, but not always, be ones the speaker actually holds.  
 If all this is right, then conversational implicature will not be speaker-
independent, since in order to work out an implicature we shall need to know what 
background assumptions the speaker intends us to draw on. It may be objected that 
this is not a problem for Grice, even on a normative reading. For the speaker’s 
intentions regarding the appropriate background assumptions to use could be 
treated as part of the context for their utterance. Then speaker-independency will 
be preserved, since all hearers who know the context will, by definition, make the 
same background assumptions. However, like the previous objection (that the 
relevant background assumptions are the ones that predominate in the speaker’s 
community), this preserves speaker-independency only in name. On this view, 
implicatures are speaker-independent relative to a context, but contexts themselves 
are not speaker-independent, since they are defined by reference to the speaker’s 
intentions. There will be agreement on what is implicated only between people 
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who share the same (relevant) intentions as the speaker, and bundling these 
intentions into the context does not change this.5 
 Finally, note that the background knowledge cases discussed above are similar 
to the Suleiman case discussed in the previous chapter, in which different 
interpretations are required depending on what background information the hearer 
has about Suleiman (that he is a good conversationalist, that he is a skilled masseur, 
and so on). The main difference is that in that case it was a matter of choosing from 
a range of different but compatible background beliefs (or choosing their 
disjunction), whereas in the cases discussed here the choice was between 
incompatible background beliefs. In the Suleiman case, I argued that we would 
have to say that nothing was implicated, since there were no grounds for picking 
out one interpretation over another, and the disjunction of all the possible 
interpretations was ruled out by clause (3). (The speaker did not believe that their 
hearer could work out that the disjunction was required.) However, given the 
discussion above, another option offers itself: namely, that the correct background 
information to apply is that which the speaker intends their hearer to apply. 
Assuming that the speaker believes their audience can detect these intentions (or, 
on the revised version, that a typical hearer could detect them) this would mean 
that there is an implicature in such cases after all.  
 I shall look at some consequences of speaker-dependency later in this section, 
and discuss a general objection to it. First, however, I want to look at other inputs 
to the Gricean calculation process and argue that these are speaker-dependent too. 
  
1.3 What is said  
The first item of information Grice lists as entering into the process of calculating 
what an utterance implicates is the conventional meaning of the words used and 
any references. This, fixes ‘what is said’ by the utterance, which Grice identifies 
with what is directly communicated — the proposition that is judged true or false 
                                                 
5  Note that if we were to regard information about speaker intentions with regard to background 
assumptions as part of the context of the utterance, then it becomes uncontroversial that condition 
(II) is met in cases like Ellie’s. A typical hearer could work out such implicatures, since knowledge 
of the context including the speaker’s intentions is taken as a given in the working-out process.  
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and that is the starting point for the calculation of anything that may be indirectly 
communicated by implicature.  
 There are several issues here. First, as Davis points out, it is not enough to 
know the conventional meanings of the words used and their referents; as 
interpreters we need to know their ‘applied’ meaning — their meaning on this 
particular occasion of use (Davis 1998, p.64). If a word has more than one 
conventional meaning, we need to know which one is relevant on this occasion. 
(Grice acknowledges that disambiguation is required in order to fix what is said; 
Grice 1975/1989, p.25.) However, on Grice’s own view, applied meaning is fixed 
by both conventional (sentence) meaning and speaker meaning (Grice 1968, 1969, 
both reprinted in 1989). There is, therefore, no completely speaker-independent 
way of fixing what is said.  
 Davis extends this thought further, suggesting that even disambiguated 
conventional meanings are not decisive for interpretation. A speaker may misspeak 
(for example, saying ‘coroner’ for ‘corner’), or use words in an unconventional 
way. Provided the hearer understands what the speaker means by the words on this 
occasion, Davis argues, the utterances in question could still generate 
conversational implicatures. In such cases, it would be speaker meaning that forms 
the premise for implicature calculation, not conventional (sentence) meaning 
(Davis 1998, pp.64–5).  
 A further problem for Grice arises from his identification of what is said with 
what is directly communicated. Conventional meaning (even when 
disambiguated) and referents determine only a minimal form of explicit content 
which does not correspond to our intuitive understanding of what is directly 
communicated. Here is an example (borrowed with simplification from Carston 
and Hall 2012) 
 
 (4)  Max: How was the party? Did it go well?  
    Amy: There wasn’t enough drink and everyone left early.  
  
Here what Amy says (in Grice’s sense) is simply that there was not enough 
drinkable liquid and everyone left early — which would be false if there had been 
plenty of lemonade and if someone somewhere did not leave early. But this is not 
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what Max will take Amy to be directly communicating. Rather, he will understand 
her to be saying something like: 
 
 (5)  There wasn’t enough alcoholic drink to satisfy the people at the party 
and so everyone who came to the party left it early.  
 
This is the proposition Max will judge to be true or false, and it is from this that he 
will work out the implicated answer to his question — namely that the party did 
not go well. Cases like this are very common (for more examples, see Carston and 
Hall 2012). 
 The process of filling out the explicit content of an utterance in this way is 
called ‘explicature’, a term coined by Sperber and Wilson (1995), and relevance 
theorists argue that it is a pragmatic process, involving the application of general 
communicative principles like those involved in the derivation of implicatures 
(see, for example, Carston 2004a; Hall 2008; Recanati 2002; Wilson and Sperber 
2002). This view is controversial, and other theorists argue that explicature is a 
semantic process involving the filling in of hidden indexicals, demonstratives, and 
variables present in the logical form of the utterance (for example, Stanley 2000). 
This is a large and complicated debate, which is not directly relevant to my main 
topic, and I shall not discuss it here. (The relevance theory approach to implicature 
recovery and the relation between explicature and implicature will be discussed 
more in Chapter 5.) Rather, I simply want to note that this gives us yet another 
reason for doubting that implicature is speaker-independent. If contextualized 
pragmatic processes are involved in explicature, then they may draw on 
information about the speaker. And if so, then even the basic step of establishing 
the explicit content that forms the starting point for implicature calculation will not 
be speaker-independent.  
 
1.4 Cooperativeness 
Another premise in a Gricean calculation is that the speaker is being cooperative, 
following the CP and its maxims. Moreover, there must be a further judgement to 
the effect that what the speaker says is not cooperative — that the utterance cannot 
be taken at face value, consistently with the premise that the speaker is being 
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cooperative. But what counts as being cooperative? A normative account of 
implicature will need a standard of cooperativeness to guide our judgements on 
this matter. Grice spells out cooperativeness in terms of adherence to the maxims 
of Quantity, Quality, Relation, and Manner, but again these need interpretation, 
and I shall argue that we cannot determine whether an utterance meets them 
without taking into account the speaker’s attitudes. I shall consider each maxim in 
turn. 
 The first is the maxim of Quantity, which says that speakers should be as 
informative as is required and no more informative. But what amount of 
information is required in any given situation? There is no clear speaker-
independent standard, and the same sentence might be regarded as either 
sufficiently or insufficiently informative, depending on who uttered it. Consider a 
reference letter case. Suppose a hiring committee receives a reference letter for 
Rebecca, an applicant for a philosophy lectureship, which consists simply of the 
following sentence: 
 
 (6)   Rebecca is a good philosopher and I recommend her to you.  
 
Does this violate the maxim of Quantity? It is plausible to think that the answer 
depends on who the committee think wrote it. If they think it was the famously 
uncommunicative Professor A, who rarely agrees to write reference letters at all 
and never writes more than a few words, then they will probably see it as providing 
as much information as they can expect and take it at face value. On the other hand, 
if they think it was written by Professor B, who usually writes detailed reference 
letters running to several pages, then they will regard it as uncooperatively short 
and probably read it as implicating that Rebecca is not a very good philosopher 
and is not really being recommended. This indicates that cooperativeness with 
regard to information quantity is speaker-relative, and that hearers may need to 
consider the speaker’s attitudes and intentions in order to judge whether it is being 
violated.  
 The next maxim is the maxim of Quality, which says that speakers should not 
say things they believe to be false or for which they lack adequate evidence. The 
speaker-dependency here is obvious. Since the maxim makes reference to what the 
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speaker believes and what evidence they have, there is no speaker-independent 
way of determining whether an utterance violates it. If the speaker believes that p 
is false or if they have inadequate reasons for believing p, then they are violating 
the maxim of Quality if they say that p, even if p is true and objectively well 
supported by evidence. (I assume that what matters is the evidence the speaker 
actually possesses. Even if there is good evidence that p, the speaker violates the 
maxim of Quality if they are not aware of the evidence.)  
 There is also room for speaker-dependency in the notion of adequate evidence. 
Different speakers may have different conceptions of what counts as adequate 
evidence (different evidential standards). Some people are quicker to jump to 
conclusions than others. It is not clear that there are any independent norms 
available in this area, and even if there were, it is the speaker’s own norms that 
matter in determining whether they are respecting the maxim of Quality. If I assert 
that aliens exist on the basis of evidence that is in fact flimsy but that I regard as 
adequate, then it is plausible to think that I have not violated the maxim and should 
not be taken to be implicating something. But if a speaker with the same evidence 
but much stricter evidential standards says the same thing, then they would be 
violating the maxim and might be appropriately interpreted as being ironic.  
 Next consider the maxim of Relation, which says that contributions should be 
relevant. Now, as we saw in section 1.2 above, what counts as relevant to a 
conversation varies with background assumptions. A comment about a student’s 
handwriting might be relevant to a philosophical reference if handwriting is taken 
to be a good indicator of philosophical ability. Given the right background 
assumptions, any comment could be relevant to any exchange. So determining 
whether an utterance violates the maxim of Relation involves determining what 
background assumptions to apply, and, as we saw, this involves considering the 
speaker’s intentions.  
 Moreover, even given fixed background assumptions, there is still room for 
judgements of relevance to vary depending on who the speaker is. For example, 
consider this exchange: 
 
 (7)  Freda: Why should we vote for Smith? 
   Jack: She has a strong policy on protecting frogs.  
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Whether Jack’s reply is relevant depends on Jack’s attitude to frogs. If Jack is an 
animal-lover obsessed with protecting amphibians, then his reply is a relevant 
response to Freda’s question under its literal meaning. Jack is being 
straightforwardly cooperative, and there is no reason to think he is implicating 
anything. But if Jack cares nothing for wildlife and regards frog protection as a 
trivial issue, then his reply is not relevant under its literal meaning and implicates 
that there is no good reason to vote for Smith. Thus, whether or not there is an 
implicature in this case depends on the speaker’s attitudes.  
 In other cases, the speaker’s attitudes may determine an utterance's degree of 
relevance or irrelevance, and thus what it implicates. Consider:  
 
 (8)  Ed: Do you like this shirt? 
   Joy: It has lovely buttons. 
 
Here Joy’s reply is not directly relevant to Ed’s question, and its lack of relevance 
signals that Joy is implicating something. However, what Joy is implicating 
depends on how relevant remarks about buttons are, which in turn depends on 
Joy’s attitude to buttons. If she prizes buttons and judges items of clothing by the 
quality of their buttons, then she is praising a relevant feature of the shirt and 
implicating that she likes it. However, if she regards buttons as trivial, then she is 
praising an irrelevant feature and implicating that she dislikes it.  
 Note that the different interpretations in these cases depend, not on different 
background assumptions about animal welfare and clothing accessories, but on 
different values or preferences. Joy need not think that buttons are objectively 
important, but just have strong personal feelings about them. There will be many 
cases like this, where an utterance’s relevance to a conversation depends on what 
the speaker values. In the absence of objective standards of value on the matters in 
question, there will be no speaker-independent way of interpreting these 
utterances. 
 Finally, similar issues arise with the maxim of Manner, which includes 
submaxims requiring speakers to avoid obscurity and ambiguity and to be brief 
and orderly. The problem again is that there are no clear speaker-independent 
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standards on these matters. For example, what counts as obscurity? It will depend 
on context: wording that would be obscure in a teacher’s comment on a third-grade 
pupil’s work might not be obscure in a supervisor’s comments on a PhD thesis. 
Moreover, there is room for different styles within each type of context. For 
example, what is the correct type of language to use in a reference letter? Suppose 
a reference letter for Rebecca, a philosopher, concludes with the following 
statement:  
 
 (9)   I can sum up my view of Becks by saying that she is one cool 
philosophy dude. 
 
Does this violate the maxim of Manner by using obscure, slang terms and phrases 
(‘Becks’, ‘one’ (for ‘a’), ‘cool’, ‘dude’)? Whether the hiring committee reading 
the letter think so plausibly depends on who they think wrote it. If they think it was 
Professor C, who likes to present himself as youthful and hip and usually writes in 
an informal style reflecting his (rather dated) ideas of youth culture, then they will 
probably take the comment at face value, as expressing high praise of Rebecca. It 
they think it was written by the conservative Professor D, who usually writes in a 
very formal style, then they will probably read it as deliberately flouting the 
obscurity submaxim and implicating that the professor does not take Rebecca 
seriously as a philosopher. (We can also imagine the reverse case in which a formal 
and old-fashioned reference would implicate a negative evaluation if written by 
Professor C but not if written by Professor D.) Thus, as in the case of Quantity, 
cooperativeness with regard to Manner is speaker-relative, and judgements on the 
matter will depend on facts about the speaker’s attitudes and intentions.  
 Similar points could be made with respect to the submaxims relating to 
orderliness and brevity. Many different styles of speaking and writing are 
acceptable (compare the styles of different novelists), and what counts as a 
violation of brevity and orderliness in one writer or speaker might be perfectly 




Another premise in the Gricean calculation is a description of context of the 
utterance. Again, I shall argue that this cannot be given in a speaker-independent 
way. I want to focus specifically on the linguistic context — the topic and purpose 
of the wider communicative exchange to which the utterance being interpreted 
belongs. Identifying this is crucial for establishing whether the Cooperative 
Principle is being followed at the level of what is said or what is implicated. For 
example, the sentence ‘Fred has excellent handwriting’ implicates that Fred is a 
poor philosopher only if uttered in the context of a request for an assessment of 
Fred’s philosophical abilities, and then only if it has a prominent position in the 
assessment (added at the end of a reference letter, following a long series of highly 
positive comments about Fred’s philosophical abilities, it would not generate the 
implicature).  
 But how do we determine the context for an utterance? We cannot simply read 
it off from the words uttered. Consider the following exchange between Sally and 
Sarah, academics who have just listened to a talk by a colleague Phil: 
 
 (10) Sally: What did you think of Phil’s talk?  
   Sarah: It was OK. By the way, did I tell you about the new air freshener 
I bought?  
 
Is Sarah’s second sentence part of her response to Sally’s question or is she 
changing the subject? If it is part of her response, then it must be interpreted as 
carrying an implicature, to the effect that Phil’s talk ‘stank’. But if it is a new topic, 
then it can be taken literally. It is hard to see how to decide without appealing to 
facts about Sarah and her intentions. We need to know whether she meant to 
change the subject with her second sentence, and to decide this we need to know 
more about what Sarah thinks of Phil and his philosophical views, how she reacted 
during his talk, whether she has a particular interest in air-freshening products, and 
so on. And this means that linguistic context cannot be determined in a speaker-
independent way. Again, it might be suggested that we could treat all this 
information about Sarah as included within the context for the utterance, but, 
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again, this would preserve speaker-independence in name only. The nature of what 
was implicated would still vary from speaker to speaker.  
 
2. Responding to the argument 
I have reviewed all the premises for a Gricean calculation — the background 
constraints relative to which the implicated meaning is required — and argued that 
none of them can be established in a completely speaker-independent way. I will 
consider the consequences of this in a moment, but first I want to deal with a 
possible objection. 
 
2.1 Resisting speaker dependency  
Griceans might try to resist the argument for speaker-dependency by claiming that 
in the cases considered in the previous section the speakers’ attempts at implicature 
simply fail. Because their utterances do not meet speaker-independent standards 
of interpretation, the speakers do not identify unambiguous implicata and thus 
either fail to implicate anything or implicate open-ended disjunctions. We are 
simply wrong to think that there are determinate implicatures in these cases. Our 
intuition that something specific is being implicated may correspond to an utterer-
implicature or an audience-implicature, but there is no specific conversational 
implicature. This is counter-intuitive, but if the Gricean theory is a normative one, 
then we should expect that it will correct some of our everyday judgements. 
 I do not think this reply is satisfactory. First, it would mean that Saul’s notions 
of utterer-implicature and audience-implicature will have a lot of theoretical work 
to do, and, as I shall argue in section 3 below, it is doubtful that they are up to the 
job. Second it means that Grice’s theory becomes a radically revisionary one. 
Grice’s aim was, I take it, to analyse the everyday phenomenon we have in mind 
when we talk of a speaker conveying something indirectly — implying, 
suggesting, indicating, or meaning one thing by saying another (Grice 1989, p.86). 
But on the view just proposed the Gricean notion of conversational implicature is 
very strict, and there will be many cases where the Gricean account of what, if 
anything, a speaker is implicating is very different from what we would naturally 
take them to be indirectly implying (suggesting, indicating, meaning). Where we 
detect a clear indirect meaning, Gricean theory often tells us we should see none 
  106
at all, or only a much weaker, disjunctive one. (In many cases, these disjunctive 
meanings would be very weak. For example, given different background 
assumptions, Ellie’s reply in (3) could be interpreted as indicating either that 
Senator Bloggs did take the bribe or that he did not, so if the implicature is the 
disjunction of these alternative interpretations, then it is completely 
uninformative.) Thus, Gricean theory requires us to revise or abandon a wide range 
of everyday interpretations and replace them with ones that are far less rich and 
informative. It is hard to see what value such a normative theory has.  
 Finally, and most importantly, the objection misdescribes the problem. It is not 
that in the cases we considered in section 1, the utterances failed to meet speaker-
independent standards. Rather, the cases showed that there are no such standards. 
There are no speaker-independent norms for establishing the correct premises to 
use in a Gricean calculation. In the case of background assumptions, we saw that 
truth cannot serve as the standard, and community-wide belief will not do either, 
since there is no speaker-independent way of identifying the relevant community. 
Similarly, in the case of cooperativeness and the associated maxims, there are no 
objective standards governing the amount of information required, the truth or 
probability of the content, the relevance to the topic, and the manner of expression. 
As we have seen, the same words may be judged cooperative when uttered by one 
speaker and uncooperative when uttered by another, and there is no clear speaker-
independent standard to which we could appeal to correct these judgements. 
Similar points hold for linguistic context and explicit (directly communicated) 
content. These cannot simply be read off from the words used, and fixing them 
involves reference to the speaker’s attitudes. 
 Griceans might respond that even if there are no speaker-independent 
standards for determining background constraints, it does not follow that all 
implicatures are speaker-dependent to any significant degree. First, generalized 
implicatures are not sensitive to context at all and so should not be speaker-
dependent. Second, even in the case of particularized implicatures, it will often be 
obvious what the relevant background constraints are from the non-psychological 
context, without considering the attitudes of the particular speaker. 
 I do not think these points are very strong. I will consider generalized 
implicatures in the next chapter, where I will argue that these are more context-
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sensitive than Griceans suppose. But note that even if speaker dependency holds 
only for particularized implicatures, this still involves giving up the idea that 
Gricean theory provides global speaker-independent norms of implicature that 
cover both particularized and generalized varieties. As for the second point, it is 
not clear that it is correct. Although it may frequently be obvious what the 
appropriate background constraints are, this may be because it is obvious what the 
relevant psychological attitudes of the speaker are (perhaps because they are 
widely shared in the speaker’s community), rather than because these attitudes are 
not relevant. At any rate, the examples used to argue for speaker-dependency in 
section 1 were familiar, everyday ones, and many more could have easily been 
offered.  
 
2.2 Consequences of speaker-dependency 
Suppose we accept, then, that implicatures are not speaker-independent. Although 
the notion of what is required to make sense of an utterance as cooperative appears 
to offer a speaker-independent standard, it turns out that the background 
constraints relative to which an interpretation is required cannot themselves be 
identified without reference to the attitudes of the speaker. What are the 
consequences of this? 
 First, it weakens the normative role of the Gricean framework. As we have 
seen, the framework is best understood as aiming to establish conditions for 
implicature that are independent of the speaker’s attitudes and intentions. If the 
arguments in section 1 above are sound, then it fails to do this. Although the 
framework still establishes conditions for the presence of an implicature, these 
conditions are not independent of the speaker. Facts about the speaker and their 
mental states are an essential part of the background for a Gricean calculation. The 
notion of what is required to make sense of an utterance as cooperative still 
provides a standard for implicature, but it is a speaker-dependent one. Quite 
different interpretations may be required to make sense of two utterances of the 
same sentence in the same context made by different speakers. This is a much 
weaker normative standard. 
 Second, if, as I argued, a speaker’s intentions partially fix the background 
assumptions with respect to which utterances are to be interpreted, then speakers 
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can at least partially control what is required to make sense of their utterances as 
cooperative.6 Consider an example from Davis. Carl says ‘I am sick’ and Diane 
replies ‘A flying saucer is nearby’ (Davis 1998, p.74). Although there is no single 
interpretation required to make sense of this bizarre comment, Davis claims that 
Diane may nonetheless be implicating something specific. For she may mean to 
convey a specific message — say that Carl can get help from the doctors on the 
flying saucer — and on Davis’s view for a speaker to implicate something is 
simply for them to mean to convey it by saying something else (where meaning to 
convey something is a matter of having appropriate communicative intentions) 
(Davis 1998, p.4–5, p.114, p.122, p.130, 2007, p.1661).7 Saul objects that it is 
counter-intuitive to think that speakers possess such a degree of authority over 
what they implicate, and uses this intuition to support the normative reading of 
Grice we have been considering (Saul 2001, p.633; 2002, pp.240–1). However, if 
a speaker’s intentions determine which background assumptions to use in 
interpreting their utterances, then it might seem that Diane’s utterance could carry 
the implicature she intends, even on Gricean principles. Suppose Diane intends her 
utterance to be interpreted in the light of the following background assumptions: 
(a) Flying saucers are real and often visit Earth, (b) Flying saucers carry alien 
doctors, (c) Alien doctors are able and willing to cure human sickness. Then, given 
                                                 
6  Not all the background constraints that are speaker dependent are under speaker control, of 
course, since speakers may not have control over the relevant facts about themselves. For example, 
a speaker violates the maxim of Quality in saying that p only if they believe that p is false or have 
(what they regard as) inadequate evidence for p. These are facts about the speaker, but not ones 
over which the speaker has any direct control. But as we saw earlier, some background constraints, 
in particular background assumptions, are plausibly fixed by the speaker’s intentions, which are 
under their control.  
7  This is how Davis defines what he calls speaker implicature, which he identifies with Grice’s 
particularized implicature (Davis, 1998, p.21). Davis also argues for the existence of what he calls 
sentence implicatures (corresponding to Grice’s generalized implicatures), which depend on 
conventions of use within a language community. I shall discuss Davis’s views about sentence 
implicature in the next chapter.  
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this background, the supposition that Diane believes that Carl can get help on the 
spaceship is plausibly required to make sense of her utterance as cooperative.  
  This is too fast, however. Given Diane’s intentions with regard to background 
assumptions, the supposition that she is expressing the belief that Carl can get help 
on the spaceship is required to make sense of her utterance as cooperative, so 
clause (2) of Grice’s definition (= clause (I) of the revised definition) is met. But 
there is still clause (3) (= revised clause (II)) to consider. On the original version 
this says that the speaker believes that the audience can work out that the 
supposition in question is required.8 But, as I argued in the previous chapter 
(section 3.2), this does not provide a strong normative constraint. Diane may 
believe, wrongly, that Carl shares her beliefs about flying saucers and alien 
doctors, and thus that he can work out that she is implicating that he can get help 
on the saucer. However, I proposed a revised version of this clause (II), to the 
effect that a typical audience can work out that the supposition in question is 
required — where a typical hearer is a competent potential addressee for the 
utterance in question (an alert, averagely informed, linguistically competent, 
member of the community to whom the speaker might address the utterance). 
Since speakers cannot control whether or not a typical audience can work out what 
                                                 
8  As a reminder, Grice’s conditions (2) and (3) and my conditions (I) and (II) are as follows: 
(2) The supposition that [the speaker] is aware that, or thinks that, q is required 
in order to make his saying or making as if to say p (or doing so in those terms) 
consistent with this presumption. 
(3) The speaker thinks (and would expect the hearer to think that the speaker 
thinks) that it is within the competence of the hearer to work out, or grasp 
intuitively, that the supposition mentioned in (2) is required. 
(I) The supposition that the speaker is aware that, or thinks that, q, is required to 
make his saying or making as if to say p (or doing so in those terms) consistent 
with the presumption that he is observing the CP. 
(II) It would be within the competence of a typical audience to work out, or grasp 
intuitively, that the supposition mentioned in (I) is required. 
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supposition is required to make sense of their utterances as cooperative, this limits 
speakers’ control over what they can implicate. A speaker may have intentions that 
dictate that a certain reading of their utterance is required to make sense of it as 
cooperative, but the speaker does not implicate that reading unless a typical 
audience can work out that it is required. Thus, depending on the details of the 
situation, Diane may or may not succeed in implicating what she intends. If she 
thinks, mistakenly, that everyone shares her eccentric views about flying saucers 
and alien doctors, then she will fail to implicate it. However, if she and Carl are 
members of a UFO cult who all share similar beliefs about flying saucers, and she 
takes this for granted in making her remark, then a typical hearer (in the specified 
sense) would be able to work out her intended meaning and she would succeed in 
implicating it. Thus, on this view there remains a significant constraint on 
speakers’ power to implicate.  
 
2.3 An intention-centred account of implicature 
Is the normative element provided by clause (II) sufficient to save the Gricean 
framework? I don’t think so — at least not in its traditional form. In fact, I think 
the moral of the discussion is that a theory of implicature can and should give a 
greater role to speaker intentions.  
 On the surface, the Gricean framework gives no role to speaker intentions in 
fixing what utterances implicate (though, as argued in the previous chapter, it may 
allow a role for intentions in determining what speakers implicate). But if the 
arguments above are correct, then there is a hidden indirect role for speaker 
intentions in fixing what utterances implicate, since implicatures are sensitive to 
facts about speakers’ intentions with regard to the background constraints on 
interpretation (background assumptions, cooperative standards, and so on). But, 
once this is admitted, then the question arises of why speaker intentions should not 
play a greater role. Why not allow that speaker intentions can directly fix what is 
implicated, as Davis holds? This would immediately resolve many of the problem 
cases discussed in Chapter 3, where considerations of calculability could not 
determine whether or not a speaker was implicating something (as with Candy and 
the Tarantino movie) or provide a non-disjunctive account of what they were 
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implicating (as with Finn’s Suleiman remark). For the speaker may have clear 
communicative intentions that settle the matter.  
 As noted, Saul rejects Davis’s view on the grounds that it gives speakers too 
much power over the nonconventional content of their utterances — power they 
do not have over their utterances’ conventional content. (Compare the Humpty 
Dumpty theory of implicature mentioned in Chapter 1.) As Saul puts it, ‘What 
Grice’s theory gives us and Davis’ does not is the idea that what is implicated is 
not wholly up to the speaker’ (Saul 2001, p.633). But, as we have seen, the notion 
of what is required (on Gricean principles) to make sense of an utterance as 
cooperative does not in itself provide a speaker-independent standard, since a 
speaker’s intentions play a crucial role in the calculation, by establishing the 
relevant background assumptions, cooperative standards, and so on. The 
normative element comes in only with the requirement that a typical hearer can 
work out what is required. But a similar constraint could also be incorporated into 
an intention-based account like Davis’s. We might say that a speaker S who says 
that p implicates that q if (a) S means to convey that q by saying p, and (b) a typical 
audience could work out that S means to convey that q. (Again, a typical audience 
is a competent potential addressee, where this might be someone with considerable 
background knowledge of S’s attitudes.)9 
                                                 
9  It is arguable that a constraint similar to Grice’s condition (3) is actually implicit in an 
intention-based account of implicature — at least given a Gricean view of speaker meaning. 
According to Grice, for S to mean that q is (in essence) for S to intend to get their hearer to believe 
that q by recognizing S’s intention to get them to do so. But one cannot seriously intend to do 
something unless one believes one has at least a chance of success. We cannot seriously intend to 
do things we think are impossible. So if S intends to get their hearer H to recognize their intention 
to communicate q, then S must at the very least think it is possible for H to recognize it, and thus 
that it must be possible for H to see the connection between what they say and what they are trying 
to implicate. Davis himself stresses this point: 
On my view, S means or implies I by uttering Σ only if S utters Σ with the 
intention of providing an indication that he believes I … Because intention 
implies expectation, S must have some expectation that uttering Σ will provide 
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 Thus we can avoid the Humpty Dumpty theory. Even if speakers’ intentions 
can directly fix what they implicate, speakers cannot implicate whatever they like. 
They must ensure that they make their communicative intentions clear. Borrowing 
a term from Saul, we might say that they must make their intended meaning 
available to their audience. They might do this in various ways. They could rely 
on Gricean mechanisms. If the meaning they intend to convey is the one that is 
obviously required (given the relevant background constraints) to make sense of 
their utterance as cooperative, then they have made it available. But this is not the 
only means they might use. They might indicate their intended meaning by tone of 
voice, expression, gestures, and other non-verbal cues. They might rely on their 
hearer’s knowledge of their beliefs, intentions, preferences, dispositions, and 
conversational habits. (Remember that a typical audience in our sense may be one 
that is well acquainted with the speaker.) They might know that they have a rapport 
with the hearer, which enables him or her to pick up their communicative 
intentions intuitively from numerous subtle cues. They might, at the extreme, 
simply tell the hearer what they mean. Or they might rely on a combination of 
these and other means.10  
 On this view, then, the core normative constraint on speakers is that they make 
their intended meaning available by some means. The Gricean framework is just 
one particular account of how a content might be made available, and calculability 
is no longer a necessary condition for implicature.11 It is true that this move makes 
                                                 
an indication that he believes I. Unless S is psychotic, S will have such an 
expectation only if S perceives some connection in the context of utterance 
between I and the proposition E literally expressed by Σ. (Davis, 1998, p.186) 
10  They might also, perhaps, rely on the hearer’s knowledge of specific interpretative principles 
or implicature conventions, which support generalized implicatures. I will discuss this in the next 
chapter. 
11  Compare Davis: 
[A] speaker can make her implicature available if she creates a context in which 
there is enough evidence available to her conversational partners to give them a 
reasonable chance of figuring out what she has implied on the basis of what she 
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our account of implicature more vague, but, arguably, this reflects the open-ended 
nature of the phenomenon itself. Implicature-based communication is complex and 
subtle and cannot be captured in a precise definition, even one as clever as Grice’s. 
(I shall suggest in Chapter 6 that the difficulty we have in providing a precise 
theory of implicature tells us something about the social function of implicature.) 
 I think this is on the right lines, but I want to make an important modification. 
Above, I said that a speaker S implicates that q by saying that p if (a) S means to 
convey that q by saying that p, and (b) a typical hearer could work out that S means 
to convey that q. However, this formulation states conditions for the speaker to 
implicate and does not allow for the possibility (discussed in Chapter 3, section 
3.3) that an utterance may implicate something that the speaker does not mean. (I 
offered the example of Rita, who, in her eagerness to say what a wonderful human 
being Omar was, forgot to mention his philosophical abilities and thereby 
implicated that he was a poor philosopher.) If we are to allow for unmeant 
implicatures, we need to make a distinction between what a speaker implicates and 
what their utterance implicates, and the latter must thus be independent of (or at 
least not wholly determined by) the former. As we saw in the previous chapter, 
with the modifications I proposed, the Gricean framework can allow for this: We 
can say that an utterance U implicates that q if the supposition that the speaker 
thinks that q is required to make sense of U as cooperative, and that a speaker S 
implicates that q if S means that q and produces an utterance that implicates that 
q. If we want to make a similar distinction on our intention-centred account, then 
we cannot say that what an utterance implicates is fixed by what the speaker means 
to convey (even if what they themselves implicate is fixed by that).  
                                                 
said. Knowledge that speakers generally observe the Cooperative Principle and 
the maxims may be part of this evidence. But that knowledge may be overridden 
… Moreover, the evidential base may be completely different. (Davis, 2007, 
1668–9)  
For more on the range of factors that may be involved in the recognition of an implicature, see 
Davis 1998, pp.127–31. 
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 I think we can do this, by appealing again to the notion of making a meaning 
available. Let us say that an utterance U makes q available (where q is not the 
literal meaning of U) if a typical audience (in our sense) would identify q as the 
(or a)12 intended meaning of U, inferring this from the literal meaning of U, 
together with any or all of the indications mentioned earlier (Gricean 
considerations, non-verbal cues, knowledge of the speaker’s attitudes and habits, 
personal rapport, and so on).13 Then we can say that an utterance implicates q if it 
makes q available in this way. In short, what an utterance implicates is what a 
typical hearer (in our sense) would judge the speaker to mean to convey by saying 
what they do, where this may differ from what the speaker actually meant to 
convey by saying it. The implicated meaning is the non-literal meaning the speaker 
appears to intend.14  
                                                 
12  I say ‘or a’ since the hearer may also regard the utterance’s literal meaning as an intended 
meaning of the utterance.  
13  This definition of making available is restricted to non-literal meanings. We might also speak 
of utterances making literal meanings available: A literal meaning is made available if a typical 
audience would interpret it as the speaker's intended meaning. If we do this, then it will of course 
be crucial to distinguish the indirect making available involved in implicature from the direct 
making available involved in literal communication. It might seem that we can do this by saying 
that implicature-carrying utterances make their implicated meanings available by making their 
literal meanings available. However, if 'made available' means 'would be interpreted as intended', 
then this will not do, since the literal meaning of an implicature-carrying utterance would often not 
be interpreted as intended, as in cases of irony. It would be better to say that an implicature-carrying 
utterance makes its implicated meaning available by having another meaning, which itself may or 
may not be made available. In the text, 'made available' should always be understood in this way, 
to mean made available via another meaning. 
14  In a fuller treatment, this might need some refinement. For example, we might want to allow 
for cases where a hearer judges that an utterance implicates something while at the same time 
realizing that the speaker does not really intend to convey it. (In the Rita example, Donald might 
realize that Rita’s admiration for Omar’s general goodness has led her to misjudge the content of 
her reference.) Many such cases will be ones where the speaker is not paying full attention to what 
they are saying, so one option would be to say that
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  On this view, then, the speaker’s communicative intentions are central to what 
an utterance implicates, since evidence about them will affect how a typical hearer 
would interpret the utterance. (On the Gricean view, by contrast, such evidence is 
irrelevant.) However, if that evidence is misleading (if the speaker has given 
misleading indications of their meaning), then the meaning their utterance makes 
available, and thus implicates, may differ from what the speaker meant to convey. 
(In Saul’s Roland case, for example, the professor’s letter implicated that Roland 
was a poor student since it gave clear indications that that was what the writer 
meant to convey, even though she did not in fact want its readers to form that 
belief.) Similarly, if the speaker fails to give adequate indication of their intended 
meaning, then their utterance may fail to make any (non-literal) content available 
and thus fail to implicate anything at all. Thus, we can say that an utterance 
implicates that q if it makes q available, in the sense just described, and that a 
speaker implicates that q if they mean that q and produce an utterance that 
implicates that q. 
 To sum up, then, on our intention-centred account (conversational) implicature 
can be defined as follows: 
 
In saying that p, a speaker S implicates that q if (a) S means to 
convey that q by saying that p, and (b) S's utterance makes q 
available (in the sense defined earlier, relative to a typical 
audience).15 
 
                                                 
hearer would judge the speaker to intend to convey if they thought the speaker was being fully 
attentive. 
15  Davis suggests a similar account. Responding to Saul’s objections, he stresses that his notion 
of (speaker) implicature is a purely descriptive one, and that we may also need a normative notion, 
proper implicature. On Davis’s view, a person implicates that q if they mean or imply q by saying 
something else, but they properly implicate that q only if they also fulfil their communicative 
responsibilities by making their meaning available to their audience (Davis 2007, pp.1662–3). 
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This preserves the parallel between saying and implicating, both of which involve 
a psychological condition and a normative condition, as set out in the table below 
(a revised version of Table 1, updated to reflect our intention-centred definition).  
 






S says that p S means that p 
(speaker meaning) 
S uses a sentence 




S implicates that q S means that q 
(speaker 
implicature) 
S produces an 
utterance that 




Table 2: Saying and implicating according to the intention-centred account of 
conversational implicature. 
 
 I want to emphasize that, although this account retains a normative component 
and allows for unmeant implicatures, it does not establish speaker-independent 
norms of implicature. As I explained, in interpreting an utterance a typical hearer 
may draw on information about the particular speaker (their beliefs, conversational 
habits, and so on), and such information may therefore determine what the 
utterance makes available, and so implicates (which may, however, be different 
from what the speaker actually meant). Thus, the same sentence may generate 
different implicatures in the same context when uttered by different speakers. The 
account is, we might say, only weakly normative. Given the problems raised earlier 
in this chapter, I doubt that it is possible to provide speaker-independent norms of 
implicature, at least for particularized implicatures.  
 This is only a sketch of the intention-centred account, and further refinements 
and additions might be needed in order to develop it fully. But I hope I have said 
enough to show that it is possible to develop an intention-centred account of 
implicature which drops the requirement for calculability in Grice’s sense but does 
not ignore normative concerns.  
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3. Utterer-implicature and audience-implicature 
Before moving on, I want to return to an issue that I set aside earlier. As part of 
her case for a normative reading of Grice, Saul introduced the notions of utterer-
implicature and audience-implicature. These are psychological states, and the 
purpose of positing them was, as it were, to fill in the gaps left by Grice’s account. 
Many apparent cases of implicature turn out not to meet the strict Gricean 
conditions for implicature (given the argument in section 1, there may be a very 
large number of such cases). But — the suggestion was — rather than see this as 
evidence against Grice, we could see it as evidence for the existence of distinct 
psychological phenomena related to implicature. In cases of apparent implicature, 
Griceans may say, there is not an implicature, but the speaker or hearer thinks there 
is one. In this way, Griceans might use the notions of utterer-implicature and 
audience-implicature to respond to the challenge of speaker-dependency. I said 
earlier that I did not think this tactic would work, and I shall now explain why.  
 To recap, here is how Saul defines the two notions:  
Utterer-implicature: 
(1*) The speaker thinks that he is presumed to be following the 
conversational maxims, or at least the Cooperative Principle. 
(2*) The speaker thinks that the supposition that he is aware that, or thinks 
that, q, is required to make his saying or making as if to say p (or doing 
so in those terms) consistent with this presumption. 
(3) The speaker thinks (and would expect the hearer to think that the 
speaker thinks) that it is within the competence of the hearer to work out, 
or grasp intuitively, that the supposition mentioned in (2*) is required. 
Audience-implicature: 
(1) The speaker is presumed to be following the conversational maxims, 
or at least the Cooperative Principle; 
(2A) The audience believes that the supposition that [the speaker] is 
aware that, or thinks that, q, is required to make his saying or making as 
if to say p (or doing so in those terms) consistent with this presumption. 
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(3A) The audience takes the speaker to think that it is within the 
audience’s competence to work out that the supposition mentioned in 
(2A) is required.  
(Adapted with minor revisions from Saul 2002a, p.235, 237, 242) 
 
More concisely, there is an utterer-implicature when the speaker/utterer believes 
that each of the three conditions for a Gricean conversational implicature is met, 
and there is an audience-implicature when the hearer/audience thinks each of the 
three conditions is met.  
 Now, as theorists we have appealed to these notions mainly in cases where 
there is not in fact a conversational implicature. However, it cannot be supposed 
that utterer-implicatures and audience-implicatures exist only in cases where 
conversational implicature fails. It would be crazy to think that people believe that 
the Gricean conditions are met only when they are not met! Indeed, it is plausible 
to think that (on the Grice-Saul view) there will typically be an utterer-implicature 
whenever there is successful implicature generation, and that there will typically 
be an audience-implicature whenever there is successful implicature recovery. 
Cases where a person tries and fails to implicate something are subjectively just 
like cases where they try and succeed (assuming they do not realize they have 
failed), and cases where a hearer mistakenly thinks an implicature is present are 
subjectively just like cases where they correctly think one is (again, assuming they 
do not realize their mistake). So the same range of psychological states will, 
typically, be present in both cases. Thus, if utterer-implicatures are typically 
present in cases of failed implicature generation, then they will typically be present 
in cases of successful implicature generation too, and if audience-implicatures are 
typically present in cases of failed implicature recovery, then they typically will 
present in cases of successful implicature recovery too. 
 Of course, even on the Grice-Saul view there will not always be an 
accompanying utterer-implicature and audience-implicature whenever there is a 
conversational implicature. As we saw in Chapter 3, a speaker may generate an 
implicature without believing that their audience will detect it (the Roland case), 
or (at least on my revised definition) without even realizing that they have done so 
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(the Rita case), so there can be conversational implicature without utterer-
implicature. And there can be conversational implicatures that the audience does 
not recognize as having been intended (the Trigby case) or that they simply do not 
detect at all (the Wesley case), so there can be conversational implicature without 
audience-implicature.16 These are, however, atypical cases, where the generation 
of the implicature is partially or wholly unintentional, or the recovery of the 
implicature partially or wholly unsuccessful. But when a speaker successfully 
implicates something in the normal way, there will be an utterer-implicature 
present, and when a hearer successfully detects an implicature there will be an 
audience-implicature too. Or, at least, that is a consequence of the Grice-Saul view. 
There are several problems with this position, however.  
 First, it re-introduces many of the problems for the Gricean framework that we 
considered in the previous chapter. The problems arose because the original 
definition imposed psychological conditions for implicature. Condition (1) (‘the 
cooperative presumption’) required that the hearer should think the speaker is 
being cooperative, and condition (3) (‘mutual knowledge’) required that the 
speaker should believe that the hearer can work out that the implicated proposition 
is required by Gricean principles. And these conditions, we saw, are implausible. 
Contra (1), speakers can implicate things when thought to be uncooperative (as 
when they change the subject or try to mislead) or when there is no hearer at all. 
And contra (3), people unfamiliar with Gricean theory can implicate things even 
though they do not believe that the implicated meanings are required on Gricean 
principles, and people can implicate things they do not believe their audience can 
grasp (for example, when talking to a coma patient). The normative view, under 
the revisions suggested, resolved these problems by depsychologizing the notion 
of implicature. The new conditions, (I) and (II),17 did not mention the beliefs of the 
                                                 
16  For the Roland, Trigby and Wesley cases, see Chapter 3, section 2.1; for the Rita case, see 
Chapter 3, section 3.3. 
17  Again, as a reminder, these are conditions are: 
  120
actual speaker or hearer, but stipulated only that the implicated meaning should be 
rationally required to make the speaker’s utterance consistent with the cooperative 
presumption (regardless of whether anyone had actually made that presumption), 
and that a typical hearer could work out that it was required (regardless of whether 
the actual hearer did so, or whether the speaker thought they could do so). This 
removed the problems at a stroke.  
 But the notion of utterer-implicature and audience-implicature are couched in 
psychological terms, and thus reintroduce those problems, or related versions of 
them. For utterer-implicature, (1*) no more plausible than (1).18 If speakers can 
successfully implicate things when their hearer does not presume they are being 
cooperative or when they have no hearer, then it is hard to see why they cannot 
successfully implicate things when they doubt or disbelieve that their hearer 
presumes them to be being cooperative, or know they have no hearer. And, since 
the definition of utterer-implicature includes Grice’s original (3), it inherits all the 
problems arising from that clause. 
 Similarly, audience-implicature retains Grice’s (1), and inherits all of the 
problems arising from it. And (2A) and (3A) raise an acute version of the problem 
of non-Griceans. These clauses require, not only that anyone who successfully 
recovers an implicature should believe that the implicated proposition is required 
by Gricean principles, but also that they should have complex higher-order beliefs 
— beliefs about the speaker’s beliefs about their (the hearer’s) mental abilities. 
And this requires, not only a knowledge of, and belief in, Gricean theory, but also 
                                                 
(I) The supposition that the speaker is aware that, or thinks that, q, is required to 
make his saying or making as if to say p (or doing so in those terms) consistent 
with the presumption that he is observing the CP. 
(II) It would be within the competence of a typical audience to work out, or grasp 
intuitively, that the supposition mentioned in (I) is required. 
18  Saul’s (1*) (which is Grice’s (1) prefixed with the ‘The speaker thinks that’) runs as follows: 
 (1*) The speaker thinks that he is presumed to be following the conversational 
maxims, or at least the Cooperative Principle. (Saul 2002a, p.235) 
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a high level of conceptual sophistication. It seems highly unlikely that laypeople, 
non-Griceans, and children would form the beliefs mentioned; yet they are all 
capable of successfully recovering implicatures. When I tell my five-year old son 
that he may have some of the sweets, he understands that he may not have all of 
them. But, even as a proud mother, I find it highly improbable to suppose that he 
believes that I believe it is within his power to work out that the supposition that 
he may not eat all the sweets is required to make my saying that he may eat some 
of them consistent with the presumption that I am following the principles of 
cooperative communication.  
 We could reduce the problems here somewhat by remodelling the definitions 
of utterance-implicature and audience-implicature around the revised definition of 
conversational implicature proposed in the previous chapter, which omits the 
troublesome (and unnecessary) condition (1). Thus, the revised definition of 
utterer-implicature would be as follows:  
 
(I*) The speaker believes that the supposition that the speaker is aware 
that, or thinks that, q, is required to make his saying or making as if to say 
p (or doing so in those terms) consistent with the presumption that he is 
observing the CP. 
(II*) The speaker believes that it would be within the competence of a 
typical audience to work out, or grasp intuitively, that the supposition 
mentioned in (I*) is required. 
 
The definition for audience-implicature would be derived by substituting ‘The 
audience’ for ‘The speaker’ in the first clause, and inserting ‘The audience believes 
that’ at the beginning of the second, giving (IA) and (IIA). 
 But although this removes the problems arising from clause (1), all of these 
stemming from (3) remain, transferred to clauses (II*) and (IIA). If successful 
implicature generation and implicature recovery presuppose the existence of 
utterer-implicatures and audience-implicatures, then those who do not or cannot 
understand the Gricean theory, or who reject it, or who have trouble forming 
higher-order beliefs, cannot generate or recover implicatures.  
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 A second problem with the notions of utterer-implicature and audience-
implicature is that there do not appear to be any independent reasons to posit these 
states in order to account for the psychology of implicature — and it is, in fact, 
rather implausible to do so. As I argued in the previous chapter, the parallel with 
saying suggests that the psychological condition for implicature should be simply 
that the speaker means that q (that is, has the right communicative intentions). On 
Grice’s view, in order to say that p, a speaker must use a sentence with the right 
conventional meaning (the normative condition), and they must mean that p (the 
psychological condition). They need not also believe that the sentence they use has 
the right conventional meaning, and still less that the conditions spelled out in the 
Gricean analysis of conventional meaning hold. Given this, it is hard to see why a 
similar condition should be imposed on implicature. By contrast, as we saw in 
Chapter 2, there are reasons for thinking that Grice held that a speaker does need 
to mean that q in order for them to implicate it (though not for their utterance to 
implicate it).  
 Similarly, when a hearer recovers an implicature with content q, there seems 
no reason to think that they must believe that the supposition that the speaker is 
implicating q is required on Gricean principles. Grice allows that implicatures may 
be intuitively grasped — that is, the hearer may realize that they must suppose that 
the speaker thinks that q (and hence is implicating q) without explicitly reflecting 
on the grounds for this supposition. This seems right. We do not consciously 
engage in Gricean reflections when interpreting implicatures, and indeed we may 
grasp an implicated meaning without even realizing that it is an implicature. This 
is compatible with the Gricean account giving a correct account of the normative 
conditions for implicature. We can be sensitive to norms without having explicit 
beliefs about them and without explicitly calculating when and how they apply. A 
driver can follow the rules of the road without thinking about them and without 
even being able to state them clearly. Of course, it could be that in such cases the 
rules are known and applied at a nonconscious level, and the same might be true 
of Gricean principles. As we shall see in section 4 below, Grice may in fact be 
committed to this view. But, as we shall also see, there are problems for that view.  
 Given this, it is doubtful that implicature generation typically involves the 
existence of utterer-implicatures and that implicature recovery typically involves 
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the existence of audience-implicatures, as the Grice-Saul view supposes. And if 
they do not, then we cannot rely on an appeal to utterer-implicatures and audience-
implicatures to account for our intuitions in cases where implicature generation or 
recovery is not successful. If utterer-implicatures and audience-implicatures do not 
routinely accompany conversational implicatures, then we cannot appeal to them 
to account for our intuitions in cases where the conditions for conversational 
implicature are not met but we still feel there is something implicature-like 
occurring.  
 Note that this is not to deny that we may need notions similar to those of 
utterer-implicature and audience-implicature. In fact, I think we do, but they 
should be weaker and less closely tied to Gricean theory. At a first attempt, we 
might say that an utterance U carries a weak utterer-implicature with content q if 
the speaker intends U to indirectly convey (imply, suggest, indicate, mean) that q. 
And we might say that U carries a weak audience-implicature if the hearer believes 
that U indirectly conveys that q or that the speaker is indirectly conveying q via U. 
These notions are much less theoretically loaded than the original ones, and it is 
not implausible to claim that they typically accompany attempts at implicature 
generation and recovery, both successful and unsuccessful. So they may be useful 
in characterizing the psychology of implicature. However, since they are not linked 
to a Gricean approach (they are compatible with any account of the precise 
conditions required for implicature), they offer no specific support for the Gricean 
framework.  
 
4. Implicature recovery  
We have been concerned so far with implicature generation — the analysis of the 
conditions necessary for an implicature to exist, which is the heart of the Gricean 
framework. I have argued that Grice’s theory is best interpreted as a normative 
one, but that even on this interpretation it still faces serious problems, and that an 
alternative, intention-centred account is preferable. I turn now to look at the 
Gricean framework’s implications for implicature recovery — the psychological 
process by which hearers detect implicatures and recover their content. Again, I 
shall argue that there are problems for the Gricean approach. 
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 As noted in Chapter 1, a theory of implicature generation will have 
implications for a theory of implicature recovery. We can recover conversational 
implicatures with some reliability, and we must, therefore, have some means of 
detecting the existence of the conditions that generate them. Broadly speaking, if 
an implicature exists in virtue of a certain state of affairs, S, then recovering the 
implicature will involve detecting S — either by directly detecting S itself or by 
detecting some state of affairs that reliably co-varies with S. For example, if 
implicatures are determined by the speaker’s communicative intentions, then 
detecting an implicature must involve detecting those intentions. Assuming we can 
in fact recover implicatures (not infallibly, of course, but with some reliability), 
this means that a theory of implicature generation cannot completely ignore 
psychological questions about implicature recovery, and we can rule out theories 
on which we would not be able to reliably recover implicatures. Conversely, 
theories of how implicatures are recovered imply something about how 
implicatures are generated. If hearers typically detect implicatures by paying 
attention to a certain property of the communicative situation, then that property 
must be at least reliably connected with the property that generates the implicature. 
More fundamentally, the need for implicatures to be recoverable places some 
general constraints on a theory of implicature generation. 
 This is not to deny that a theory of implicature generation may play a normative 
role and may sometimes correct our judgements about what an utterance 
implicates. But the theory should not come totally apart from our everyday 
judgements. If the aim is to systematize the principles implicit in our best 
judgements about implicature, then it should be compatible with the nature of those 
judgements. If a normative theory says that implicature is determined by feature 
X, but our psychological theory tells us that our best judgements about implicature 
actually track feature Y, then the appropriate response, I suggest, would be to 
revise the normative theory.  
 Now on Grice’s view, for an utterance U to implicate q there must exist a 
certain rational relation between certain premises (concerning U, its context, 
general conversational principles, and background assumptions), and the 
supposition that the speaker believes that q, to the effect that the former entail the 
latter or make it probable. So recovering the implicature must involve detecting 
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that this relation holds. Now Grice sketches an inferential process by which the 
existence of this relation could be established (‘He has said that p; there is no 
reason to suppose that he is not observing the maxims …’), However, he adds that 
hearers need not actually go through this process and may simply ‘grasp 
intuitively’ (1975/1989, p.31) that the relation holds. This is important for the 
plausibility of Grice’s position, since as hearers we do not typically, if ever, go 
through Gricean calculations, at least consciously. However, the reference to 
intuition does not offer an alternative explanation of how implicatures could be 
recovered. As Daniel Dennett remarks, ‘Intuition, after all, is not a particular 
method of deduction or induction; to speak of intuition is to deny that one knows 
how one arrived at the answer’ (Dennett 1986, p.152). Nor will it do to appeal to 
the competence view, discussed in Chapter 2, on which a quick, gappy inferential 
process can be regarded as valid, provided the reasoner intends it to be valid and 
has the ability the produce a full version filling in all the gaps (Chapter 2, section 
3). This may be sufficient for the reference to intuition in clause (3) of Grice’s 
definition of implicature, where it is the responsibilities of the speaker that are at 
issue (‘the speaker thinks … that it is within the competence of the hearer to work 
out, or intuitively grasp, that the supposition mentioned in (2) is required’). But it 
will not do here, where the question is not whether an intuitive inference could be 
replaced by an explicit version, but how an intuitive process actually got to the 
answer. Implicature recovery is not magic, so there must be some reliable 
mechanism at work, at a nonconscious level if not at a conscious one. But what 
could it be? There seem to be only two options for Grice. First, the mechanism 
could involve a nonconscious Gricean calculation. Second, it could involve a 
shortcut — the detection of some state of affairs that usually occurs when and only 
when the implicature-generating relation holds.  
 Take the second option first. This might work for generalized implicatures, 
which are not context dependent. If the same sentence generates the same 
implicature in most contexts, then we could reliably recover the implicature simply 
by detecting the use of the sentence. But this method would not work for 
particularized implicatures, which are heavily context-dependent and one-off. 
There are no repeatable associations here to pick up on and it is hard to see what 
other feature might offer a shortcut in such cases. It would need to be a feature 
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which is as context-sensitive as the implicature-determining relation itself. The 
only option seems to be speaker intentions. If there is a reliable link between what 
speakers intend to implicate and what their utterances actually do implicate on 
Gricean principles, and if hearers can reliably detect speaker intentions, then this 
would work. However, it is doubtful that there is a reliable — or reliable enough 
— link between speaker intentions and Gricean conversational implicatures. As 
we have seen, there will be many cases where what speakers intend to implicate 
differs from what their utterances do implicate, on Gricean principles. If it is 
speaker intentions that guide our everyday judgements in such cases, then it looks 
as if Gricean theory is not describing the everyday phenomenon of implicature at 
all, and that an intention-centred theory would be preferable.  
 If this is right, then Griceans should take the first option and hold that 
implicature recovery involves nonconscious Gricean calculations — at least in 
cases of particularized implicature. It is generally accepted by psychologists that 
complex nonconscious mental processes support everyday behaviour, so this is not 
in principle an implausible claim. However, there are specific problems in positing 
nonconscious Gricean calculations.  
 First, we run up against the problem of laypeople, non-Griceans, and children 
again. How do those who have not mastered, or have rejected, the Gricean 
framework recover implicatures? The only option seems to be to suppose that such 
people are in fact nonconscious Griceans — that although they have no explicit, 
conscious knowledge of, or acceptance of, the Gricean framework, the 
nonconscious mental processes that enable them to recover implicatures 
nevertheless employ Gricean concepts and principles. (It might even be suggested 
that these concepts and principles are innate.) The idea that nonconscious 
processing employs concepts and principles to which the person has no conscious 
access, and which may even conflict with their conscious beliefs, is not uncommon 
in cognitive science. Moreover, as we shall see in the next chapter, some linguists 
propose that the recovery of generalized implicatures involves the nonconscious 
application of simplified Gricean principles. However (as we shall see), the current 
experimental evidence does not favour this view, and to maintain that all 
implicatures are recovered by means of nonconscious Gricean calculations would 
be to make a strong and risky empirical commitment.  
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 Second, there are worries about the feasibility of Gricean calculations, at least 
for particularized implicatures. As we saw in Chapter 2 (section 3), it is unlikely 
that Gricean calculations can be formulated as deductive inferences. Grice’s own 
sketch of an implicature calculation is not deductively valid, and many additional 
premises would have to be added to make it so. It is more plausible to see the 
calculation as an abductive inference, or an inference to the best explanation — a 
process central to everyday and scientific reasoning. However, the sort of 
abductive inference involved in a Gricean calculation is an unusual one. The task 
is not to find the best explanation of an event — the speaker’s making the 
utterance. If it were, then the best explanation would surely be that the speaker 
intended to convey something, and in hypothesizing about what this was, the 
hearer would naturally be guided by evidence about the speaker’s beliefs, desires, 
and other mental states. But the task for the Gricean interpreter is different. What 
they must find is not an explanation of the speaker’s utterance, but a way of 
reconciling two claims: that the speaker said what they did and that the speaker 
was being a cooperative communicator, and the data they are supposed to draw on 
excludes information about the speaker and their mental states. Given that there 
are, in principle, a limitless number of ways of making any two claims compatible, 
this could be a very demanding task, and a lot of background assumptions would 
have to be made in order to home in on a specific, non-disjunctive claim. It is hard 
to see why hearers should follow this route, especially when the more 
straightforward option of theorizing directly about the speaker’s intentions is 
available. 
 Note finally that a closely related problem arises for speakers. If speakers are 
to non-accidentally succeed in implicating, then they will need to be sensitive to 
the implicature-generating relations between literal and implicated contents, so 
that they can choose suitable literal contents to convey the meanings they wish to 
implicate. And again we can ask how they achieve this sensitivity. In the case of 
generalized implicatures, they might rely on learned associations between 
sentences and implicatures, but in particularized cases, this option is not available. 
Since speakers cannot rely on hearers simply detecting their communicative 
intentions (which are, after all, irrelevant to implicature generation within the 
Gricean framework), it seems they will have to calculate the implicature-
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generating relation, at least nonconsciously. That is, if they want to implicate q 
they will have to make a sort of reverse Gricean calculation, working out what they 
should say in order to make it the case that the supposition that they believe q is 
required in order to reconcile the claim that they said what they did with the claim 
that they are being a cooperative communicator. Again, this is a strong, and 
implausible, psychological hypothesis.  
 
Conclusion 
The previous chapter argued that many problems for the Gricean framework can 
be removed by following Saul in adopting a normative reading of Grice and by 
revising and extending the framework in sympathetic ways. This chapter has 
argued, however, that serious problems remain, especially as regards 
particularized implicatures. The revised Gricean framework does not achieve its 
aim of establishing speaker-independent norms for implicature, and it has some 
implausible implications for the psychology of implicature. One moral that 
emerged was that theories of implicature, whether concerned with generation or 
recovery, should give a greater role to speaker intentions, and I proposed an 
account of implicature that gave speaker intentions such a role while still retaining 
a normative element. 
 However, we have not finished with Gricean ideas yet. Some linguists have 
drawn on Grice’s work in developing theories of implicature recovery, especially 
for generalized implicatures. (As we shall see, these accounts also have 
implications for implicature generation.) We shall consider this neo-Gricean 
approach in the next chapter. This will also give us chance to take a deeper look at 
the Gricean approach to generalized implicature.  
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Chapter 5 
Neo-Griceanism and its rivals 
 
The previous chapters assessed the Gricean framework as a theory of implicature 
generation — of what makes it the case that certain utterances carry implicatures. 
I argued that the framework is best understood as aiming to provide a normative, 
speaker-independent notion of conversational implicature, parallel to that of 
conventional meaning. And I went on to argue that it fails in that aim: Gricean 
principles cannot be applied without appealing at some level to speaker intentions. 
I also argued that theories of implicature generation cannot be separated entirely 
from psychological theories of how implicatures are recovered and that it is hard 
to see how Grice’s account could be integrated with such a theory.  
 But we should not write off the Gricean framework yet. Although it may not 
succeed in its original aim, it may still explain some important aspects of 
conversational implicature. In fact, many linguists have seen Grice’s ideas as 
providing the basis for accounts of implicature recovery. These neo-Gricean 
theorists argue that in interpreting utterances we automatically apply certain 
general principles or heuristics, which are versions of the Gricean maxims. Where 
applicable, these principles yield non-literal meanings that become the default, or 
preferred, interpretations of utterances of the type in question. The same principles, 
it is assumed, guide speakers in their choice of utterance, ensuring that 
communication is usually successful (for example, Levinson 2000, p.24). Thus, 
this view treats the Gricean maxims, not as norms of conversation, but as 
inferential principles that guide conversational behaviour (Levinson 2000, p.35).  
 Though neo-Griceanism is primarily a theory of implicature recovery (of how 
hearers derive implicatures), it can also be seen as offering a theory of implicature 
generation. Neo-Griceans can say that an utterance possesses a generalized 
implicature q if the interpretive principles the theory posits would yield q as a 
preferred interpretation of it. Since neo-Griceans hold that we do typically apply 
these principles in making and interpreting utterances, this amounts to saying that 
an utterance implicates q if hearers would typically interpret it as possessing it and 
speakers typically would expect it to. Understood in this way, the theory would 
licence normative claims to the effect that a particular speaker or hearer has 
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misunderstood what an utterance implicates. Since the neo-Gricean principles are 
derived from Grice’s maxims, and make many of the same predictions, this 
approach promises to rescue at least part of the original Gricean project. (Neo-
Griceans sometimes speak of the principles they posit ‘generating’ implicatures — 
meaning that they yield them as interpretations in the minds of hearers. Although 
I treat neo-Griceanism primarily as a theory of implicature recovery, I shall 
occasionally follow this usage in the chapter, especially since, as just explained, 
the principles can also be thought of as generating implicatures in the constitutive 
sense.) 
 This chapter will assess neo-Griceanism, focusing on one prominent version 
of the approach. The first section outlines the theory, and the second section briefly 
introduces some rival theories with which I shall contrast it. The third and fourth 
sections look at the neo-Gricean principles, asking whether they accord with and 
explain our intuitions about what implicatures utterances possess, and the final 
section reviews some relevant experimental work. 
 The literature in this area is often technical and deeply involved with wider 
issues in theoretical linguistics. It is impossible to do justice to it in a chapter, but 
I shall focus on some key points and test cases. 
 
1. Neo-Griceanism 
Neo-Gricean theories propose simple, formalized versions of the Gricean maxims 
and rules for their application, with the aim of explaining and predicting patterns 
of implicature. Key figures in the field are Gerald Gazdar (1979), Laurence Horn 
(1984, 1989, 2004), and Stephen Levinson (1983, 2000). I shall focus on 
Levinson’s presentation in his 2000 book Presumptive Meanings, which 
synthesizes earlier work in the tradition and is a comprehensive and influential 
presentation of the neo-Gricean approach (Levinson 2000).  
 
1.1 Utterance-type meaning 
Levinson adopts a broadly Gricean approach to communication, distinguishing 
aspects of meaning that are coded (including what is said and what is 
conventionally implicated) and aspects that are inferred from conversational 
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principles, including, but not limited to, conversational implicatures (2000, p.14).1 
Levinson follows Grice in accepting that there are two types of conversational 
implicature — particularized and generalised. (Levinson uses the abbreviations 
PCI and GCI.) PCIs hold because of specific contextual assumptions that do not 
hold in all, or even many, cases; whereas GCIs hold universally unless there are 
specific contextual assumptions that cancel them. Take, for example: 
 
 (1)  Some of the guests got food-poisoning.  
 
Unless the implicature is cancelled (say, by adding ‘In fact all of them did’) this 
would always carry the implicature that not all the guests got food poisoning, 
which is a GCI. However, if uttered in response to the question ‘How was the 
wedding?’ it would also carry the implicature ‘The wedding went badly’, or 
something similar, which would be a PCI. Levinson suggests that PCIs are the 
result of applying the maxim of Relevance, where this involves attending to the 
particular speaker’s goals and plans (2000, p.17, p.380 n.4). 
 Levinson’s primary interest is in GCIs, which he regards as the central class of 
‘presumptive meanings’ — default, or preferred, interpretations, which are 
‘carried by the structure of utterances, given the structure of the language, and not 
by virtue of the particular contexts of utterance’ (2000, p.1). These presumptive 
meanings, he claims, form a distinct level of meaning, utterance-type meaning, 
which is distinct from both the linguistically coded meaning that a sentence carries 
in every context (sentence-meaning), and the pragmatically enriched meaning that 
a sentence carries when uttered by a particular speaker in a particular context 
(speaker-meaning, or utterance-token meaning). Utterance-type meaning is like 
                                                 
1  Although he makes this distinction, Levinson regards all communication as, fundamentally, an 
inferential process, in which even coded aspects of meaning are clues to interpretation. He writes: 
From a Gricean perspective, communication involves the inferential recovery of 
speakers’ intentions: it is the recognition by the addressee of the speaker’s 
intention to get the addressee to think such-and-such that essentially constitutes 
communication. (Levinson 2000, p.29) 
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sentence-meaning in being context-independent and deeply connected with the 
structure of language, but unlike it in being cancellable. Utterance-type meaning 
is like speaker-meaning in resulting from pragmatic enrichment of sentence-
meaning, but unlike it in resulting from the application of general principles rather 
than theorizing about the speaker’s intentions (2000, p.22). (Levinson notes that 
utterance-type meaning is not composed only of GCIs, but includes a variety of 
other pragmatic phenomena, including presuppositions, conventional implicatures 
(in Grice’s sense), and conventions of use (2000, p.23). Levinson’s aim is to 
defend the existence of a level of utterance-type meaning, in opposition to 
reductionists, who would reduce it either to sentence meaning or (as relevance 
theorists do) to speaker meaning (2000, p.25). 
 Levinson suggests that our capacity for GCIs is an evolutionary adaption, 
which developed in order to compensate for an inefficiency in human 
communication (2000, pp.27–9). He points out that pre-articulation and 
comprehension processes in the human brain run three to four times faster than the 
process of phonological articulation (2000, p.28). Our brains can prepare and 
process utterances much faster than our vocal systems can articulate them, creating 
a bottleneck in the human communication system. Evolution has eased this 
bottleneck, Levinson argues, by designing our comprehension systems to apply 
certain general pragmatic principles, or heuristics, which are defined over formal 
features of utterances and are applied by default whenever certain expressions are 
encountered.2 These principles yield GCIs — default interpretations that are 
derived without the need to theorize about the speaker’s intentions — and they 
speed up communication by creating an extra layer of utterance-type meaning, 
                                                 
2  Levinson writes: 
Now, the solution to the encoding bottleneck, I suggest, is just this: let not only 
the content but also the metalinguistic properties of the utterance (e.g., its form) 
carry the message. Or, find a way to piggyback meaning on top of the meaning 
... by utilizing the form, the structure, and the pattern of choices within the 
utterance to signal the extra information beyond the meanings of its constituents. 
(Levinson 2000, p.6) 
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which enriches the content of utterances in ways that we all understand and expect. 
This requires, of course, that GCIs are recovered very swiftly, without complex 
theorizing. Indeed, Levinson suggests that some of the principles are applied on a 
word-by-word basis and that a quantifier such ‘some’ will trigger its default 
interpretation of ‘not all’ even before the predicate it governs has been processed 
(2000, p.5, p.259)3.  
 Although the inferencing here is default, Levinson stresses that it is defeasible; 
it goes through automatically unless contrary information is available, in which 
case the inference is cancelled. The process therefore cannot be a deductive one, 
since deductive inference is not defeasible, and it must involve some form of non-
monotonic reasoning. Levinson reviews various types of defeasible inference, 
including induction, abduction, practical reasoning, and default logics, and argues 
that the last offers the most promising model for implicature (2000, pp.45–6). 
 
1.2 The three principles 
Levinson proposes that GCIs can be accounted for by appeal to three principles, 
which he calls the Q-principle, the I-principle, and the M-Principle — the first and 
second derived from Grice’s maxim of Quantity and the third from his maxim of 
Manner. The maxim of Quality plays ‘only a background role’ in the production 
of GCIs, and the maxim of Relation or Relevance plays none (it ‘has pertinence 
only to the immediate, ever variable, conversational goals: it generates PCIs, not 
GCIs’) (Levinson 2000, p.74). 
 The Q-principle can be summarized as ‘What isn’t said, isn’t.’ The idea is that 
speakers make the most informative statement they can, given what they know, 
and that hearers assume that they do this. This resembles Grice’s first submaxim 
of Quantity (‘Make your contribution as informative as is required’). On its own 
the Q-principle is too vague to be applied automatically, and Levinson explains 
                                                 
3  Levinson writes ‘the phrase some of the boys can invoke the default assumption “not all of the 
boys” even before the predicate has been heard’ (Levinson 2000, p.259). This is an important claim 
for him, since he holds that it is just these sorts of rapid default inferences that enable hearers to 
transform semantic fragments into full-blown propositional representations (Levinson 2000, 
pp.256–9). 
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that it can be applied only where there is a salient set of contrasting expressions of 
different informational strength from which the speaker is assumed to have chosen. 
In choosing a weaker element from the set, the speaker implicates that a 
corresponding statement substituting a stronger element is false. So, for example, 
if a person utters the sentence, ‘Some of the students failed’, the contrast set <all, 
some>, is salient, and the Q-principle produces the default reading ‘It is not the 
case that all the students failed.’  
 The most important class of Q-implicatures are scalar implicatures, which 
depend on an entailment scale (also known as a Horn scale), in which the stronger 
elements entail the weaker ones. As examples, Levinson gives the following (with 
stronger items to the left): 
 
  quantifiers <all, most, many, some>,  
  connectives <and, or>,  
  modals <necessarily, possibly>, <must, should, may>, 
  adverbs <always, often, sometimes>,  
  degree adjectives <hot, warm>   
  verbs <know, believe>, <love, like>  
  (Levinson 2000, p.79).  
 
In making an utterance using an expression to the right of one of these scales, one 
Q-implicates that a corresponding utterance substituting an expression to the left 
either is false, or might be for all one knows.4 Thus ‘Some of the students passed’ 
Q-implicates that not all the students passed’; ‘I told Jack or Annie’ Q-implicates 
                                                 
4  There is debate about the strength of the epistemic commitment involved in Q-implicatures. 
Does the speaker implicate that they know that the stronger claim is false, or that they believe it is, 
or simply that it may be false for all they know? The issues are complex and I shall not address 
them here. (For discussion and references, see Levinson 2000, pp.77–9.) In any case, as Atlas notes, 
the speaker’s attitude is independent of the content implicated. An utterance of ‘Some F are G’ 
implicates that not all F are G, and invites the hearers to believe that not all F are G, regardless of 
what attitude the speaker is understood to take towards that claim (Atlas 1993, discussed in 
Levinson 2000, p.78, p.387, n.10). 
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that the speaker didn’t tell both Jack and Annie; ‘You may smoke’ Q-implicates 
that it is not the case that the hearer is obliged to smoke, and so on.  
 The other main type of Q-implicature is clausal implicature, which can arise 
when a sentence contains an embedded clause. By choosing an expression that 
does not entail the truth of the embedded clause instead of one that does, the 
speaker implicates that they do not know whether or not the embedded clause is 
true. For example, if I say ‘John believes there is life on Mars’ (rather than ‘John 
knows there is life on Mars’) I Q-implicate that I myself do not know whether or 
not there is life on Mars (Levinson’s example; 2000, p.76).5  
 The second principle is the I-principle, which Levinson summarizes as ‘What 
is simply described is stereotypically exemplified’. The idea here is that typical 
(‘unmarked’) expressions implicate that the thing described is itself typical, 
prompting hearers to fill in the details according to the appropriate stereotype. 
Levinson notes that this is related to Grice’s second sub-maxim of Quantity: ‘Do 
not make your contribution more informative than is required’. Speakers need not 
spell out details that hearers will fill in automatically (‘one need not say what can 
be taken for granted’) (2000, p.37).  
 The I-principle is a powerful one, which underpins a variety of linguistic 
phenomena, including generality narrowing, where a general expression is 
interpreted in a more specific sense (‘secretary’ is understood as ‘female 
secretary’, ‘road’ as ‘hard-surfaced road’, ‘John’s book’ as ‘the book John 
read/wrote/borrowed’); conjunction buttressing, where a conjunction is interpreted 
as indicating temporal or causal sequence (‘John turned the switch and the motor 
started’ implicates that the switch turning preceded, or caused, the starting, or was 
done with the intention of causing it); and conditional perfection, in which a 
conditional is read as a biconditional (‘If’ in ‘If you mow the lawn, I’ll give you 
$5’ is interpreted as ‘if and only if’) (Levinson 2000, pp.37–8; the examples are 
Levinson’s).  
 The I-principle allows us to enrich the content of an informationally minimal 
utterance by drawing on background knowledge. It might seem that the reliance 
                                                 
5  In this example there is also a separate scalar implicature to the effect that John does not know 
that there is life on Mars. 
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on background knowledge here undermines the status of I-implicatures as 
generalized and default. I assume Levinson would reply that the knowledge in 
question is of stereotypes that are both immediately accessible (hence default) and 
context independent (hence generalized). Thus applying the I-principle does not 
involve drawing on knowledge of the specific context of utterance or speculating 
about the speaker’s intentions. (This may not be an adequate reply, however; I will 
return to this issue in section 4 below.) 
 Levinson summarizes the third principle, the M-Principle as ‘What’s said in an 
abnormal way isn’t normal’ (2000, p.38). This is the reverse of the I-principle: The 
use of an untypical, or ‘marked’, expression indicates that the thing referred to is 
itself atypical in some way. Levinson notes that the principle is related to Grice’s 
maxim of Manner (‘Be perspicuous’) and in particular to its first and third6 
submaxims: ‘avoid obscurity’ and ‘avoid prolixity’. In flouting these submaxims 
by using unusual or long-winded expressions, speakers indicate that there is 
something unusual about the thing described. For example, ‘Bill caused the car to 
stop’ (Levinson’s example) M-implicates that Bill stopped the car indirectly rather 
than by simply pressing the footbrake, and ‘Jack talked and talked’ M-implicates 
that Jack talked at unusual length. As with Q-implicatures, M-implicatures depend 
on an implied contrast, this time with unmarked expression that could have been 
used instead (‘stopped the car’, ‘talked’).7 
 Levinson notes that there can be conflicts between the three principles. For 
example, the Q-principle and the I-principle pull in opposite directions: the former 
tells us that if a speaker doesn’t say something then it should be ruled out; the latter 
that if a speaker doesn’t say something then it can be taken for granted. Similarly, 
the I-principle tells us to adopt standard interpretations, the M-principle to look for 
non-standard ones. Levinson argues that these potential conflicts are resolved by 
assigning priorities to the different types of implicature: Q-implicatures and M-
implicatures take priority over I-implicatures; Q-implicatures take priority over M-
                                                 
6  Levinson actually calls it the fourth, but this seems to be a slip (2000, p.38) 
7  As Levinson notes, the M-principle and the Q-principle both involve negative inferences: in 
both cases the hearer infers the implicated message from the fact that the speaker has avoided using 
some other expression, informatively stronger in one case, less marked in the other (2000, p.40).  
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implicatures, and clausal Q-implicatures take priority over scalar Q-implicatures.8 
He suggests that all applicable principles are applied automatically, and any 
inconsistent results subsequently filtered out in accordance with the rules of 
priority (2000, pp.161–2). Levinson also allows that a Q-implicature can be 
implicitly cancelled if it conflicts with an entailment of what the speaker says, or 
is inconsistent with shared background assumptions, or is obviously irrelevant to 
the speaker’s conversational goals (in the last case considerations of relevance, in 
Grice’s sense, will play a role). (Levinson 2000, p.49–52). 9 
 
1.3 Applying the principles 
Levinson gathers a huge amount of data to support the existence of GCIs, 
highlighting the ‘regularity, recurrence, and systematicity’ of pragmatic inferences 
of the kind he describes (2000, p.22). One important piece of evidence comes from 
facts about lexicalization (Levinson 2000, pp.64–71). English lacks words for the 
contradictories of certain logical concepts (the concepts are not lexicalized). For 
example, we have a word for all, but none for its contradictory not all. This, 
Levinson, argues, is because that concept is carried by ‘some’ (the contrary of the 
contradictory of 'all') in virtue of a Q-implicature. The same goes for several other 
concepts that stand in similar logical relations; for example: 
 
                                                 
8  Levinson suggests that the priority of Q- and M-implicatures is due to the fact that they involve 
a deliberate choice of words (a weaker term or a marked expression) rather than reliance on 
stereotypical interpretation, and that the priority of Q-implicatures over M-implicatures reflects the 
greater importance of informational content over nuances of expression (2000, p.161). 
9  Other neo-Gricean theorists propose closely related taxonomies; for a useful table comparing 
them, see Levinson 2000, p.41. In particular, Horn reduces the principles to two: the Q-principle 
and the R-principle (for example, Horn 2004). The former combines Grice’s first submaxim of 
Quality (be as informative as required) and two submaxims of Manner (avoid obscurity and avoid 
ambiguity), and it does the combined work of Levinson’s Q- and M- principles. The R-principle 
combines Grice’s second submaxim of Quantity (do not be more informative than required), maxim 
of Relation (be relevant), and third and fourth submaxims of Manner (be brief and be orderly), and 
it corresponds to Levinson’s I-principle.  
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 Not require is unlexicalized since Q-implicated by ‘permit’.  
 May not is unlexicalized since Q-implicated by ‘may’. 
 Not always is unlexicalized since Q-implicated by ‘sometimes’. 
 Not necessary is unlexicalized since Q-implicated by ‘possible’. 
 Not both is unlexicalized since Q-implicated by ‘or’. 
 
Levinson notes that these patterns arise in other languages too, suggesting that they 
are due to the operation of a general interpretative principle (2000, p.69).  
 Levinson reviews the principles and their application in great detail, showing 
how they can explain a wide variety of linguistic features and intuitions and raising 
and responding to numerous objections. He also argues that GCIs are deeply 
involved in processes of disambiguation, indexical resolution, reference 
identification, ellipsis unpacking, generality narrowing, and co-reference 
(anaphora), which are necessary to establish the truth-conditional content of an 
utterance, and have been traditionally thought of as part of semantic processing.10 
As he notes, this creates a problem for Grice’s view that implicatures are 
determined in part by what is said (the truth-conditional content expressed), since 
what is said may itself be determined by implicatures. (Levinson calls this ‘Grice’s 
circle’; 2000, p.186). Levinson himself avoids this problem by arguing that the 
GCI principles can be applied to utterance fragments (words or phrases), before a 
complete propositional content has been determined. This view does, however, 
present a challenge to the traditional conception of the relation between semantics 
and pragmatics, on which semantic processing yields a fully-fledged propositional 
content, which is then enriched or supplemented by pragmatic processes. The 
upshot, Levinson suggests, is that there are two rounds of pragmatic processing — 
                                                 
10  Levinson also highlights the importance of intrusive constructions, such as comparatives and 
conditionals, where the truth conditions of a sentence depend on an implicature generated by a part 
of it (Levinson 2000, pp.198–217). An example is ‘Driving home and drinking three beers is better 
than drinking three beers and driving home’, where the proposition expressed by the whole 
sentence is determined by I-implicatures of temporal sequence generated by its two component 
phrases. 
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a presemantic round, which establishes a truth-conditional content and a 
postsemantic round, which may produce a further implicature (Levinson 2000, 
pp.187–8).  
 
2. Alternatives to neo-Griceanism 
In assessing neo-Griceanism, it will be helpful to compare it with rival theories of 
implicature recovery, and I will briefly introduce three of these in this section. As 
we shall see, there are reasons for thinking that each has some advantages over 
neo-Griceanism, and it may be that a theory of implicature recovery can draw on 
elements from all of them.  
 
2.1 Relevance theory 
In the linguistic literature, the neo-Gricean approach to implicature recovery is 
usually contrasted with that of relevance theory (for example, Carston 2002; 
Sperber and Wilson 1995; Wilson and Sperber 2004). The theory (really a cluster 
of closely related theories) is complex and has developed over time.11 Here I shall 
give a simplified outline, emphasizing the contrast with the neo-Griceanism.12 
 According to relevance theorists, a hearer infers a speaker’s meaning from the 
linguistically coded meaning of their words and contextual information, searching 
for the interpretation that is the most relevant one, in a certain technical sense. The 
relevance of an utterance is a measure of its positive cognitive effects (in particular 
its contextual implications — conclusions one can draw from it in the context), set 
against the effort it takes to process it. Relevance theorists hold that human 
cognition is automatically geared to maximize the relevance of the inputs it 
receives, aiming for maximum effects for minimum effort.  
                                                 
11  As Wayne Davis puts it,  
Exposition [of relevance theory] is difficult because formulation of the theory 
varies significantly from presentation to presentation. And many interlocking 
technical terms require considerable clarification.' (Davis 1998, p. 99) 
12  The following outline draws in particular on Wilson and Sperber 2004 and Carston 2004a, 
2004b. 
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 Since speakers want hearers to attend to what they say, utterances carry a 
presumption of optimal relevance — that is, that they are both (a) sufficiently 
relevant to be worth the hearer’s effort to process them and (b) the most relevant 
the speaker is able and willing to provide. This presumption (the ‘communicative 
principle of relevance’) gives hearers specific expectations of relevance and guides 
how they interpret utterances. A hearer seeks to infer the speaker’s meaning from 
their words and the context of the utterance, forming and testing hypotheses until 
their expectations of relevance are satisfied. Note that since clause (b) refers to the 
speaker’s abilities and preferences, relevance theory, unlike the Gricean 
framework, treats interpretations as sensitive to information about the particular 
speaker, and it can allow for the possibility that speakers are uncooperative (see, 
for example, Carston 1998). 
 According to relevance theory, the interpretation process starts with the 
linguistically coded content of the utterance (roughly, the context-independent 
meaning of the sentence uttered), which will typically be underspecified and fail 
to express a propositional content. Interpreting the utterance then involves two 
tasks. First, there is a process of what relevance theorists call explicature, which 
involves enriching the linguistically coded content to produce an explicit 
propositional content, corresponding to what the speaker literally meant. 
Relevance theorists argue that this process involves not only resolving ambiguities 
and identifying references, but also a substantial process of pragmatic enrichment, 
including filling in missing conceptual elements (for example, expanding ‘It’s 
raining’ to ‘It’s raining in Sheffield’) and narrowing down (or broadening) the 
meaning of expressions to express more specific ad hoc concepts (for example, 
narrowing down the meaning of ‘happy’ to express some contextually salient level 
or type of happiness).13 Second, there is a search for additional implicated 
                                                 
13  From a relevance theory perspective, talk of the ‘literal’ meaning of an utterance is thus 
ambiguous. It might refer either to its linguistically coded content as opposed to an enriched 
explicature of that content, or it might refer to the explicature of the utterance as opposed to a 
distinct implicature of it. Moreover, neither the linguistically coded content of an utterance nor the 
explicature of it correspond to what is said by it, in Grice’s sense. What is said is richer than the 
linguistically coded content. (Grice allows that determining what is said requires resolving 
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meanings (implicatures) distinct from the explicit meaning. Crucially, relevance 
theorists hold that these processes follow a path of least effort, starting with the 
simplest, most accessible interpretation and progressing to more complex ones 
only if current expectations of relevance have not been met. (Although the most 
accessible interpretation of an expression will usually be what we would regard as 
the literal one, it may not always be so. Sometimes the linguistic context may 
strongly prime for a pragmatically enriched meaning, and sometimes an enriched 
meaning may be much easier to process, as with some metaphors; Noveck and 
Sperber 2012, p.371.)14 
                                                 
ambiguities and identifying references; Grice 1975/1989, p.25). Yet what is said is weaker than the 
explicature, since it does not depend on pragmatic enrichment. We might say that what is said by 
an utterance is the minimal proposition it expresses — the minimal filling in of its linguistically 
coded content needed to generate a propositional content (Recanati 1993). One problem for this 
view, however, is that such a minimal proposition will often be quite different from what the 
speaker means, and will often be trivially true or trivially false. (Consider, for example, ‘Everyone 
screamed’ and ‘It’s snowing’, which, without further specification of the relevant domain, will 
always be respectively false and true.) Since Grice holds that what is said must be meant by the 
speaker (1968/1989, p.88), this is an implausible consequence. For more discussion of this tricky 
topic, see Carston 2004b (from where the examples just given are taken) and for a useful table 
comparing different theorists’ use of ‘what is said’, ‘explicature’, ‘implicature’, and related terms, 
see Levinson 2000, p.195. Saul defends the Gricean notion of what is said, arguing that it is 
normative rather than psychological (Saul 2002b). As noted in the previous section, Levinson also 
holds that pragmatic processes contribute to fixing the truth-conditional content of utterances. 
However, he holds that these processes are limited to application of the GCI principles (as opposed 
to context-specific enrichment), and he does not recognize a distinction between explicature and 
implicature, which, he argues, has no principled basis (2000, pp.194–8). 
14  The searches for explicatures and implicatures should not be thought of as independent of each 
other. The search for an explicature may be constrained by the need to find an explicit meaning that 
supports a contextually relevant implicature. For example, if a person replies ‘I’m tired’ when asked 
‘Do you want to go out?’, then interpreting their utterance may involve narrowing down the 
meaning of ‘tired’ to a more specific degree of tiredness suitable to implicate ‘I don’t want to go 
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 Since relevance theory holds that implicature derivation is guided by psycho-
social principles, it is in a very broad sense Gricean (in effect, it puts all the weight 
of derivation on the maxim of Relevance, reinterpreted as the presumption of 
optimal relevance in the technical sense). However, there are big differences 
between it and Levinson’s neo-Gricean theory. First, Levinson holds that the GCI 
principles are applied at an early stage in language processing and that the 
interpretations they yield are the default ones. Relevance theory, by contrast, holds 
that meanings are processed in order of accessibility, starting with their 
semantically coded content and enriching it (and deriving implicatures if 
necessary) until current expectations of relevance are met. As we shall see later, 
this difference between neo-Griceanism and relevance theory yields conflicting 
predictions, which have been experimentally tested. A second difference is that 
neo-Griceanism holds that some implicatures are generalized and context-
independent, whereas relevance theory sees implicature derivation as context-
driven (for example, Breheny et al. 2006). Since optimal relevance is defined in 
terms of the speaker’s abilities and preferences, hearers’ expectations of relevance 
will vary from context to context, and similar utterances may generate an 
implicature in one context but not in another.  
 To illustrate this, consider the following examples (taken from Sperber and 
Wilson 1995, p.277): 
 
 (2)   Henry: If you or some of your neighbours have pets, you shouldn’t use 
this pesticide in your garden. 
   Mary: Thanks. We don’t have pets, but some of our neighbours 
certainly do. 
 
 (3)  Henry: Do all, or at least some, of your neighbours have pets? 
   Mary: Some of them do. 
 
                                                 
out’. Interpretation involves a search for the combination of explicit and implicit contents that 
together makes the utterance optimally relevant (Noveck and Sperber 2012, p.313).  
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Here, neo-Griceanism predicts that both of Mary’s replies should implicate that 
not all of her neighbours have pets, thanks to an automatic application of the Q-
principle. Sperber and Wilson suggest that this is wrong; only her second reply 
carries that implicature. In the first example, the reading of ‘some’ as ‘some and 
possibly all’ (which Sperber and Wilson assume is the more basic one) is sufficient 
to satisfy Henry’s expectations of relevance. In the context it does not matter 
whether all of Mary’s neighbours have pets. In the second example, by contrast, 
Henry has made it clear that it is relevant to him to know whether all of Mary’s 
neighbours have pets, and Mary’s answer would not meet this expectation on the 
basic reading of ‘some’. Henry therefore engages in further processing, reasoning 
that Mary did not say that all of her neighbours had pets because she was not in a 
position to do so, and that she means him to understand that they do not all have 
pets (Sperber and Wilson 1995, pp.277–8).  
 To sum up, relevance theory holds that there are no general inferential 
principles involved in the derivation of implicatures (other than the presumption 
of optimal relevance), and no distinction between generalized and particularized 
implicatures; in effect, it treats all implicatures as particularized.  
 
2.2 Convention theory  
In the literature on implicature recovery, neo-Griceanism and relevance theory are 
the main players. However, I want to introduce another approach, which draws on 
a non-Gricean analysis of conversational implicature developed by Wayne Davis 
(Davis 1998; see also Morgan 1978).  
 Davis argues that conversational implicatures cannot be calculated, even in 
principle, by applying Gricean conversational principles. I have discussed some of 
his arguments in previous chapters (for example, Chapter 3, sections 1.1–1.3, 
Chapter 4, section 1.3), and I shall introduce another one later in section 3.2 below. 
In opposition to Grice, Davis argues that particularized implicatures (he calls them 
‘speaker implicatures’) are determined by the intentions of the speaker, and that 
generalized implicatures (‘sentence implicatures') are determined by semantic 
conventions. It is this latter claim that I want to focus on here.  
 According to Davis, languages are associated with implicature conventions. It 
is a convention of English that sentences of the form ‘Some F are G’ are used to 
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implicate that not all F are G, that sentences of the form ‘p or q’ implicate ‘Not 
both p and q’, that sentences of the form ‘p and q’ implicate that p preceded q, and 
so on.15 Davis defines a convention as 
 
an arbitrary social custom or practice. More explicitly, a convention is a 
regularity in the voluntary action of a group that is socially useful, self-
perpetuating, and arbitrary. (1998, p.133; italics in original) 
 
And he argues that implicature practices of the sort just mentioned are conventions 
in this sense. They are socially useful, promoting ‘cooperative, efficient, polite, 
and stylish communication’ (1998, p.174, italics in original). It is often quicker, 
politer, and more stylish to implicate something than to say it explicitly. They are 
largely arbitrary; different implicature practices are possible, and it is a historical 
accident that we have the ones we do.16 (Davis accepts that there will have been 
some pre-existing relation between the literal meaning of a sentence and the 
implicature it has come to carry, which made the practice ‘fitting’, ‘appropriate’, 
or ‘intelligible’ (he calls this the Principle of Antecedent Relation) (1998, pp.183–
4). However, he argues this relation is never strong enough to uniquely determine 
the implicature.) Finally, implicature practices are self-perpetuating; once a 
                                                 
15  Davis also argues that there are more general implicature conventions, which are not associated 
with a particular sentence form, but are in effect procedures for generating one-off speaker 
implicatures. For example, we have conventions of implicating one thing by asserting its denial (as 
in irony); of implicating a piece of information by making a closely related statement (as in Grice’s 
example of saying ‘There is a garage round the corner’ to convey where petrol can be bought; or 
of implicating an affirmative or negative answer by asking a question whose answer is obvious (as 
in ‘Is the pope Catholic?’) (Davis 1998, pp.148–54; see also Morgan 1978). 
16  Davis also points out that some generalized implicatures are language-specific, citing 
Wierzbicka’s work on cross-cultural pragmatics (1985, 1987, 1991). For example, in English ‘An 
X is an X’ implicates that one X is as good as another, but the Polish equivalent implicates that 
there is something uniquely good about an X (Davis 1998, p.144). 
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practice has become established, people have reason to continue following it if 
they wish to communicate successfully.17 
 Davis claims that the semantic conventions that fix implicatures are of a 
different type from those that that fix literal meaning (sentence meaning, or 
conventional meaning in the usual sense). The latter are first-order: they are rules 
for assigning meanings to words and sentences. By contrast, the conventions that 
determine implicatures are second-order: they are rules for assigning further 
meanings to sentences when they are used with the meanings assigned by the first-
order conventions. Thus, first-order conventions dictate that ‘Some politicians take 
bribes’ means that some politicians take bribes, and a second-order convention 
dictates that using that sentence with that meaning expresses the further meaning 
that not all politicians take bribes. As Davis puts it: 
 
The first-order rules are conventions for using sentences to directly 
express certain thoughts. The second-order rules are conventions for 
indirect expression, rules for expressing further thoughts by expressing 
thoughts assigned by first-order rules. (Davis 1998, p.156)18 
 
 Davis holds that languages are defined by their first-order rules, not their 
second-order ones and that a language’s implicature conventions are not essential 
                                                 
17  Morgan also argues for the existence of implicature conventions, though from a Gricean 
perspective (Morgan 1978). Take the use of ‘Can you X?’ to request that the hearer do X. Originally, 
Morgan suggests, this implicature was a particularized one, and the hearer inferred the connection 
between the literal and implicated content by applying Gricean principles. But as the use of such 
indirect requests spread, a convention was established whereby one could request someone to do 
X by saying ‘Can you X?’, and hearers no longer needed to calculate or even notice the rational 
connection. The implicature became, as Morgan puts it, ‘short-circuited’. Although Davis denies 
that implicatures are calculable in the Gricean way, he envisages a similar historical process, in 
which repeated use of a one-off implicature gradually establishes a conventional connection 
between literal and implicated content (Davis 1998, pp.164–5).  
18  This distinction corresponds closely to Searle’s distinction between conventions of language 
and conventions of usage (Searle 1975; see also Morgan 1978).  
  146
to it. He compares implicature conventions to speech act rituals, such as saying ‘N 
speaking’ when answering the telephone or asking ‘How are you?’ when greeting 
someone. Because implicature conventions are second-order, Davis predicts that 
second-language learners should take longer to master them than lexical 
conventions, at least when they are different from those of their first language 
(Davis 1998, pp.161–2). 
 Davis also contrasts sentence implicatures with idioms, such as ‘kicked the 
bucket’ (meaning 'died') (1998, pp.162–6). Like sentence implicatures, idiomatic 
meanings are not derivable from the literal meaning of the component words, 
though there is some relation between the literal and idiomatic meaning that makes 
the connection appropriate. However, unlike sentence implicatures, idioms do not 
depend on the current literal meaning of the words used. ‘Kicked the bucket’ does 
not mean 'died' in virtue of meaning 'struck the bucket with the foot'. Davis 
suggests that idioms typically start life as nonce implicatures (metaphors), which 
later become conventional and finally fossilized into idioms. The literal meanings 
dropped out of the picture, and the phrases came to express the idiomatic meanings 
directly. (In effect, second-order conventions became first-order ones.)19  
 I shall refer to Davis’s view of generalized implicature as convention theory. 
As will be clear from the previous summary, convention theory is a theory of 
implicature generation — of what makes it the case that certain utterances carry 
certain implicatures. There is therefore no direct comparison between it and either 
neo-Griceanism or relevance theory, which are (primarily) theories of implicature 
recovery. However, as we have seen, issues of generation and recovery are closely 
interconnected and convention theory does have some implications for implicature 
recovery. (I should stress that these implications are not identified by Davis 
himself, who focuses on issues of implicature generation. My remarks here and 
                                                 
19  As noted in Chapter 2, Grice also holds that some implicatures are conventional. For example, 
‘p therefore q’ conventionally implicates that q follows from p (Grice 1989, pp.25–6). However, 
these implicatures are different from sentence implicatures in Davis’s sense. They are part of the 
meaning of the words used and depend on first-order conventions. Davis’s claim is that many of 
what Grice regarded as non-conventional, ‘conversational’ implicatures are also conventions, 
though of a second-order kind (Davis 1998, p.157). 
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later in this chapter may be thought of as a preliminary sketch for a cognitive 
counterpart to convention theory.)  
 First, if convention theory is correct, then recovering a generalized implicature 
will involve knowing and applying the relevant second-order convention, as 
opposed to applying a general inferential principle or searching for an optimally 
relevant interpretation. Exactly what cognitive states and processes are involved 
in this is of course an open empirical question. Second, like neo-Gricean theory, 
convention theory holds that some implicature processing at least is not context-
driven, but involves applying context-independent rules. Third, convention theory 
agrees with relevance theory that literal (linguistically coded) meanings are in a 
sense psychologically more basic than implicated ones. As we have seen, 
knowledge of literal meanings requires mastery of first-order conventions only, 
whereas knowledge of implicatures requires mastery of second-order conventions 
as well. Since it is possible to acquire the former without the latter (as in the case 
of second language learners), this suggests that knowledge of lexical conventions 
may be stored and accessed separately from knowledge implicature conventions. 
As we shall see in section 5, this means that convention theory may offer new ways 
of interpreting experimental work on scalar implicature. 
 
2.3 Weak neo-Griceanism 
The fourth approach to implicature recovery that I want to introduce is one that, so 
far as I know, does not have a name, though it is a possible position and one that 
is represented in the literature. (I shall consider an example later.) It is an inclusive 
position, which can be seen as a halfway house between neo-Griceanism and 
relevance theory. 
 Neo-Griceanism can be thought of as involving two core claims: (1) some 
implicatures are derived from the application of broadly Gricean principles, and 
(2) these principles are applied by default. Claim (2) itself can be understood to 
mean (a) that the principles are applied automatically whenever an appropriate 
expression is detected, regardless of context, and (b) that they yield the same 
interpretations of the same expressions each time. (Subclaim (b) follows from 
subclaim (a); it is because the principles are not sensitive to context that they yield 
the same interpretations each time.) Claim (2) is important to Levinson’s view that 
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the principles serve to speed up language processing; it is because they provide 
rapid context-independent enrichments that they save time. But (1) does not entail 
(2), and the principles might still serve a useful interpretative function even if they 
are not applied by default.  
 The view I want to introduce accepts (1) but rejects (or remains neutral about) 
(2). That is, it holds that we derive some implicatures by applying Gricean 
principles, such as the Q-principle, but does not claim that we do so by default. It 
allows that contextual factors may determine when and how the principles are 
applied, and that the principles may yield different interpretations of the same 
expressions in different contexts. This view agrees with neo-Griceanism that some 
implicatures are derived by applying general pragmatic principles but holds that 
the principles in question are applied in a context-sensitive way — perhaps when 
a literal interpretation fails to meet relevance expectations. Hence, it agrees with 
relevance theory that there are no truly generalized, context-independent 
implicatures. I shall refer to this broad approach as weak neo-Griceanism 
(‘Griceanism’ because its principles are derived from Grice’s; ‘neo’ because it 
applies Gricean principles to implicature recovery; and ‘weak’ because it is not 
committed to (2)). 
 
2.4 Back to Levinson 
Having outlined these broad alternatives to neo-Griceanism, I shall now turn to the 
task of assessing neo-Griceanism itself, in the form developed by Levinson. I shall 
highlight some problems for the theory and indicate how one or other of the 
alternative approaches might be applied instead. I shall not attempt to adjudicate 
between the alternatives themselves but merely show that each may better explain 
some of the cases discussed.  
 As already noted, Levinson discusses a huge number of examples, often 
persuasively, and I cannot possibly engage with the range and detail of his 
analyses. (Nor, indeed, can I consider more than a tiny fraction of the alternative 




3. Assessing the Q-principle  
This section looks at some problems relating to Q-implicatures. It looks first at a 
core example, and then discusses some more general theoretical concerns about 
the neo-Gricean treatment of scalar implicatures.20  
 
3.1 ‘An X’ 
Since Neo-Griceanism is derived from Grice’s account of generalized implicature, 
I will begin by returning to the example Grice uses to introduce the notion (which 
he describes, in a characteristically cautious way, as one that he ‘hope[s] may be 
fairly noncontroversial’; Grice 1989, p.37). This example, which I discussed 
briefly in Chapter 2, concerns the indefinite article. Grice notes that when a speaker 
uses an expression of the form an X, they typically implicate that the X in question 
is not closely connected to them. For example, ‘I met a man’ implicates that the 
man was not my close relation or friend, ‘I found a cat’ implicates that the cat was 
not mine or one known to me, and so on. Grice proposes that this is due to the first 
maxim of Quantity:  
 
the implicature is present because the speaker has failed to be specific in 
a way in which he might have been expected to be specific, with the 
consequence that it is likely to be assumed that he is not in position to be 
specific. (Grice 1975/1989, p.38) 
 
Grice explains that when a person or object is familiar to the speaker, it will usually 
be informative to indicate that it is, since our interactions with familiar persons and 
objects are typically very different from our interactions with unfamiliar ones. If a 
                                                 
20  One common area of application for the Q-principle is in relation to number words. Neo-
Griceans typically hold that these literally specify only minimum amounts (‘three’ literally means 
‘at least three’) and that the exact meanings they commonly carry (‘exactly three’) are the product 
of implicatures generated by application of the Q-principle. However, number words present 
special problems (see, for example, Carston 1998; Levinson 2000, p.88), and I shall not focus on 
them here. 
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speaker does not indicate that the person or item in question was familiar (for 
example, by using ‘my’ rather than ‘an’), they implicate that it was not familiar.  
 There is a problem with this, however. For, as Grice notes, in some cases the 
implicature does not hold. ‘I have been sitting in a car all morning’ does not 
implicate that the car was not my own. And in some cases the opposite implicature 
holds. ‘I broke a finger yesterday’ implicates that the finger was mine. (Both 
examples are Grice’s.) Since there is no explicit cancellation in these cases, how 
can ‘an X’ carry a generalized implicature of lack of connection?  
 Levinson revisits this case and proposes a slightly different and more 
comprehensive account. He points out that the implicature from ‘an X’ to ‘not my 
X’ cannot be a simple Q-implicature, since possession and indefiniteness are 
different types of relation, and there is therefore no scale <my, a>. Rather, he 
argues, it is a two-stage process, involving a Q-implicature followed by an I-
implicature. First, there is an entailment scale <the, a> since definite and indefinite 
reference are similar relations, so ‘an X’ Q-implicates ‘not the X’. In using the 
indefinite article, we implicate that we do not mean to refer to some definite, 
unique X. Second, ‘the X’ I-implicates ‘the salient X’ — that is, the one I am 
familiar with or closely connected to in some way.  
 
Grice’s examples are thus indirectly explained: when one says ‘I went 
into a house’ one Q-implicates ‘I didn’t go into the house’, where the 
definite suggests (I-implicates) my very own house. (Levinson 2000, 
p.92) 
 
 This is neat. But how is ‘I broke a finger’ to be explained? According to this 
account, it should implicate that the speaker cut someone else’s finger, not their 
own, but that would not be the usual interpretation. Levinson agrees but argues 
that this is not a counterexample. He explains (taking ‘I cut a finger’ as his 
example):  
 
[W]hen I say ‘I cut a finger’ I merely implicate that it was no unique, 
otherwise salient finger (say, the one I cut before) that suffered, and that 
interpretation is compatible with the assumption that it was my own 
  151
finger (which in turn is a more stereotypical reading than one that 
involves the chopping of other peoples’ fingers). (Levinson 2000, p.92)  
 
The idea is that the Q-implicature to ‘not the finger’ goes through as usual, 
indicating that the speaker did not mean to pick out some specially salient finger, 
such as the one that they had been planning to cut or had cut the day before. But 
this does not rule out the finger being his or her own. 
 There are problems with this response, however. First and most obviously, 
although the implicated message is compatible with the claim that the finger in 
question was one of the speaker’s own, it is also compatible with the claim that the 
finger was someone else’s. If a manicurist were talking, for example, it would be 
natural to read the utterance as implicating that they had cut a client’s finger — as 
Levinson himself acknowledges (2000, p.17). Yet the implicated message is not 
that the finger might have been my own, but that it was my own. The parenthesis 
in the passage just quoted suggests that Levinson would respond by appealing to 
I-principle. If the speaker is not a manicurist, then the stereotypical reading will be 
one on which the finger was their own. But this cannot be right. For the I-principle 
(we are assuming) tells us to draw on general background knowledge, not on 
knowledge of the specific context. This would include knowledge that manicurists 
use sharp objects on other people’s fingers, whereas non-manicurists rarely do this, 
but it would not include knowledge that the speaker himself is a manicurist. That 
is context-specific knowledge and hence irrelevant to GCIs. So the implicature that 
the finger cut was someone’s else cannot be a generalized one. At most there is a 
generalized implicature that it was not the salient one — whichever that might be.  
 A second problem for Levinson’s account is that it does not explain other very 
similar cases. In English, ‘I cut a finger’ implicates that the cut finger was the 
speaker’s own, but the formally and semantically similar ‘I cut a nose’ typically 
carries the opposite implicature — that the nose was not the speaker’s own. On 
Levinson’s account it is hard to see why this should be so. Use of ‘a nose’ should 
implicate ‘not the nose’ — the unique, otherwise salient nose — and that is 
compatible with the assumption that it was the speaker’s own. Moreover, an appeal 
to stereotypicality reinforces this. We are more likely to cut our own noses than to 
cut other people’s, just as we are more likely to chop our own fingers than those 
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of others. It seems that other factors or principles must be in play here, beyond 
those mentioned by Levinson. In fact, the uniqueness or otherwise of the bodily 
part in question seems to be crucial here. ‘I hurt an X’ implicates that the X is the 
speaker’s own if the speaker has more than one X (for example, finger, toe, ear, 
breast, testicle), but implicates ‘The X was someone else’s’ if the speaker has just 
one X (for example, head, nose, chin, penis, vagina, etc.). We might call this the 
Uniqueness Principle. Why should this hold? It might be suggested that since ‘an 
X’ implicates ‘not the X’, it cannot refer to a unique feature of the speaker. 
Compare ‘A wheel of the car is loose’, where the use of ‘a’ rather than ‘the’ 
indicates that the reference is to a (non-unique) road wheel rather than the (unique) 
steering wheel (example adapted from Levinson 2000, p.155). The cases are not 
parallel, however. A speaker would not refer to their own nose as ‘the nose’, and 
‘nose’ unlike ‘wheel’ is not ambiguous between unique and non-unique features. 
Besides, this does not get to the heart of the matter. The implications we need to 
explain are not of uniqueness or otherwise, but of possession. Why should ‘a nose’ 
implicate ‘not my nose’ while ‘a finger’ implicates ‘my finger’? It is not obvious 
that this can be explained with the resources Levinson has to offer, and a more 
plausible explanation may be that it is a simply a convention of English usage, in 
line with convention theory.21  
 It turns out then, that Levinson’s account of the ‘an X’ case, does not fare much 
better than Grice’s. If GCIs are genuinely context-independent, then the same 
expression-form should give rise to the same implicature in every context (and 
indeed every language), but ‘an X’ does not, and neither Grice nor Levinson can 
fully explain why. Given that this was the example with the notion of generalized 
implicature was originally introduced into the literature, this is a problem for 
                                                 
21  Informal discussions with speakers of other languages suggest that the Uniqueness Principle 
is indeed a convention of English. In many languages it is not applicable, since it not felicitous to 
use a ‘a leg/nose’ in this context without explicitly indicating whose it is, by use of a pronoun or 
reflexive verb. However, in languages where the phrase is not infelicitous, the principle does not 
always hold. In Finnish, for example, the reference would be the speaker’s own X, whether unique 
or not, and in Greek the reference would be ambiguous. (My thanks to the friends and 
correspondents who have shared their intuitions on this topic with me.) 
  153
Gricean approaches. Even if there are generalized implicatures associated with use 
of the indefinite article, they do not appear to be derivable from general principles 
and may depend on language-specific conventions.  
 
3.2 Scalar implicatures 
I turn now to some more general considerations about Q-implicatures, and, 
specifically, scalar implicatures. These are perhaps the clearest examples of GCIs, 
and Levinson’s account of them builds on a rich body of pre-existing work on the 
topic, including Gazdar 1979, Horn 1972, 1984, 1989, and Hirschberg 1985. 
However, even here there are reasons for thinking that the neo-Gricean account 
may not be the best. I shall begin with a general worry about the Gricean approach 
to scalar implicature, raised by Wayne Davis (2014).  
 As Davis points out, the idea behind Quantity implicatures is that we recover 
the implicated message by reference to what is not said. He quotes Levinson own 
(1983) account of the implicit reasoning involved:  
 
(i)  S has said p 
(ii)  There is an expression q, more informative than p (and thus q 
entails p), which might be desirable as a contribution to the current 
purposes of the exchange (and here there is perhaps an implicit 
reference to the maxim of Relevance) 
(iii)  q is of roughly equal brevity to p; so S did not say p rather than q 
simply in order to be brief (i.e. to conform to the maxim of Manner) 
(iv)  Since if S knew that q holds but nevertheless uttered p he would be 
in breach of the injunction to make his contribution as informative 
as is required, S must mean me, the addressee, to infer that S knows 
that q is not the case (K~q), or at least that he does not know that q 
is the case (~Kq). 
   (Levinson 1983, p.135) 
 
But of course, in any exchange there are many things that are not being said. As 
an example, Davis takes ‘Some athletes smoke’. This implicates the denial of the 
stronger claim that all athletes smoke. But that is far from being the only stronger 
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relevant statement of roughly equal brevity the speaker could have made and did 
not. Davis illustrates this with a range of scales on all of which ‘Some athletes 
smoke’ figures as the weakest element:  
 
<All athletes smoke, Nearly all athletes smoke, Most athletes smoke, 
Many athletes smoke, Several athletes smoke, Some athletes smoke> 
<100% of athletes smoke, At least 90% of athletes smoke, At least 50% 
of athletes smoke, At least 10% of athletes smoke, At least 1% of athletes 
smoke, Some athletes smoke> 
<Some athletes smoke constantly, Some athletes smoke regularly, Some 
athletes smoke often, Some athletes smoke occasionally, Some athletes 
smoke> 
<Some athletes, maids, and cops smoke, Some athletes and maids smoke, 
Some athletes smoke> 
<Some athletes smoke filterless Marlboros, Some athletes smoke 
Marlboros, Some athletes smoke> 
<Everyone knows some athletes smoke, I know some athletes smoke, 
Some athletes smoke> 
<n% of athletes smoke (0 < n < 100), Only some athletes smoke, Some 
athletes smoke>  
(Adapted from Davis 2014) 
 
By Levinson’s reasoning, Davis argues, ‘Some athletes smoke’ should implicate 
the denial of all of the stronger statements. Yet in fact it implicates the denial of 
only one of them: 
 
Among the infinity of statements stronger than ‘Some athletes smoke,’ 
‘All athletes smoke' is highly unusual in that people typically implicate 
its denial. (Davis 2014) 
 
 Now Levinson has an answer to this. In the passage quoted above he mentions 
that the stronger statement must be ‘of roughly equal brevity’ and ‘desirable as a 
contribution to the current purposes of the exchange’. And in later work he sets 
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out two more precise constraints that an entailment scale must meet in order to 
support Q-implicatures. First, the stronger items in the scale must be lexicalized to 
at least the same degree as the weaker ones. That is, the stronger items must consist 
of as few or fewer words than the weaker ones, so that, for example, if the weakest 
item is monolexemic, then all the other elements are monolexemic too. Second, all 
the items in the scale must be ‘about’ the same semantic relations and thus ‘in 
conceptually salient opposition’. So for example, the scale <regret, know> does 
not support Q-implicatures, since ‘regret’ involves a conceptual element not 
present in ‘know’ (Levinson 2000, p.80). And these conditions rule out most of 
Davis’s examples. None of his scales except the first meets the lexicalization 
constraint, and the penultimate one at least fails the aboutness constraint. 
 The lexicalization constraint also gives Levinson a response to what would 
otherwise be a serious objection. He holds that ‘and’ is typically strengthened by 
application of the I-principle to indicate temporal or causal sequence (2000, p.37–
8). So ‘They got married and had a child’ I-implicates that the marriage preceded 
the child’s birth. But it seems that the Q-principle could also be applied here to 
produce precisely the opposite implicature. Since the speaker chose ‘and’ rather 
than the informationally stronger ‘and then’, we might infer that they were not in 
a position to assert that the events took place in that order described and thus that 
they do not know that they did and perhaps know that they did not. Since Q-
implicatures take precedence over I-implicatures, we should therefore take the 
utterance to implicate that the child’s birth did not take place after the marriage 
(Davis 1998, p.52–3). However, the scale involved here, <and then, and>, does 
not satisfy the lexicalization constraint, since the stronger element is less 
lexicalized than the weaker one, and it does not therefore support Q-implicatures 
(Bezuidenhout 2002, p.264–5).22 
                                                 
22  We might press the objection, pointing out that some speakers use ‘then’ (incorrectly, 
according to grammarians) as a coordinating conjunction, as in ‘They got married, then had a 
child’, which suggests that in their idiolect at least there is a legitimate scale <then, and> which 
does support the Q-implicature. However, it may be that in these cases the comma before ‘then’ 
serves as a coordinating conjunction, so the real scale is <[comma] then, and>, which, arguably, 
does not meet the lexicalization condition.  
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 But why should the Q-principle be restricted in this way? (The fact that it saves 
Levinson’s account from a serious objection is not itself a reason, unless one is 
already convinced that the account is correct.) If we typically assume that what is 
not said isn’t the case, then why doesn’t saying that some athletes smoke imply 
that it is not the case that some athletes, maids, and cops smoke? What justifies the 
two constraints? Levinson suggests answers. He justifies the lexicalization 
constraint on the grounds that where stronger items are less lexicalized (more 
wordy), then any Q-implicature would be undercut, since the hearer might think 
that the speaker had avoided the stronger term simply because they were avoiding 
being ‘clumsy and prolix’ (following Grice’s maxim of Manner), rather than 
because they were not in a position to assert it (Levinson 2000, pp.79–80). I 
assume the aboutness constraint is justified in a similar way, by reference to the 
maxim of Relevance. Where a stronger term would have introduced a different 
kind of information, the hearer may take the speaker to have avoided it simply in 
order to remain relevant, rather than because they were not in a position to assert 
it, thus undercutting any potential Q-implicature it might have supported. These 
justifications are not unreasonable, and plainly the Q-principle (if it is a principle) 
would have to be restricted in some way — otherwise it would produce endless 
implicatures from every utterance. However, we might wonder if an appeal to 
Gricean maxims is sufficient to justify the conditions in the strict form Levinson 
proposes. The assumption that a speaker is following the maxims of Manner and 
Relevance doesn’t require us to suppose that they would have avoided even 
slightly longer phrases or introduced any new information. Moreover, even if we 
accept the conditions, some problems remain.  
 First, the constraints do not rule out all the problematic scales. For example, 
consider the scale <several, some>. This meets the two constraints, but does not 
support GCIs. ‘Some athletes smoke’ does not imply that it is not the case that 
several athletes smoke. Levinson might reply that ‘several’ forms part of a larger 
scale that continues up to ‘all’ and that it is only the strongest element on the scale 
whose denial is implicated (Levinson 2000, p.77). However, even if this further 
qualification is added, it is arguable that exceptions remain. For example, consider:  
 
  <is a cardiologist, is a physician> 
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  <commit murder, commit a crime> 
  <likes baseball, likes sports> 
 
Again, these scales meet Levinson’s constraints but do not support generalized 
scalar implicatures. ‘X is physician’ does not generally implicate that X is not a 
cardiologist; ‘Some cops commit crimes’ does not generally implicate that no cops 
commit murder, ‘Y likes sports’ does not generally implicate that Y does not like 
baseball (though there might be specific contexts in which those implicatures 
would hold).  
 Second, there are entailment scales which do not meet the constraints but do 
plausibly support GCIs. Consider, for example: 
  
  <got a distinction, passed> 
  <right up to, near> 
  <got a good look at, saw> 
 
These scales do not meet the lexicalization constraint. Yet my intuition is that they 
support scalar implicatures. ‘Amy passed’ implicates that Amy did not get a 
distinction; ‘Bob went near the edge’ implicates that Bob didn’t go right up to the 
edge; ‘Cal saw the robber’ implicates that Cal didn’t get a good look at the robber.23 
 Perhaps further constraints could be added to deal with these exceptions, but 
they would begin to look ad hoc. Moreover, if the Q-principle were supplemented 
with even more constraints, it would no longer look like a rule that could be applied 
automatically at an early stage of processing. Applying it would be a complicated 
business, which would involve checking that multiple conditions hold, and it might 
slow down communication rather than improve its efficiency. If there are such 
tight constraints on the application of the Q-principle — with the result that the 
                                                 
23  This is confirmed by the recognized diagnostics for scalar implicatures, summarized by 
Levinson (2000, p.81). If a scale, <S, W>, supports scalar implicatures, then the following 
cancelling and suspending phrases should be permissible: ‘W and even S’, ‘Not only W, S’, ‘W in 
fact/indeed S’, ‘W or possibly/even S’ and ‘W if not S’. This is the case with the three scales 
mentioned. 
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exceptions to it hugely outnumber the cases to which it applies — then why posit 
the principle in the first place? Wouldn’t it be more economical to appeal to 
conventions of use rather than the general principles? Perhaps it is a convention of 
English (and other languages) that when we use ‘some’, with its basic meaning of 
‘at least one’, it is understood to implicate ‘not all’. Thus, in order to recover the 
implicature, hearers would simply need to know the convention and recognize that 
it applies in this case. This is a simpler hypothesis than supposing that speakers 
have to access a relevant scale, check that the scale meets multiple constraints, and 
then apply an inferential principle.  
 This conclusion is reinforced, I think, by another point made by Davis (Davis 
2014). If someone asks ‘Do any athletes smoke’ the response ‘Some do’ will carry 
the implicature that not all athletes smoke, but the answer ‘Yes’ will not. Yet, 
Davis points out, in the context ‘Yes’ is logically equivalent to ‘Some do’ and is a 
no less cooperative response. Since the two exchanges are informationally 
equivalent we should expect them to produce the same implicatures, if general 
principles are at work. If the Q-heuristic produces a scalar implicature in the first 
case, then it should do so in the second too. The fact that no implicature arises in 
the second case strongly suggests that a general principle is not involved in either 
case. Again, it seems more appropriate to appeal to a convention of use, which is 
associated with particular expressions. There may be a convention of use that 
‘some’ (in the right context) implicates ‘not all’, but there is of course no 
convention that ‘yes’ implicates ‘not all’. 
 
3.3 Reducing scalar GCIs to PCIs 
There is another way of looking at scalar implicatures, which stresses their 
continuity with particularized implicatures. Levinson allows that there may be 
other types of Q-implicature, in addition to those based on entailment scales and 
clausal contrasts (see Levinson 2000, pp.98–103, from where the examples below 
are taken). For example, Q-implicatures can be based on non-entailment scales, 
such as <succeed, try> (saying that John tried to reach the peak implicates that 
John did not succeed, even though succeeding does not entail trying). Q-
implicatures can also be based on sets of alternatives, where the choice of one 
alternative implicates that the others do not apply (for example, ‘The flag is white’ 
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implicates ‘The flag is not white and red’), and on levels of specificity, where the 
use of a more general term implicates that the speaker cannot be more specific (for 
example, ‘I just saw a horrid animal in the larder’ implicates that the speaker is not 
sure what sort of horrid animal it was). Levinson notes that many of the inferences 
underlying these implicatures are weak unless contextually reinforced, and thus lie 
at the border between GCIs and PCIs (2000, p.103). 
 Following Fauconnier (1975), Levinson also notes that scalar implicatures can 
be generated by contingent scales, which depend on our beliefs about the world 
rather than on the meanings of the terms involved. He offers this example 
(Levinson 2000, p.104):  
 
 (4)  He can drive small trucks  
   Implicature: He can’t drive big ones.  
 
The Q-implicature here depends on the scale <driving big trucks, driving small 
trucks> which is based on knowledge of truck-driving rules and skills (people 
licensed to drive big trucks are also allowed to drive small ones, but not vice versa).  
 Q-implicatures can also depend on contextually given nonce scales. Levinson 
quotes the following example (Levinson 2000, p.105, quoted from Hirschberg 
1985, p.50):  
  
 (5)  A:  Did you get Paul Newman’s autograph? 
   B:  I got Joanne Woodward’s. 
   Implicature: I didn’t get Paul Newman’s. 
 
Here the speaker assumes a scale of autograph prestige <Newman, Woodward>, 
and by affirming that they secured the lower value item, they implicate that they 
did not secure the higher-value one.  
 Julia Hirschberg proposes a systematic treatment of scalar implicatures which 
includes such contingent and context-dependent ones (Hirschberg 1985; for 
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discussion, see Levinson 2000 pp.104–8).24 According to this, scalar implicatures 
are supported by orderings (Levinson calls them ‘Hirschberg scales’) constructed 
from a contextually salient set of values (expressions) and an ordering relationship 
of some kind (it can be any relation that is salient). For example, the values ‘oak’, 
‘maple’, ‘tree’ and the ordering relation is-a-kind-of would give the following 
ordering: 
 
  <{oak, maple}, tree> 25 
 
Note that this ordering is a partial one, in that it does not apply to every pair of 
items in the set. ‘Oak’ and ‘maple’ are both ordered with respect to ‘tree’, but not 
with respect to each other. In Hirschberg’s account, scalar implicatures require 
only partial orderings to support them. Similarly, the ordering relationships has-
parts, has-attribute, and has-prior-stage, might yield the following orderings 
(examples quoted in Levinson 2000, pp.106-7): 
 
  <{book, {chapter 1, chapter 2, …}> 
  <Greek, {Greek-speaking, Greek relatives, Greek residency, Greek 
ancestry}> 
  <marriage, engagement, going-steady, dating> 
 
The rules for scalar implicatures are then as follows. Affirming a lower expression 
in an ordering (to the right) implicates either that the speaker doesn’t believe that 
a higher expression applies or that they do not know which, if any, does. Thus ‘It’s 
a tree’ implicates that the speaker does not know which kind of tree; ‘I’ve read 
Chapter 1’ implicates that the speaker hasn’t read the whole book, and ‘I’ve Greek 
relatives’ implicates that the speaker is not Greek. By contrast, denying a higher 
                                                 
24  Hirschberg is a computer scientist, and her aim is to develop a formal framework for the 
representation and calculation of scalar implicatures that could be implemented computationally, 
rather than to identify the psychological mechanisms involved in human implicature recovery. The 
framework is detailed and complex and only its broad outlines are relevant here.  
25  Example from Levinson 2000, p.106. 
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item implicates that the speaker believes that a lower one applies, or may do so. 
Thus, ‘It’s not an oak’ implicates that it is a tree, ‘I haven’t read the whole book’ 
implicates that the speaker has read some of the chapters, ‘We’re not married’ 
implicates that the speaker may be engaged or dating, and so on.  
 Hirschberg holds that scalar implicatures can also be generated by unordered 
sets of alternatives, such as {chapter 1, chapter 2 …}. Here the rule is that 
affirming one expression implicates that the others do not apply or are not known 
to apply, and denying one expression implicates that one of the others may apply. 
So, for example, ‘I’ve read Chapter 1’ implicates that the speaker has not read 
Chapter 2, and ‘I’ve not read Chapter 1’ implicates that the speaker may have read 
Chapter 2 (Levinson 2000, p.106). 
 Crucially, Hirschberg extends this treatment to scalar implicatures based on 
entailment scales. Given the contextually salient expressions ‘all’ and ‘some’ and 
the relation of entailment, we can form the Hirschberg scale <all, some>. Applying 
the rules, ‘Some came’ implicates that not all came, and ‘Not all came’ implicates 
that some came. Since these implicatures too are generated from contextually 
saliently orderings, it follows that there is no sharp distinction between PCIs and 
GCIs, and that Hirschberg’s approach reduces GCIs to PCIs.26  
 Levinson rejects this conclusion, of course. Though he concedes that 
Hirschberg offers a neat treatment of particularized scalar implicatures, he argues 
that it does not tend to undermine the distinction between GCIs and PCIs, since 
we can still draw a clear-cut distinction between context-independent scalar 
implicatures that are based on contrasts in meaning (GCIs) and context-dependent 
ones that are based on contrasts salient in particular contexts (PCIs): 
 
The GCI theorist is simply claiming that speakers carry their lexicons on 
their backs, as it were, from context to context, and it is mutual knowledge 
of this fact that elevates the Q-heuristics to a default mode of inference. 
(Levinson 2000, p.108) 
                                                 
26  Hirschberg writes: ‘the traditional distinction between generalized and particularized 




 This is questionable, however. Levinson assumes that some expressions (such 
as ‘some’, ‘sometimes’, ‘possibly’) will evoke the same set of contrasting values 
and the same ordering relation (namely, entailment) in all contexts, thus supporting 
context-independent scalar implicatures. That is, the scales that support GCIs will 
be salient in all contexts. But this is questionable. Consider these exchanges, for 
example:  
 
 (6)  A: Is it true that she bought ten pairs of shoes yesterday? 
   B: She bought some. 
 
 (7)  A: Do you visit her as often as you used to? 
   B: We visit her sometimes. 
 
In the context of (6) ‘some’ does not evoke the entailment scale <all, some> but 
the nonce specificity scale <ten, some>, and by using ‘some’ B implicates that she 
doesn’t know if the more specific figure of ten is correct. Similarly, in (7) the 
entailment scale <always, sometimes> is not salient, but instead the nonce scale 
<as often as we used to, sometimes> is. Of course, in many contexts where ‘some’ 
is used, the familiar entailment scale <all, some> would be salient, but as the 
examples just given show, there are contexts in which it would not be. Given this, 
it is more appropriate to think of scalar implicatures as lying on a continuum, from 
relatively particularized ones, which depend on orderings that are salient only in a 
few contexts, to relatively generalized ones, which depend on orderings that are 
salient in many contexts. But since this difference is a matter of degree and there 
will be a full range of intermediate cases, this view tends to undermine the sharp 
neo-Gricean distinction between PCIs and GCIs, and, with it, Levinson’s case for 
existence of a distinct level of utterance-type meaning.27 
                                                 
27  This is not to deny, of course, that there are general principles at work in scalar implicature, 
on Hirschberg’s account. There are the rules that affirming a lower-ranked element in an ordering 
implicates the denial of stronger one, and that denial of a stronger element implicates affirmation 
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 Levinson also objects that Hirschberg’s account will overgenerate 
implicatures, since it imposes no constraints on scalehood (echoing Davis’s 
complaint against him, discussed above) (Levinson 2000, p.107). But this, I think, 
mistakes Hirschberg’s aims. In fact, it is a virtue of her account that it imposes no 
such constraints. For, as Hirschberg stresses, given the right ordering, any 
expression can generate a scalar implicature.28 Consider again the examples Davis 
gives. There is no general implicature from ‘Some athletes smoke’ to ‘It is not the 
case that some athletes smoke Marlboros’, but there are contexts where it arises:  
 
 (8)  A: Do some athletes smoke Marlboros? 
   B: Some athletes smoke.   
 
The implicature depends on the contextual salience of the expression ‘smoke’ and 
‘smoke Marlboros’ and the ordering relation is-a-specific-form-of. Affirming that 
some athletes engage in the general activity of smoking implicates that they do not 
                                                 
of a weaker one. But these rules by themselves do not generate implicatures, even when combined 
with the lexicon. A contextually salient ordering must also be given. 
28  Hirschberg illustrates this with the following example. Each of B’s replies generates a different 
scalar implicature, based on a different implicit ordering or set of alternatives: 
A: Did the girl in the red dress spill a diet coke? 
a. B: She spilled a diet pepsi. 
b. B: She spilled a regular coke. 
c. B: She spilled a glass of tomato juice. 
d. B: Jane spilled a diet coke. 
e. B: The girl in the red slacks spilled a diet coke. 
f. B: The girl in the green dress spilled a diet coke. 
g. B: The girl in the green slacks spilled a diet coke, 
h. B: The boy in the red dress spilled a diet coke. 
i. B: The girl in the red dress will spill a diet coke. 
j. B: The girl in the red dress drank a diet coke. 
k. B: The girl in the red dress spilled the diet coke. 
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engage in the more specific Marlboro-involving form of smoking (or are not 
known to do so).29 
 This suggests another way of looking at the constraints on scalehood that 
Levinson proposes. I have already suggested that these are inadequate, and I think 
we can now see why. If Hirschberg is right, then our intuitions about which scales 
do and do not support scalar implicatures are based on our judgements about 
contextual salience. We judge that the entailment scale <all, some> does support 
implicatures and that the specificity scale <ten, some> does not because in most 
contexts the former would be salient and the latter would not. But, as we have seen, 
there are contexts in which the reverse is the case. We cannot hope to provide 
general rules of scalehood since there are no truly general, context-independent 
scalar implicatures. Any rules would have potentially unlimited context-specific 
exceptions.  
 Of course this means that the notion of contextual salience has a lot of work to 
do in Hirschberg’s account, and Levinson suggests that this is a major problem for 
the account:  
 
All implicatures are made dependent on the contextually salient ordering 
relation, so we have no account of implicature generation without an 
account of how this is arrived at. (Levinson 2000, p.107) 
 
In fact, Hirschberg devotes a whole chapter to the discussion of contextual 
salience, identifying some of the cues that make an ordering salient to a speaker 
and hearer (syntactic, intonational, semantic, pragmatic, and communication 
dynamical) and proposing ways in which assignments of salience might be 
                                                 
29 Other examples from Davis’s list would generate implicatures based on unordered sets of 
alternatives: 
A: Is it true that athletes, maids, and cops smoke? 
B: Some athletes smoke. 
Here the salient set of alternatives is {athletes, maids, cops}, and the affirmation of one element 
implicates the denial of the others.  
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formally represented in a computational model (Hirschberg 1985, Chapter 6). It is 
true that this does not amount to (and is not intended to be) a complete theory of 
contextual salience (indeed, providing such a theory would be a major 
achievement for psycholinguistics). But that does not undermine the case for 
thinking that we need such a theory, and Levinson has not shown that we don’t 
need one.  
 According to Hirschberg, then, there are genuine scalar implicatures, whose 
recovery involves the application of general principles (affirmation of a weaker 
scalar term implicates denial of a stronger one, and denial of a stronger one 
implicates affirmation of a weaker one). But these principles do not yield default, 
context-independent interpretations. The orderings to which the principles are 
applied are contextually determined, and the same expression might evoke a 
different ordering, and hence a different scalar implicature, in different contexts. 
Thus, Hirschberg’s approach (at least as I have interpreted it) is an example of the 
class of views I called weak neo-Griceanism. 30 
 
3.4 Q-implicature and T-implicature 
There is another set of considerations that pose a challenge for Levinson’s account 
of Q-implicature. Levinson’s principles, like Grice’s maxims and the Cooperative 
Principle from which they follow, are rooted in the assumption that the aim of 
communication is the efficient sharing of information. Thus, the Q-principle tells 
us to assume that speakers will give as much (relevant) information as they can. 
But as several writers have noted, conversation often has other aims besides the 
communication of information. Sometimes it is more important to be polite than 
to be informative. Geoffrey Leech has formalized this idea, proposing a Politeness 
Principle, ‘Minimize (other things being equal) the expression of impolite beliefs’, 
which he breaks down into a series of maxims, of Tact, Generosity, Approbation, 
Modesty, Agreement, and Sympathy (Leech 1983, p.132). Leech notes that 
                                                 
30  The particularized implicature carried by Mr Bronston’s reply ‘The company had an account 
there’, discussed in Chapter 1, might be regarded as a scalar implicature, dependent on the ad hoc 
scale <me, my company>, where the ordering relation is something like seriousness of holding a 
bank account in the name of. 
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communicative exchanges frequently involve a trade-off between the Cooperative 
Principle and the Politeness Principle, and he explores in detail the complex 
pragmatics of politeness. Here I shall focus on a narrow range of cases, in order to 
highlight a potential problem for neo-Griceanism.  
 In British English at least it is common to use understatement to convey 
information or instructions that will be unwelcome to the hearer. We might see this 
practice as obeying what Leech calls the Tact maxim: ‘Minimize the expression of 
beliefs which express or imply cost to other’ (Leech 1983, p.132). For example, a 
manager might tell a subordinate, ‘There is a problem with your report’, to convey 
that they are in fact seriously displeased with it. We might call this a Tact 
implicature, or T-implicature. Here are some more examples: 
 
 (9)   I might not be able to do that.  
   T-implicature: I won’t do that. 
 
 (10) I would like to see your passport. 
   T-implicature: You must show me your passport.  
 
  (11) Someone’s eaten the icing off the cake.31 
   T-implicature: You have eaten the icing off the cake. 
 
Note that these implicatures are not M-implicatures. The expressions used are not 
untypical or unusual. Indeed, these sentences could be used without generating the 
implicatures. If (9) were uttered by a friend who was clearly anxious to help as 
much as they could, or (10) by someone known to be interested in the design of 
passports, the implicatures would not arise. To this extent, then, these are context-
dependent, particularized implicatures. However, they are not highly 
contextualized, and the examples given can be easily understood without any 
background information.  
 In these cases, the hearer applies what we might call a Tact principle: interpret 
the affirmation of a weaker, less unwelcome statement or request as implicating a 
                                                 
31  Example borrowed from Leech 1983, p.80. 
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relevant stronger, more unwelcome one. What isn’t said, is, we might say. This is, 
of course, the opposite of Levinson’s Q-principle, which says that affirmation of a 
weaker claim implicates the denial of a relevant stronger one. Moreover, the same 
utterance may potentially generate both a Q-implicature and a T-implicature. In 
(9), ‘I might not be able’ should Q-implicate that it is not the case that the speaker 
definitely won’t be able to do the thing requested — which is, of course, at odds 
with the T-implicature that the speaker won’t do it. Here are some more examples: 
 
 (12) It is possible that the train will be delayed. 
   Q-implicature: It is not probable that the train will be delayed.  
   T-implicature: It is probable that the train will be delayed. 
  
 (13) Some of the staff you sacked are angry. 
   Q-implicature: Not all the staff you sacked are angry. 
   T-implicature: Many or even all of the staff you sacked are angry. 
 
 (14) I think you dropped this. 
   Q-implicature: I am not sure that you dropped this.  
   T-implicature: You dropped this. 
 
 Given the right context, the T-implicatures here would take precedence over 
the Q-implicatures. (Imagine (12) said by a grim-faced railway employee.) And 
this poses a problem for Levinson’s account, which holds that Q-implicatures are 
generalized and take priority over other implicatures. It is true, as I mentioned 
earlier, that Levinson allows that Q-implicatures can be cancelled if they conflict 
with entailments of what is said or with background assumptions, or if they are 
obviously irrelevant. But it would be a major concession to allow that Q-
implicatures can also be overridden by T-implicatures, which are context-
dependent, play a social role rather than an informational one, and may even be 
culturally determined.  
 This is only tentative, of course, but it tends to support the earlier suggestion 
that scalar implicature is much more context sensitive than Levinson allows. I 
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suspect this point could be reinforced by considering other manifestations of the 
Politeness Principle.  
 
3.5 Scalar implicature or explicature? 
I shall close this section by introducing another alternative to the neo-Gricean 
treatment of scalar implicature, this time from a relevance theory perspective. (The 
following draws on Noveck and Sperber 2012.)32  
 The view in question is that some supposed scalar implicatures are not in fact 
implicatures but explicatures. As explained earlier, an explicature of an utterance 
is (roughly) a pragmatically enriched version of its linguistically coded meaning, 
with ambiguities resolved, references identified, gaps filled, and so on. It can be 
thought of as the speaker’s explicit meaning (as opposed to any distinct implicated 
meaning).33 Now, one of the central processes in explicature is narrowing, in 
which the meaning of an expression is narrowed to express a more specific 
meaning, often an ad hoc, contextually determined one. Noveck and Sperber give 
the following example: 
 
 (15)  Henry: Do you want to go on working, or shall we go to the cinema? 
   Jane: I’m tired. Let’s go to the cinema.34 
 
‘Tired’ can be used to express a wide range of physical and mental states from 
boredom and mild weariness through to outright exhaustion. In the context, 
however, it is clear that Jane’s utterance of ‘I’m tired’ is relevant only if she means 
something like ‘tired enough to prefer going to the cinema to going on working’, 
                                                 
32 Bezuidenhout has made a similar proposal (Bezuidenhout 2002). Unlike Noveck and Sperber, 
however, she focuses mainly on number terms. 
33 For detailed discussion of explicature, see Carston 2002, 2004a, 2012. As noted earlier, 
Levinson denies that the distinction between explicature and implicature can be drawn in a rigorous 
way (Levinson 2000, pp.194–8). However, this does not affect the coherence of the position 
described in the text. We can agree that narrowing is a real phenomenon, whether or not we think 
of it as contributing to a distinct process of explicature.  
34  Noveck and Sperber 2012, p.312 
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and Henry will narrow down the meaning of the term to express that ad hoc 
concept.  
 Noveck and Sperber maintain that many cases of supposed scalar implicature 
are in fact cases of narrowing of this type. As an example, they give the following 
sentence, which we are to imagine being uttered in the context of a discussion of 
scientific literacy in America: 
 
 (16)  Most Americans are creationists and some even believe that the Earth 
is flat.35  
 
Here the hearer will narrow down the basic, semantically coded meaning of ‘some’ 
(which Noveck and Sperber take to be ‘at least two and possibly all’) in the search 
for a relevant interpretation (that is, one that has contextually useful, easily 
processed implications). Given the context, it would obviously not be a useful 
contribution to utter (16) if there were only two Americans who believe the Earth 
is flat. The utterance is contextually relevant only if a significant number is meant. 
Moreover, it is common knowledge that not all Americans believe the Earth is flat, 
so that information has little value, and the contrast with ‘most’ makes it clear that 
the speaker means a smaller number than the number of creationists. In this way, 
the meaning of ‘some’ is narrowed down at both ends to mean something like ‘a 
number large enough to be relevant to the discussion, but smaller than the number 
of creationists’. 
 In cases like this, ‘some’ is interpreted as having a meaning that is narrowed 
down at both ends of the scale. This narrowed-down meaning will, of course, 
entail the more limited top-end narrowing that the Q-principle would have 
produced, but it is a much richer and more contextually useful one. Noveck and 
Sperber give other examples. If Henry is preparing dinner and Jane tells him ‘Some 
of the guests are arriving’, a vague reading of ‘some’ as ‘more than one and less 
than all’ will be sufficient to render her utterance optimally relevant (having 
various contextual implications about what Henry should do next). Similar points, 
Noveck and Sperber note, apply to other scalar terms. For example, ‘possible’ may 
                                                 
35  Noveck and Sperber 2012, p.313. 
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be narrowed down to indicate a modest probability, excluding both certainty and 
tiny probability.36  
 This view provides an alternative, and perhaps more plausible, analysis of 
some of the cases discussed in the previous subsection. For example, the 
implicatures in examples (6) and (7), which I suggested would generate 
implicatures based on nonce Hirschberg scales, may be better thought of as 
yielding interpretations involving contextually narrowed meanings of ‘some’ and 
‘sometimes’. Similarly, the ‘tact’ implicatures I discussed in the previous 
subsection might be re-interpreted as resulting from narrowing-down of the key 
concepts rather than an application of a general Tact principle. In (12) and (13), 
for example, ‘possible’ is narrowed to mean ‘highly probable’ and ‘some’ to ‘many 
and even all’, since these are the meanings from which most contextual 
implications can be drawn (concerning what actions the hearer should take). 
 Noveck and Sperber do not claim that we never draw scalar implicatures. They 
hold that where there is an implicit or explicit question as to whether a stronger 
term applies, we typically do draw one. If Henry had explicitly asked Jane whether 
all the guests had arrived, then her utterance would have prompted him to derive 
the implicature ‘not all’ (Noveck and Sperber 2012, pp.314–5). (Example (3) in 
section 2.1 above would be another example of what Noveck and Sperber would 
regard as a genuine scalar implicature.) But they argue that such cases are much 
rarer than neo-Griceans believe:  
 
From the point of view of relevance theory, then, the classical neo-
Gricean theory of scalar implicatures can be seen as a mistaken 
generalisation of the relatively rare case where a weaker claim genuinely 
implicates the denial of a stronger claim which is under consideration in 
                                                 
36  Noveck and Sperber also give an example in which the meaning of ‘some’ is broadened. Henry 
has agreed to go and pick up dessert as soon as the dinner guests start arriving, and Jane calls to 
him ‘Some of the guests are arriving’. Here the relevance of Jane’s utterance does not depend on 
how many guests are arriving, and Henry will understand ‘some’ as compatible with any number 
of guests arriving, from one to all — which is a broadening of the basic meaning of ‘some’, as 
Noveck and Sperber understand it (Noveck and Sperber 2012, pp.313–4).  
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the context, to the much more common case where the denotation of an 
expression is narrowed to exclude marginal or limiting instances with 
untypical implications. (Noveck and Sperber 2012, p.315) 
 
 If this analysis is correct, then it is problematic for Levinson. In cases where 
considerations of relevance narrow down the meaning of scalar terms, automatic 
application of the Q-principle will be at best redundant, slowing down the 
comprehension process rather than speeding it up. If such cases are common, it is 
hard to see why there would have been pressure for the Q-principle to be applied 
by default.37  
 It might be suggested that the cases Noveck and Sperber highlight should be 
regarded as falling under the I-principle, which tells us to enrich interpretations of 
utterances in the light of background knowledge. I don’t think this is a promising 
suggestion, however, since in these cases the enrichment would depend heavily on 
contextual factors that have no role in a process of default interpretation (see 
section 4 below for more on this). Moreover, it is unclear why the Q-principle 
would not be applied in these cases, and if it is, then, on Levinson’s account, the 
implicatures it produces should override ones produced by the I-principle.  
 
                                                 
37  Levinson does allow that considerations of relevance (in the everyday sense) may affect how 
a scalar term is interpreted. He gives the following example:  
A: Is there any evidence against them? 
B: Some of their identity documents are forgeries. 
(Levinson 2000, p.51) 
Here he argues, ‘some’ is not interpreted as meaning ‘not all’, since the stronger claim is irrelevant 
to the speaker’s communicative goal (establishing that there is evidence against the people in 
question). However, on his view this does not mean that the implicature is not derived, but only 
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4. Assessing the I- and M-principles 
This section looks at Levinson’s other two principles, the I-principle and the M-
principle. Again, I shall argue that it is doubtful that these principles support the 
existence of a level of utterance-type meaning.  
 
4.1 Stereotypes and defaults  
The I-principle tells hearers to enrich the content of utterances by drawing on 
knowledge of relevant stereotypes. Levinson notes that this is a powerful heuristic, 
which ‘allows an interpreter to bring all sorts of background knowledge about a 
domain to bear on a rich interpretation of a minimal description.’  
 When introducing this principle, I noted a possible objection. Since the 
principle tells us to draw on background knowledge to interpret an utterance, it 
does not look like one that yields default interpretations, associated with utterance 
types. I suggested that Levinson would reply that the relevant background 
knowledge can be applied without considering the context of the utterance in 
question. This is a plausible reply when an expression reliably evokes a single 
stereotype. Levinson’s examples are, arguably, of this kind: ‘secretary’ is 
interpreted as ‘female secretary’, ‘road’ as ‘hard-surfaced road’ (though the former 
might be considered problematic). But, as Anne Bezuidenhout points out, the same 
expression can evoke different stereotypes in different contexts (Bezuidenhout 
2002). As an example, she takes the utterance ‘Susan turned the key and the engine 
started.’ (an example used by Levinson; 2000, p.117). Here, the I-principle tells us 
to enrich the interpretation of ‘and’ by drawing on background knowledge 
(conjunction buttressing). But (as Levinson himself notes; 2000, p.117), several 
different enrichments are possible, corresponding to temporal sequence, causal 
sequence, and goal: 
 
(a) GCI: Susan turned the key and then the engine started.  
(b) GCI: Susan turned the key and as a result the engine started.  
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(c) GCI: Susan turned the key with the goal of bringing it about that the 
engine started.  
(Bezuidenhout 2002, p.266).38 
 
 Now, in any given context, we will pick out one of these as the relevant 
stereotype. But plainly the words of the utterance itself cannot determine which is 
the relevant one, since they are the same in all three cases. In order to access the 
relevant stereotypical information, it seems we must draw on contextual 
information. As Bezuidenhout puts it: 
 
Thus hearers will need to rely on the information made accessible in the 
wider context, such as information from prior discourse context (i.e., the 
mutual linguistic context), from the mutual physical environment, or from 
other shared sources of knowledge. (Bezuidenhout 2002, p.266) 
 
 As another example, Bezuidenhout gives ‘Professor White’s book is on the 
table’. Here, the I-principle tells us to enrich the possessive (via narrowing this 
time) by treating it as the stereotypical person-book relation. But again there is no 
single relation of this kind. The book might be one the professor owns, bought, 
borrowed, wrote, and so on. And which one the hearer chooses will be determined 
by the wider context. If the conversation is between assistants in a bookshop, the 
hearer will probably take the speaker to mean the book the professor wrote; if they 
are librarians processing requests from academics, they will probably take them to 
mean the one the professor requested, and so on (Bezuidenhout 2002, p.267–8).  
 Many more examples could be given. And, of course, similar cases will arise 
with the M-principle. What counts as the relevant non-stereotypical reading of an 
expression will also vary with context. ‘Bill caused to car to stop’39 implicates that 
                                                 
38  And, as Bezuidenhout notes, this does not exhaust the possible enrichments. ‘And’ can also 
implicate relations of temporal inclusion (‘He went to London and he saw the Queen’; co-
occurrence (‘She likes to ride her bike and listen to her Walkman’; enabling (‘I forgot to hide the 
cake and the kids ate it’), and more (examples from Bezuidenhout 2002, p.272). 
39  Levinson’s example (Levinson 2000, p.39). 
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Bill didn’t stop the car in the usual way but leaves open a wide range of options, 
from which the hearer will choose, depending, for example, on whether Bill was 
the driver, a passenger, a bystander, a policeman, and so on. Indeed, the range of 
possible M-implicatures will be wider than that of I-implicatures since there are 
many more ways of being non-stereotypical than of being stereotypical.  
 All this undermines Levinson’s claim that I- and M-inferences are default ones, 
supporting a level of meaning associated with utterance types. If the default 
interpretation is the one that is most easily accessible, then, as Bezuidenhout notes, 
expressions will have many defaults, varying with context (Bezuidenhout 2002, 
p.272). Bezuidenhout concludes that Levinson faces a trilemma. If the I-principle 
produces multiple interpretations of the same expression in every context, then it 
does not serve the function of speeding up language processing. If it produces 
different interpretations of an expression in different contexts, then it is not part of 
a system of default interpretation. And if it produces the same interpretation in 
every context, then it will often hinder processing, since in many cases this 
interpretation will have to be overridden and corrected (Bezuidenhout 2002, 
p.274).  
 One way of resolving this would be to adopt a weak neo-Gricean view. We 
might say that hearers employ a general principle which tells them to read 
unmarked expressions in a stereotypical way (and marked ones in a non-
stereotypical way), but that which of the many available stereotypes (or 
alternatives) they settle on will be determined by contextual factors. On this view, 
the I- and M- principles would guide interpretation, but would not yield default 
interpretations.  
 
4.2 A deeper problem 
There may be a deeper general problem with the I-principle. Levinson holds that 
the function of the Q-, I-, and M-principles is to overcome the bottleneck in human 
communication caused by the relatively slow speed of our articulatory processes. 
But he does not, of course, think that these principles exhaust our pragmatic 
competence; he assumes that they supplement a system of context-driven 
pragmatic processing, which processes PCIs and utterance-token meaning 
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generally.40 The three principles speed up communication by providing automatic 
enrichments of certain types of utterance, pre-empting or reducing the need for 
context-driven pragmatic processing.  
 Now, it is crucial to this function that they are formal principles. Each is 
triggered by the presence of some formal property (for example, a certain 
expression type), which can be detected at an early stage of processing. The 
principle then specifies a formal procedure that can be applied to enrich the content 
of the utterance in reliable ways. In the case of the Q-principle, the triggering 
condition is the presence of a lower-ranked expression from a suitable scale, such 
as ‘some’, ‘possibly’, ‘may’, and the procedure is the replacement of the weaker 
expression with the negation of a stronger one from the same scale. As we have 
seen, there are some problems for the Q-principle, but in outline at least it looks 
like a feasible and effective strategy of default enrichment.  
 In the case of the I-principle, however, the picture is less clear. The triggering 
condition here is the presence of an unmarked expression — that is, one that is 
simple, brief, and familiar. This in itself is problematic, since this condition is the 
default one: people generally use unmarked expressions, unless they have some 
reason not to. Given this, it would seem more cost-effective in processing terms to 
look out for situations in which the condition doesn’t hold than for ones in which 
it does. Second, the procedure to be applied is simply an instruction to draw on 
background knowledge to interpret the expression in the standard way. But this is, 
presumably, what would have happened anyway, thanks to the context-driven 
pragmatic processes. In effect, the I-principle says to check if an utterance is 
                                                 
40  He writes, for example:  
In the composite theory of meaning, the theory of GCIs plays just a small role in 
a general theory of communication. In this regard, GCI theory is not in direct 
competition with holistic theories like Sperber and Wilson’s theory of Relevance, 
which attempts to reduce all kinds of pragmatic inference to one mega-principle 
— GCI theory is simply not a general theory of human pragmatic competence. 
Instead it attempts to account for one relatively small area of pragmatic inference. 
(Levinson 2000, pp. 21–2) 
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linguistically normal, and if it is, to process it in the normal way. But this does not 
pre-empt or reduce pragmatic processing; it is simply permission for it to go ahead, 
and explicitly applying it would be more likely to delay the process than speed it 
up. What is the point of checking if a condition holds, unless you’re going to do 
something differently if it does? In short, the I-principle appears to be simply 
redundant, even from a weak neo-Gricean perspective.41  
 There is a related worry about the M-principle. Here the trigger is the presence 
of a marked (prolix, unusual) expression, and the procedure is to look for a 
nonstandard interpretation. This may seem more effective. When a marked 
expression is detected, we skip the usual processing and jump straight to a 
nonstandard interpretation. There is a problem, however. How can we tell what a 
nonstandard interpretation might be until we know what the standard one is? We 
cannot set aside the standard interpretation until we have identified it. It seems that 
in order to execute the M-principle, we (or rather, our cognitive systems) will have 
to let the normal pragmatic processes run until they reach the standard 
interpretation, and then let them run further, looking for alternative, less obvious 
interpretations.  
 This does not, however, mean that the M-principle is redundant. It does not 
pre-empt or reduce context-driven pragmatic processing and does not yield default 
interpretations. But it does guide how pragmatic processing is conducted and when 
it terminates. From a weak neo-Gricean perspective, the M-principle may still have 
a role to play, even if the I-principle does not. 
 
5. Experimental evidence 
Neo-Gricean theories were developed by drawing on linguistic intuitions and 
analyses rather than by experiment. However, since they involve, or at least imply, 
                                                 
41  It might be suggested that processing costs could be reduced by using a single detector, 
sensitive to only marked expressions, to implement both the I- and M- principles. If the detector is 
triggered, the M-principle procedure is executed, if it is not triggered, then the I-principle procedure 
is. However, if executing the I-principle simply involves letting normal pragmatic processing run, 
this would in effect eliminate the I-principle, since when the detector isn’t triggered, nothing 
different happens. 
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claims about the mental processes involved in implicature recovery, they are open 
to experimental testing, and in recent years relevant work has been done in the 
growing field of experimental pragmatics (Noveck and Reboul 2008; Noveck and 
Sperber 2004). In particular, there are many experimental studies of scalar 
implicature, designed in part to test whether neo-Griceanism or relevance theory 
gives a better account of it. In this section I shall briefly survey some of this work 
and assess its findings. 
 
5.1 Reaction-time studies 
A key difference between neo-Griceanism and relevance theory concerns the order 
in which interpretations of scalar terms are processed. According to Levinson, 
scalar inferences are made automatically by default, and processing a literal 
interpretation of a scalar term will involve cancelling the scalar inference. 
According to relevance theory, by contrast, the initial interpretation is typically the 
linguistically coded one, and pragmatically enriched interpretations are derived 
only if needed to meet current expectations of relevance. Thus, in the case of 
‘some’, for example, Levinson’s view predicts that the pragmatic meaning ‘some 
but not all’ is derived first, whereas relevance theory predicts that the basic 
meaning ‘some and possibly all’ is. (The latter meaning is sometimes referred to 
as the logical one, since it corresponds to the existential quantifier of predicate 
logic). Thus, if Levinson is right, pragmatic interpretations of ‘some’ should take 
less time to process than the logical one, and if relevance theory is right, the 
opposite should be the case. 
 In a pioneering study (conducted in French), Lewis Bott and Ira Noveck sought 
to test these predictions (Bott and Noveck 2004). They focused on what they call 
‘underinformative’ sentences, such as ‘Some giraffes have long necks’, which 
make a claim that is true on a logical reading of ‘some’ but false on a pragmatic 
one (such sentences are said to be pragmatically infelicitous). Bott and Noveck 
used a sentence verification task, in which participants were presented with 
sentences of the form ‘Some/All F are G’ and asked to classify each as true or 
false. A sixth of the sentences were underinformative ‘some’ sentences, the rest 
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were control sentences that were straightforwardly true or false.42 There were two 
sessions. In one, the participants were told to treat ‘some’ logically, as meaning 
‘some and possibly all’; in the other they were told to treat it pragmatically, as 
meaning ‘some but not all’. Bott and Noveck reasoned that if underinformative 
sentences generate scalar inferences by default, then participants should take 
longer to respond to such sentences when told to treat them logically than when 
told to treat them pragmatically, since in the former case the default pragmatic 
inference would have to be cancelled before the logical reading could be derived. 
In fact, the opposite happened. Participants responded to underinformative 
sentences more quickly in the logical condition than the pragmatic one, taking 
around 800 ms in the former and nearly 1400 ms in the latter. (They also responded 
more quickly to control sentences in the pragmatic condition, though the difference 
was not as great.) Participants also gave fewer incorrect answers when instructed 
to adopt a logical reading (90% correct as opposed to 60% in the pragmatic 
condition), suggesting that they found it easier to apply the logical interpretation.43 
 In a variant of the experiment, Bott and Noveck allowed the participants to 
interpret ‘some’ as they wished. Those participants who classified the 
underinformative sentences as true were assumed to have adopted the logical 
interpretation and those who classified them as false were assumed to have adopted 
the pragmatic one. Again, there was a significant difference in response time, with 
                                                 
42  The control sentences consisted of equal numbers of true ‘some’ sentences (for example ‘Some 
mammals are elephants’), false ‘some’ sentences (for example ‘Some elephants are insects’), and 
three sets of ‘all’ sentences produced by substituting ‘all’ for ‘some’ in underinformative, true, and 
false ‘some’ sentences. 
43 A possible weakness in the experiment is that the underinformative sentences called for a 
positive response in the logical condition and a negative response in the pragmatic one. If 
participants were quicker to confirm a sentence than to deny it, this might explain the difference in 
response times. To control for this, Bott and Noveck ran a second experiment in which the 
underinformative sentences called for the same response in both conditions. (They achieved this 
by asking participants to assess a second sentence that expressed a true/false verdict on the original 
one and switching the value of the verdict between the conditions.) The results were in line with 
those of the first experiment. 
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those who adopted the logical reading responding more quickly than those who 
adopted the pragmatic one (2700 ms as opposed to 3300 ms).44  
 In a final variant of the experiment, Bott and Noveck manipulated the time 
participants were given to respond to the sentences presented to them. There were 
two experimental conditions, Long and Short. In the Short condition participants 
were allowed 900 ms to respond, in the Long condition they were allowed 3000 
ms. Bott and Noveck found that participants were more likely to classify 
underinformative sentences as true in the Short condition than in the Long 
condition (72% ‘true’ responses in the former, versus 56% in the latter). In other 
words, forcing subjects to respond more quickly (and thus limiting the cognitive 
resources available for producing their response) increases the likelihood of their 
treating ‘some’ as meaning ‘some and possibly all’ and reduces the likelihood of 
their drawing a scalar inference ‘not all’. (The claim that the availability of 
cognitive resources affects implicature processing has been confirmed in another 
study (Pouscoulous et al. 2007). Pouscoulous et al., showed that by using a simpler 
task, with fewer distracting factors and more basic terms, implicature processing 
improved across the board from age 4 to adult.) 
 Bott and Noveck conclude that their studies provide evidence against the neo-
Gricean view that scalar inferences are automatic and default and support for the 
relevance theory view that scalar implicatures take time and effort to process and 
are derived only when contextually required. The data do certainly indicate that 
scalar implicatures are not default interpretations, and they thus pose a problem 
for neo-Griceanism. However, this does not leave relevance theory as the only 
option. 
 First, the data are compatible with weak neo-Griceanism. The data suggest that 
the Q-principle is not applied automatically, before logical interpretations are 
processed; but it might be applied later and with more effort, if the context makes 
the logical reading unsatisfactory. That is, the Q-principle may be responsible for 
scalar implicatures if they are derived, even though they are not derived by default.  
                                                 
44 Another study found an even greater difference, with pragmatic responders taking nearly twice 
as long as logical ones; see Noveck and Posada 2003. 
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 Second, the data are also compatible with convention theory (or rather its 
cognitive counterpart). As noted earlier, convention theory treats literal meanings 
as more basic than generalized (‘sentence’) implicatures, since it holds that they 
depend on first-order semantic conventions rather than second-order ones. 
Moreover, convention theory, I suggest, predicts (at least tentatively) that scalar 
implicatures will require more time and effort to process than literal 
interpretations. According to convention theory, deriving literal interpretations 
involves applying first-order semantic rules only, whereas deriving sentence 
implicatures involves applying both first-order and second-order semantic rules. 
(Second-order semantic rules are rules for expressing further meanings by using 
sentences with their basic first-order meaning, so a second-order rule cannot be 
applied until the relevant first-order meaning has been processed. Otherwise, we 
would be dealing with an idiom rather than an implicature.) This suggests that 
sentence implicatures should take more time and effort to process than literal 
meanings. This is only a tentative prediction, of course; to make firm predictions 
we would need a theory of how knowledge of semantic conventions is stored and 
accessed. But it is a plausible initial one. Prima facie, then, convention theory fits 
the experimental data quite well.45 
                                                 
45  Other methods are also being used to test theories of scalar implicature. In one of the first 
studies of its kind, Bezuidenhout and Morris used eye movement monitoring to detect how long 
participants took to read different regions of a sentence, indicating the different processing demands 
each region made (Bezuidenhout and Morris 2004). Their aim was to compare Levinson’s view 
(they call it the Default Model, DM) on which scalar terms automatically trigger Q-implicatures, 
and models such as those discussed in section 3.5 above, where expressions such as ‘some’ are 
semantically underspecified and undergo a process of contextually cued pragmatic enrichment 
(Bezuidenhout and Morris call this the Underspecification Model). Participants were asked to read 
passages such as the following, in which a ‘some’ sentence is followed by a sentence explicitly 
cancelling the supposed ‘not all’ implicature:  
Some books had colour pictures. In fact all of them did, which is why the teachers 
liked them.  
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5.2 Developmental studies 
Experimental work has also been done on the development of implicature 
processing in children. In a pioneering study, Ira Noveck ran a series of 
experiments to test competence with scalar implicature in French children and 
adults (Noveck 2001).  
 In one experiment, participants were presented with underinformative ‘some’ 
sentences (such as ‘Some elephants have trunks’) and control sentences, and asked 
to say whether they agreed with them. Noveck found that, whereas most adults 
rejected the underinformative sentences, the majority of the children accepted 
them (89% of eight-year-olds and 85% of ten-year-olds accepted them, as opposed 
to 41% of adults), suggesting that most of the children were adopting the logical 
reading of ‘some’ and not deriving the implicature ‘not all’. (The children correctly 
evaluated control sentences.) Noveck obtained similar results using the scalar 
terms ‘might’ and ‘must’. When asked to assess a claim that something might be 
the case (for example, ‘There might be a parrot in the box’) in a condition in which 
they knew it must be the case, children were much more likely than adults to accept 
the sentence as true (such sentences were accepted by 80% of seven-year olds, 
69% of nine-year-olds, and 35% of adults). Again, this indicates that children tend 
to adopt a logical interpretation of the modal term, treating ‘might’ as meaning 
                                                 
Bezuidenhout and Morris reasoned that if participants don’t make the scalar inference by default 
when reading the first sentence, but simply start searching for the most contextually appropriate 
enrichment of ‘some’ (in line with the UM), then they should spend more time on the word ‘all’, 
since it is a strong clue that ‘some and possibly all’ is the appropriate enrichment. On the other 
hand, if participants automatically make the scalar implicature to ‘not all’ (as the DM model 
predicts), then they will not be pulled up by ‘all’ since they already have an interpretation of ‘some’, 
and it is not until they reach ‘them did’ that it becomes clear that this interpretation is wrong (‘all’ 
might have governed some other predicate). They should thus spend more time processing the 
words ‘them did’, which indicate the need for reinterpretation. The results favoured UM rather than 
DM. In comparison with control sentences in which (for example) ‘The books’ was substituted for 
‘Some books’, participants spent more time processing ‘all’ and actually spent less time processing 
‘them did’.  
  182
‘possibly and perhaps necessarily’, whereas most adults adopt a pragmatic reading, 
taking the affirmation of possibility to implicate the denial of necessity (Noveck 
2001). Noveck concluded that logical interpretations of scalar terms are 
developmentally primary and that children are, in a sense, more logical than 
adults.  
 Noveck’s findings have been replicated by other researchers (see, for example, 
Guasti et al. 2005, Experiment 1; Papafragou and Musolino 2003, Experiment 1; 
Pouscoulous et al. 2007, Experiment 1). Children, it seems, do not spontaneously 
make scalar inferences. There is evidence, however, that they do have the ability 
to make them, given suitable prompting. After confirming five-year-olds’ apparent 
lack of sensitivity to scalar implicature, Papafragou and Musolino went on to see 
if they could improve the children’s performance by training them to detect 
pragmatic infelicity. They prepared the children by telling them stories in which a 
character said ‘silly things’, which were true but inappropriate (for example, 
describing a dog as ‘a little animal with four legs’) and asking how the character 
might ‘say it better’. They also changed the experimental task itself (which 
involved assessing descriptions of acted-out stories) to make it clear that it was 
relevant to know whether or not the stronger statements were true.46 The result was 
that a much higher proportion of the children rejected underinformative ‘some’ 
statements (52.5% of five-year-olds as opposed to only 12.5% in the previous 
experiment).47 Moreover, the children who rejected them justified their answer by 
pointing out that the stronger term was applicable (Papafragou and Musolino 
2003).  
                                                 
46  For example, the children would hear about a character Mickey, who had been challenged to 
put all his hoops round a pole, and, after trying hard, had succeeded. They would then hear Minnie 
respond to a question about how Mickey had done by saying ‘Mickey put some of his hoops round 
the pole’. The children would then be asked if Minnie had answered well (Papafragou and 
Musolino 2003, p.271).  
47  The children were also tested on the scales <finish, start> and <three, two>, and showed similar 
increases in pragmatic responding (47.5% vs 10% on <finish, start>, and 90% vs 65% on <three, 
two>. The experiments were conducted with Greek-speaking children. 
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 Other studies have confirmed this. Feeney et al. found that in pragmatically 
rich contexts (using storyboards and photographs to tell a story and asking 
participants to assess claims made by one of the characters) only 21% of seven-to-
eight-year-olds adopted the logical reading of ‘some’, as opposed to 57% on a 
simple sentence verification task (Feeney et al. 2004, Experiment 2). Similarly, 
Guasti et al. found that in a realistic conversational setting where all the relevant 
evidence was easily accessible, seven-year-olds derived scalar implicatures at 
adult levels (Guasti et al. 2005, Experiment 4). Guasti et al. note, however, that the 
same does not go for younger children. In tests, only half of five-year-olds rejected 
underinformative statements, even when the statements were presented in a natural 
way (although the ones that did so, did so consistently) (Chierchia et al. 2001; 
Papafragou and Musolino 2003). Guasti et al. suggest that at that age some children 
simply lack the knowledge or ability to derive scalar implicatures, either because 
the weaker expression does not activate the contrasting stronger one or because 
the inference from the affirmation of the former to the denial of the latter isn’t 
made (Guasti et al. 2005, p.694).48 
 A possible weakness in some of the experiments reviewed is that they required 
young children to make metalinguistic judgements (judgements about how well a 
character had described a situation). These tasks may have been too demanding 
for younger children, hiding their pragmatic competence. In an ingenious 
experiment, Yi Ting Huang and Jesse Snedeker sought to get round this problem 
by using pictures and eye-tracking (Huang and Snedeker 2009). They presented 
five-year-old children with a range of pictures showing four characters, two boys 
and two girls, each of whom had a number of items, either socks or soccer balls 
(but not both). While looking at one of these pictures, the children then heard an 
instruction of the following form:  
 
                                                 
48  However, in another study where the task was naturalistic and informational demands clear, 
children of four-to-five years made scalar inferences at a high level. This extended to particularized 
scalar implicatures, dependent on nonce scales. For example, if a character was asked whether it 
had wrapped two presents and replied that it had wrapped one of them, 90% of children detected 
the implicature that it had not wrapped the other (Papafragou and Tantalou 2004). 
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Point to the girl/boy that has some/all/two/three of the socks/soccer balls. 
 
Their eye movements were recorded as they listened to the instruction and looked 
for the intended target.  
 The pictures were designed in such a way that when ‘all’, ‘two’, or ‘three’ were 
used in the quantifier position, the identity of the target could be inferred from 
gender and quantifier alone, and the children tended to look to the target, even 
before processing the final words (‘socks’ or ‘soccer balls’). When ‘some’ was 
used, however, the identity of the target remained uncertain unless ‘some’ was 
interpreted pragmatically (for example, the relevant options might be a girl with 
two socks and a girl with all the balls). The final words of the instruction then 
resolved the ambiguity in favour of the pragmatic reading. Huang and Snedeker 
reasoned that if children made the scalar inference when they processed ‘some’, 
then they would look to the correct target before the end of the sentence. In fact, 
they did not, but delayed looking to the target until they heard the disambiguating 
words at the end, suggesting that they had not derived the implicature.  
 Variants of the experiment confirmed this. When the pictures were adjusted so 
that ‘some’ identified the correct target whichever reading was adopted (when, for 
example, the relevant options were a girl with a subset of the socks or a girl with 
no socks at all), the children looked to the correct target before the end of the 
sentence. In a final version of the experiment, ‘some’ was ambiguous, and the 
pragmatic reading of it now indicated the wrong target (for example, a girl with a 
subset of the balls, when in fact the correct target was a girl with all the socks). 
Huang and Snedeker predicted that if children were drawing the scalar inference, 
they would take longer to look to the correct target at the end, since they would 
have to correct an original misidentification. In fact, the adjustment made no 
difference; the children looked to the correct target just as quickly when it was 
inconsistent with the scalar inference as when it was not. In all of the experiments, 
the results from adult participants showed the opposite tendency, indicating that 
they were drawing the scalar implicature.  
 As Huang and Snedeker note, this evidence for children’s lack of competence 
with scalar implicature presents a puzzle (Huang and Snedeker 2009, p.1737). For 
young children are very good at certain kinds of pragmatic processing, in particular 
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at learning new words through interpreting speakers’ communicative intentions. 
Why then are they so slow to master scalar implicature? Huang and Snedeker 
suggest that it is because pragmatic processes play different roles in word learning 
and scalar implicature. In word learning children infer meanings directly from non-
linguistic evidence of the speaker’s intentions, such as pointing. The pragmatic 
process is a top-down one, from intentions to meanings, and it can proceed without 
any prior semantic processing. In the case of scalar implicature, the process is 
bottom up. The child must start with an analysis of word meaning and move from 
that to an implicated meaning — which is a much more demanding task. Huang 
and Snedeker note that other tasks that are hard for young children, such as 
interpreting irony and metaphor, are also of this bottom-up kind: 
 
In each case, pragmatic success requires listeners to calculate an 
interpretation that builds upon but goes beyond the initial linguistic 
meaning. These postsemantic processes may be particularly difficult, 
because they require that some feature of the child’s initial analysis be 
revised. (Huang and Snedeker 2009, p.1737) 
  
 To sum up then: The experimental data strongly suggest that (a) children 
initially adopt a logical reading of scalar terms, (b) pragmatic competence 
increases with age, and (c) children (of seven years and up at least) can derive 
scalar implicatures if they are provided with suitable contextual assistance.  
 These results are not what neo-Gricean theory would predict. If the language 
comprehension system applies the Q-principle automatically, then children should 
find the pragmatic reading of scalar terms natural and should not need contextual 
help to derive scalar implicatures. Instead, it should be the logical reading that they 
find hard to master, since its application will involve cancelling the default 
pragmatic one. Levinson might reply that the Q-principle is initially applied in a 
slow and effortful way and only later becomes automatized, but this does not fit 
well with his view that it is an evolutionary adaptation designed to alleviate the 
articulatory bottleneck.49  
                                                 
49 Levinson writes: 
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 Relevance theory, on the other hand, predicts the experimental results. If 
logical interpretations of scalar terms are more accessible than pragmatic ones, and 
if pragmatic interpretations are derived only when required to satisfy expectations 
of relevance, then we should expect children to derive scalar implicatures less 
often than adults. For children are typically less aware of informational demands 
and opportunities than adults and have more limited cognitive resources, which 
means that they will have lower expectations of relevance and will find 
implicatures more costly to process and hence less relevant. Likewise, relevance 
theory predicts that children will draw more implicatures if the context is adjusted 
to raise their informational expectations and make implicature derivation easier, 
as they in fact do.  
 Again, however, there are other options besides neo-Griceanism and relevance 
theory, not typically considered in the experimental literature. First, the data are 
broadly compatible with convention theory. It would not be surprising if children 
learn the first-order rules that govern literal meaning before the second-order rules 
that govern sentence implicatures. (As noted earlier, Davis predicts that second-
language learners will be slower to learn second-order rules, and it may be that 
children are slower to acquire them in their first language; Davis 1998, p.159.)50 
However, children who have not mastered the conventions for scalar implicature 
might still be able to work out individual scalar implicatures in a particularized 
way, drawing on contextual clues and theorizing about the speaker’s intentions. 
This would explain why children derive more scalar implicatures when tested on 
                                                 
Now it is quite clear that … intelligent agents with the asymmetrical abilities in 
thinking and speaking I have just elucidated, would find a way around the 
articulatory bottleneck (just as, as a matter of fact, evolution has). The essential 
asymmetry is: inference is cheap, articulation expensive, and thus the design 
requirements are for a system that maximizes inference. (Levinson 2000, p.29) 
50  It should be stressed that Davis himself does not commit to the second claim and does not rule 
out the possibility that first-language learners can master a language’s implicature conventions 
simultaneously with its literal meaning conventions (personal communication).  
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statements produced in realistic conversational settings where contextual clues are 
available.  
 In this context, it is interesting to note that there is evidence that word choice 
affects derivation of scalar implicatures in children. Pouscoulous et al. found that 
French nine-year-olds were more likely to draw scalar implicatures when 
‘quelques’ was used for ‘some’ instead of ‘certains’, even though their responses 
on control problems showed that they understood the meaning of ‘certains’ 
(Pouscoulos et al. 2007). (42% adopted the logical reading when ‘certains’ was 
used, as against 0% when ‘quelques’ was; the change made no significant 
difference to adults’ responses.) This result is difficult for neo-Griceans to explain, 
since the words have the same meaning and should both automatically trigger 
application of the Q-principle. Pouscoulous et al. suggest that ‘certains’ is a more 
complex word semantically, which uses up extra processing resources, leaving 
fewer free for implicature processing — an explanation that fits well with 
relevance theory. But convention theorists might offer another explanation, 
suggesting that the implicature conventions governing the two words are different 
and that those associated with ‘certains’ take longer to learn.  
 Second, the data are compatible with weak neo-Griceanism. The evidence 
indicates that scalar inferences are not drawn automatically whenever scalar 
expressions are processed, but this is compatible with the view that they are drawn 
in a more effortful way, when contextually cued. Indeed, there is evidence that 
even very young children of three-to-four years can draw scalar inferences from 
contextually salient orderings of non-linguistic stimuli (Stiller et al. 2011; see also 
Papafragou and Tantalou 2004). 
 
5.3 Tentative conclusions 
Three tentative conclusions can be drawn from the experimental research 
surveyed. First, the data do not support neo-Griceanism as developed by Levinson. 
Evidence from reaction-time studies and developmental studies suggests that the 
default reading of scalar terms is the logical one, and that scalar implicature 
processing is relatively effortful. Second, the data are compatible with the 
relevance theory. Third, the data are also compatible with other theories of 
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This chapter has looked at the Gricean framework from the perspective of 
implicature recovery and linguistic analysis, focusing in particular on the neo-
Gricean case for the existence of a class of generalized implicatures derived by the 
default application of certain general inferential principles. The survey and 
discussion has necessarily been selective, but it has been sufficient to raise doubts 
about the neo-Gricean project, at least in the strong form proposed by Levinson. 
Our examination of Q- I- and M- principles suggests that supposedly generalized 
implicatures are in fact much more context-sensitive than neo-Griceans suppose, 
and that default inferences would often need to be cancelled — slowing down, 
rather than speeding up, the interpretation process. Moreover, the results of 
experimental work on scalar implicature are at least prima facie incompatible with 
neo-Griceanism. 
 The chapter also briefly introduced some alternative approaches to implicature 
recovery, including relevance theory, convention theory (in a cognitive form), and 
what I called weak neo-Griceanism. I have argued that each of these alternatives 
has some advantages over neo-Griceanism, but I have not advocated one of them 
in particular. (I shall return to this topic briefly in the final chapter and suggest that 
elements of different alternative approaches might be combined.)  
  I noted at the beginning of this chapter that neo-Griceanism can be seen as 
offering a theory of implicature generation, with utterances being understood to 
possess the implicatures they would be interpreted as having according to the GCI 
principles. Thus, in assessing neo-Griceanism, we have, in effect, also been 
assessing this simplified and restricted version of the Gricean framework. If the 
concerns raised in the course of this chapter are sound, then this assessment must 
be largely negative. If the GCI principles did typically guide our interpretation of 
utterances in the way neo-Griceans claim, then it would be plausible to give them 
                                                 
51 For further discussion of the experimental literature on scalar implicature, and exploration of its 
connections with ‘dual-process’ theories of reasoning, see Frankish and Kasmirli 2010. 
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this sort of normative status. We could treat them as regularizations of normal 
practice, and use them to judge specific cases. However, the examples we have 
considered suggest that the principles do not play the role claimed for them. Even 
if they do have some role in interpretation (especially, perhaps, the Q-principle), 
they are not applied by default, in a context-independent way. Details of context 
and speaker intention can colour implicature recovery even in supposedly 
generalized cases. Moreover, in so far as there are general patterns of implicature 
associated with some expressions, these may be better explained as arising from 
conventions of use rather than GCI principles. So even this limited, simplified 
version of the Gricean framework looks unpromising. Of course, we could still 
give the principles a normative status and try to revise our practice to bring it in 
line with them, but it is hard to see why we should accept such artificial norms, 
which do not reflect our actual practice or the psychological processes underlying 
it. 
 Neo-Griceanism is a bold and elegant theory, but (like the Gricean framework 
that inspired it) it is too ambitious. Even apparently generalized implicatures can 








Taking stock and looking forward 
 
This short final chapter takes stock and makes some suggestions for future work. 
The first section is retrospective, briefly revisiting the major themes from the thesis 
and giving tentative answers to some of the questions posed in the opening chapter. 
The second section builds on these conclusions to offer some speculations about 
the function and ethics of implicature.  
 
1. Taking stock 
1.1 The Gricean framework 
The main focus of this thesis has been Grice’s account of how implicatures are 
generated (‘the Gricean framework’), which I introduced in Chapter 2. I raised a 
number of objections to the account, but the key ones centred around Grice’s claim 
that implicatures can be calculated from general conversational principles. This is 
an elegant and attractive idea, but I argued that it is wrong to think that there is this 
kind of rational connection between utterances and what they implicate. The 
relevant arguments in Chapters 3 and 4 can be seen as presenting a dilemma for 
Grice. If his account is construed as a descriptive one, which aims to explain our 
intuitions about what implicatures utterances possess, then it gives the wrong 
results, predicting implicatures that we do not take to be there and denying the 
existence of ones we do. If construed as a normative theory, which aims to 
establish speaker-independent norms of implicature, then it avoids many of the 
previous objections but ultimately fails on its own terms. The discussion of this 




A key question addressed in this thesis was whether it is possible to provide 
speaker-independent norms of implicature, which hold for all implicatures, 
including particularized ones. Following Saul, I argued that Grice’s account is best 
understood as aiming to provide such norms, and I proposed various revisions to 
it to make it more consistent with this aim. However, in Chapter 4, I went on to 
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argue that the account nevertheless fails. Grice identifies what an utterance 
implicates with the supposition required to preserve the assumption that the 
speaker is being cooperative, but I argued that there is no way to determine what 
this supposition is without drawing on information about the speaker, including 
their background beliefs, intentions, and values.  
 I then proposed an intention-centred account of implicature which retained a 
normative element. According to this, what an utterance implicates is (roughly) 
what a typical audience would take the speaker to intend it to convey. Since this 
may be different from what the speaker actually intended it to convey, this gives 
implicature a normative dimension and allows for the possibility that an utterance 
may implicate something that the speaker does not in fact want to convey. I noted, 
however, that this account does not provide speaker-independent norms of 
implicature, since how a typical audience would interpret an utterance may depend 
on facts about the particular speaker, and similar utterances may generate different 
implicatures when produced by different speakers. I strongly suspect that speaker-
independent norms of implicature are not in fact available and that this weak 
normative conception is the strongest we can hope for.  
 
1.3 Speaker intentions  
The role of speaker intentions in implicature has been another theme of the thesis. 
It surfaced first in Chapter 2, where we saw that there is a tension in Grice’s work 
on implicature. On the one hand, it is plausible to think that Grice regards what a 
speaker implicates as one aspect of what they mean, from which it follows that 
implicatures must be backed by appropriate communicative intentions of the sort 
Grice takes to be involved in speaker meaning. Yet there is no mention of speaker 
intentions in Grice’s definition of implicature itself. In Chapter 3 I proposed that 
we could resolve this tension by making a distinction between what an utterance 
implicates and what a speaker implicates, where an utterance implicates that q if 
the Gricean conditions for implicature are met, and a speaker implicates that q if 
they produce an utterance that implicates that q and also themselves mean that q.  
 The issue arose again in Chapter 4, where I argued that Gricean theory should 
acknowledge a greater role for speaker intentions in implicature. The theory 
identifies what an utterance implicates with what the speaker must be supposed to 
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believe in order to make sense of their utterance as a cooperative conversational 
contribution. But, I argued, this supposition cannot be calculated without drawing 
on information about the speaker’s attitudes, including their intentions with regard 
to the appropriate background assumptions to use in making the calculation. Thus, 
what an utterance implicates may depend indirectly on the speaker’s intentions. I 
argued that this undermined the idea that the Gricean framework provides speaker-
independent norms of implicature, and, given this, I suggested that there was no 
reason to deny speaker intentions a more direct role in determining what utterances 
implicate.   
 By giving intentions such a role, I argued, we can resolve many of the problems 
considered in Chapter 3, where a Gricean calculation fails to fix a determinate 
implicated content. I argued that giving speaker intentions this role need not 
involve adopting a Humpty Dumpty theory of implicature, since we can retain a 
normative condition concerning how a typical audience would interpret the 
utterance.  
 
1.4 An intention-centred account  
Developing the idea just mentioned, I sketched an intention-centred account of 
implicature that retained a normative element. I proposed that an utterance 
implicates q (where q is not its literal meaning) if it makes q available, where this 
means that a typical audience would identify q as the speaker’s intended meaning, 
inferring this from an open-ended range of evidence. This view is intention-
centred, since what an utterance makes available is what the hearer thinks the 
speaker intended to convey. However, it also retains a normative element, since a 
speaker may give inadequate or misleading evidence of their intentions, with the 
result that what their utterance makes available differs from what they intended to 
convey.  
 
1.5 Generalized implicatures 
Since my aim in this thesis was to assess the Gricean framework as a global theory 
of implicature, I focused heavily on particularized implicatures, which present the 
hardest cases for the framework. However, this left open the possibility that 
Gricean principles might explain a more limited cla
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independent implicatures. We looked at this possibility in Chapter 5, which 
discussed neo-Gricean theories, according to which hearers derive generalized 
implicatures by applying simple interpretative principles closely related to Grice’s 
maxims. (As I explained, these theories can also be construed as theories of 
implicature generation, which make predictions similar to Grice’s own.) The 
subject is a complex and technical one, but I raised a number of concerns about 
the approach, arguing that there are many exceptions to the implicature patterns 
predicted by neo-Griceanism and that it is unlikely that we apply neo-Gricean 
principles automatically and by default. A review of work in experimental 
pragmatics offered support for this conclusion, suggesting that implicature 
recovery is a context-driven process. At best, I suggested, a weak neo-Griceanism 
may be defensible, according to which neo-Gricean principles play a role in 
interpretation but contextual factors determine when and how they are applied.  
 Chapter 5 also considered the possibility that some generalized implicatures 
arise from language-specific conventions of use. There may be conventions within 
a language community that certain expressions, used with their literal meaning, 
convey something else. I suggested that this may offer a more economical 
explanation of some cases (such as ‘an X’ implicatures), but other points made in 
the chapter indicated the need for a cautionary approach to the convention view. I 
argued that scalar implicatures are attractively explained as due to context-
sensitive applications of the Q-principle, in the way Hirschberg proposes, rather 
than to conventions. And, of course, the numerous exceptions to supposedly 
generalized implicatures pose as much a problem for convention theory as for neo-
Griceanism. If there are implicature conventions, then, it seems, we do not follow 
them strictly and without regard for context. A proper assessment of convention 
theory would, however, require detailed work in historical and cross-cultural 
linguistics.  
 Under scrutiny, then, the view that there is a clearly defined class of 
generalized implicatures breaks down, and, with it, the idea that there are any 
genuinely context-independent norms of implicature. Rather, we find a continuum 
of cases from more to less particularized, differing in the relative roles played by 
contextual factors and general principles or conventions.  
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1.6 Implicature recovery 
This thesis did not attempt to survey and assess the range of theories of implicature 
recovery. The discussion in Chapter 5 was focused on neo-Griceanism, and rival 
theories were discussed mainly in order to provide contrast with it. The conclusion 
of the chapter was that neo-Griceanism was an unpromising approach, at least in 
a strong form, but I did not attempt to adjudicate between the rival theories, nor 
did I discuss the recovery of particularized implicatures. However, some points 
fall out naturally from the wider discussion, and I shall make them briefly here.  
 First, given my emphasis on the role of context in implicature and my 
scepticism about the existence of generalized implicatures, relevance theory would 
be the natural complement to the view of implicature generation I have advocated. 
I take it that relevance theory is consistent with the idea that hearers attempt to 
detect speakers’ communicative intentions, as on the intention-centred account I 
sketched. If speakers intend to provide their hearers with optimally relevant inputs 
(as relevance theory says they should), then in searching for the optimally relevant 
interpretation of an utterance, the hearer is in effect trying to detect the speaker’s 
intentions. (In fact, this seems to be the view that relevance theorists take; see, for 
example Wilson and Sperber, 2004.)1 This need not, I suggest, exclude a role for 
implicature conventions or even general principles, if applied in a context-sensitive 
way. Knowledge of conventions could feed into the search for optimally relevant 
interpretations just as knowledge of word meanings and idioms does. And if 
considerations of relevance dictate it, general principles might be applied to derive 
enriched interpretations (as in the Henry and Mary example in section 2.1 of 
Chapter 5). While I do not wish to make a positive commitment to a theory of 
                                                 
1  They write, for example: 
Understanding is achieved when the communicative intention is fulfilled — that 
is, when the audience recognizes the informative intention ... According to 
relevance theory, use of an ostensive stimulus may create precise and predictable 
expectations of relevance not raised by other inputs. ... we will describe these 
expectations and show how they may help to identify the communicator’s 
meaning. (Wilson and Sperber, 2004, p.611) 
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implicature recovery at this point, I feel that a pluralistic relevance-driven 
approach of this kind would be a natural path to explore, for those persuaded by 
the arguments in this thesis.  
 
2. Looking forward 
In Chapter 1 I promised to say something about the ethics of implicature, and I 
shall close by doing this. What follows is tentative and speculative, though it 
derives from the earlier discussion. 
 I will begin with some remarks about the social function of implicature, which 
is a topic that has, I think, received too little attention in the literature. Theorists 
often write as if the function of implicature is purely communicative. For Grice, 
implicating something is a way of making a cooperative contribution to a 
conversational exchange, and a message is implicated only if it can be interpreted 
as cooperative.2 Neo-Griceans such as Levinson hold that generalized implicatures 
increase the efficiency of communication. And relevance theorists assume that 
speakers aim to produce optimally relevant utterances, which convey as much 
information as they are able and willing to provide. But is this the whole story? 
We certainly do use implicature to communicate, but why do we sometimes choose 
to implicate a message rather than speaking literally? What is the distinctive 
function of implicature? 
 If the distinctive function of implicature were to improve communication. then 
it does not seem very well suited to it. As we have seen, particularized implicatures 
often depend on subtle contextual cues and knowledge of the speaker’s attitudes 
and habits, and even relatively generalized implicatures require more than simple 
application of interpretative maxims. If anything, use of implicature would be 
likely to impede communication, increasing demands on hearers and creating 
many new opportunities for misunderstanding and confusion. If effective 
                                                 
2  It is true (as noted in Chapter 2), that Grice recognizes the existence of a class of 
nonconversational nonconventional implicatures, which are generated by other maxims, including 
aesthetic, social, and moral ones (Grice 1975/1989, p.28). However, he says very little about such 
implicatures, and the overwhelming focus in the Gricean literature is on conversational implicature.  
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communication were our sole aim, it would surely be advisable to avoid 
implicature.  
 What other functions might implicature have? I noted Davis’s claim that we 
can use implicature to be polite and stylish (Davis 1998, p.174), and I illustrated 
how considerations of tact might promote the use of a certain implicature practice 
(Chapter 5, section 3.4). I have no doubt that implicature does serve these 
purposes, but I want to make a further suggestion, inspired by the conclusions 
reached in this thesis.  
 I have argued that implicature is context-dependent to a greater degree than is 
recognized within the Gricean tradition. In particular, an implicature may depend 
on facts about the particular speaker, and may be designed for a specific class of 
hearers. Even supposedly generalized implicatures, I have argued, may depend on 
awareness of contextual factors, such as recognition of a contextually salient 
ordering or a shared convention of use. For a purely communicative practice, this 
would be a disadvantage, but perhaps it hints at an important function of 
implicature. Perhaps a function of implicature is to establish a bond between 
speaker and hearer that goes beyond that of simple information exchange. In 
making use of implicature, a speaker invites their hearer to engage with them in a 
more intimate way than is required for literal communication, drawing on shared 
experiences, assumptions, values, and conventions. The speaker invites the hearer 
to read between the lines — to become, as it were, a partner in the communicative 
act, completing it for themselves. And in doing this, it may be that they are 
signalling something about their attitude to the hearer — that like them, share their 
values, feel a rapport with them (or want to establish one).  
 In employing implicature, speakers may also make an implicit offer. If 
implicature use demands more from the hearer, then perhaps it signals that the 
speaker is offering more, too — that they will be more open, confiding, honest. In 
order to interpret an implicature the hearer must get on the same wavelength as the 
speaker, and once they have tuned in, they may expect to receive a special 
message. In these and other ways, implicature use may be seen as an invitation to 
trust the speaker.  
 If this is right, then I think it casts a new light on the ethics of implicature. The 
duties of the implicature user are not simply those of the cooperative 
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communicator (to be truthful, informative, relevant, and so on) but also those of 
someone who offered a sort of intimacy and invited trust. A person using 
implicature to mislead is not merely being uncooperative, but, in a minor way, 
betraying a trust. And this brings us back at last to Mr Bronston. Mr Bronston used 
implicature to mislead the court. (I take it that he did this intentionally; if the real 
Mr Bronston did not, then assume I am talking about a fictional one who did.) He 
invited the lawyer questioning him to read between the lines of what he said, as if 
they trusted each other, and he exploited the lawyer’s willingness to accept his 
invitation. But it was not only Mr Bronston who was at fault. In court there is no 
place for the trusting communicative relationship that implicature creates. Chief 
Justice Burger was right; it was the questioning lawyer’s duty to challenge Mr 
Bronston’s answer, and in accepting it, they were negligent.  
 I am suggesting, then, that in order to understand the role of implicature and to 
address the ethical issues it raises, we need to take a broader view of the 
communicative situation and consider the personal relation that implicature use 
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